Summary
dismissing the plaintiff's deliberate indifference to medical care claim where the plaintiff alleged that “he was completely denied medical care following his exposure to chemical agents” but “failed to allege that he suffered an injury that was sufficiently serious” despite alleging that he experienced “breathing difficulties, chest pains, blurry vision, dizzyness, skin burning/irritation, trauma, anxiety.”
Summary of this case from Sitts v. SimondsOpinion
21-cv-1810 (JGK)
04-26-2022
PETER RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN COHALL, ET AL., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
John G. Koeltl United States District Judge
The pro se plaintiff, Peter Rodriguez, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants, Captain Cohall, Correction Officer Gadsen, Correction Officer Felipe, and the City of New York, violated his civil rights. The defendants now move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 41(b). For the following reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
I.
The following allegations are taken from the complaint and accepted as true for the purposes of resolving the motion to dismiss. On or about September 24, 2020, while the plaintiff was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee on Rikers Island, correction officers were involved in an altercation with another inmate that resulted in the use of chemical agents. Compl. at 4. The plaintiff was close to this altercation and alleges that the officers' use of chemical agents against the other inmate aggravated the plaintiff's asthma and caused the plaintiff to experience symptoms including chest pain, breathing difficulties, and blurred vision. Id. The plaintiff notified Cohall, Gadsen, and Felipe, who were the correction officers on the scene at the time, that he required immediate medical treatment to address the symptoms that he was experiencing. Id. The correction officers dismissed the plaintiff's requests and failed to provide the plaintiff with access to medical treatment. Id. at 4-5. The plaintiff alleges that this denial of access to medical care caused him "unnecessary pain and suffering" and constituted excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id. at 5. The plaintiff further alleges that there is a "continued" and "widespread" custom amongst New York City Department of Corrections ("DOC") officers to deny inmates necessary medical care. Id. at 6-7. The plaintiff contends that the City is aware of this widespread practice, which is the result of the City's failure to train and supervise adequately its correction officers. Id.
The defendants now move to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute and for failure to state a claim.
II
The defendants contend that the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), if "the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it." Courts consider the following factors when determining whether to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b):
1) the duration of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the court order, (2) whether plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal, (3) whether the defendants are likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings, (4) a balancing of the court's interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff's interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard, and (5) whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal.Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996).
Unless otherwise noted, this Memorandum Opinion and Order omits all alterations, citations, footnotes, and internal quotation marks in quoted text.
The defendants argue that all five factors weigh in favor of dismissal because: (1) at the time that the motion to dismiss was filed, the plaintiff had failed to notify the Court of his updated address, which caused these proceedings to be delayed; and (2) the plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint in violation of the Court's orders. The defendants' arguments are without merit.
First, although it appears that the plaintiff changed his address without notifying the Court at some point before the defendants filed their motion to dismiss, the defendants were apparently able to determine the plaintiff's address and serve their motion papers on the plaintiff. See ECF No. 28. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed his opposition to the defendants'' motion to dismiss and has since kept the Court apprised of his subsequent changes of address. See ECF Nos. 33-34. Accordingly, the defendants cannot claim credibly that the plaintiff's failure to notify them as to his change of address and any resulting modest delay of these proceedings prejudiced them in any meaningful way. Moreover, it would be inappropriate to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for failure to prosecute because he responded to the defendants' motion and is now actively prosecuting his claims and keeping the Court and the parties apprised of any changes of his address.
Second, the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's failure to file an amended complaint constituted a violation of the Court's orders fails. These orders were simply giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint if he wanted to do so and were not commands that the plaintiff amend his complaint or have his case dismissed. See ECF Nos. 20, 23.
In sum, the plaintiff has not failed to prosecute this action or litigated this action in a way that violated any order of this Court. It would therefore be unwarranted and unfair to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on this basis, with or without prejudice. Finally, the defendants have not been prejudiced by the plaintiff's conduct. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute is denied.
III
The defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court's function on a motion to dismiss is "not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985). The Court should not dismiss the complaint if the plaintiff has stated "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) .
When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider documents that are referenced in the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff's possession or that the plaintiff knew of when bringing suit, or matters of which judicial notice may be taken. See Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 776 (2d Cir. 2002).
When faced with a pro se complaint, the Court must "construe [the] complaint liberally and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests." Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). "Even in a pro se case, however, . . . threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. Thus, although the Court is "obligated to draw the most favorable inferences" that the complaint supports, it "cannot invent factual allegations that [the plaintiff] has not pled." Id.; see Benavides v. Grier, No. 09-cv-8600, 2011 WL 43521, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2011).
The Court has reviewed the plaintiff's complaint and construes it to raise federal claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) deliberate indifference to medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) municipal liability against the City of New York. The Court also has an obligation to consider potential state law claims raised in a pro se plaintiff's complaint even where, as here, the plaintiff appears only to have referenced explicitly federal causes of action. See Taylor v. Quayyum, No. 16-CV-1143, 2021 WL 6065743, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2021) (citing McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2017)).
Accordingly, the Court also construes the plaintiff's complaint to raise the following state law claims: (1) battery; (2) assault; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id.
A.
The defendants move to dismiss all the plaintiff's claims on the basis that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust all administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA provides that "no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Id.
"Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, not a pleading requirement." Williams v. Correction Officer Prianto, 829 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2016). "Accordingly, inmates are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints." Id. "However, a district court still may dismiss a complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies if it is clear on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff did not satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement." Id.
The defendants advance a conclusory argument that the plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust relevant DOC administrative remedies is clear from the face of the complaint. See Motion at 9 (citing Compl. at 8). In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged in relevant part that "staff complaints are not subjected to [the] grievance process. In addition to N.Y.C. D.O.C. employees intimidating me[, ] 311 complaint was made." Compl. at 9. The defendants contend that these allegations demonstrate that the plaintiff failed to comply with a DOC directive regarding inmate grievance procedures.
The defendants' argument fails. First, the defendants cite the entirety of a DOC directive in support of their argument, but do not attempt to explain which specific provisions of the directive the plaintiff allegedly failed to comply with. In any event, it is far from clear from these allegations that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all relevant administrative remedies or that exhaustion was not excused. See, e.g., Hubbs v. Suffolk County Sherriff's Dep't, 788 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that the exhaustion requirement may be excused "if the plaintiff can demonstrate that other factors - for example, threats from correction officers - rendered a nominally available procedure unavailable as a matter of fact."). Because the defendants' entitlement to a failure to exhaust administrative remedies affirmative defense is not clear from the face of the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint on this basis is denied.
B.
The defendants argue that the plaintiff's claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs should be dismissed. A claim for deliberate indifference, when brought by a pretrial detainee, is "governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Taylor, 2021 WL 6065743, at *6 (quoting Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017)). A claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs has two elements. "The first requirement is objective: the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care must be sufficiently serious." Spavone v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). "The second requirement is subjective: the charged officials must be subjectively reckless in their denial of medical care." Id. "The second element of a deliberate indifference claim - often referred to as the 'mens rea prong' -is to be assessed objectively." Taylor, 2021 WL 6065743, at *6.
With respect to the first element, "determining whether a deprivation is an objectively serious deprivation entails two inquiries." Salahuddln v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006). "The first inquiry is whether the prisoner was actually deprived of adequate medical care." Id. If so, the Court considers "whether the inadequacy of medical care is sufficiently serious." Id. at 280. "If the unreasonable medical care is a failure to provide any treatment for an inmate's medical condition, courts examine whether the inmate's medical condition is sufficiently serious." Id. "Factors relevant to the seriousness of a medical condition include whether a reasonable doctor or patient would find [it] important and worthy of comment, whether the condition significantly affects an individual's daily activities, and whether it causes chronic and substantial pain." Id.; see also Williams v. City of New York Dep't of Corr., No. 19-CV-9528, 2020 WL 3993929, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2020) (medical needs are "sufficiently serious" if they present a "condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain").
Here, the plaintiff alleges that he was completely denied medical care following his exposure to chemical agents. However, the plaintiff has failed to allege that he suffered an injury that was sufficiently serious to state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. The plaintiff alleged that the chemical agent aggravated his asthma and that he experienced "breathing difficulties, chest pains, blurry vision, dizzyness [sic], skin burning/irritation, trauma, [and] anxiety." Compl. at 4. Courts in this Circuit have found consistently that plaintiffs who complained of similar injuries arising out of exposure to chemical agents while in custody failed to plead adequately that they suffered sufficiently serious injuries. See, e.g., Taylor, 2021 WL 6065743, at *6 (observing that the "temporary discomfort caused by pepper spray does not constitute a sufficiently serious objective injury;" concluding that alleged injuries of "restricted breathing, [coughing], sneezing, burning of eyes and throat," skin irritation, and mental anguish following exposure were insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference); Williams, 2020 WL 3893929, at *4-5 (plaintiff with asthma whose exposure to chemical agents caused him to experience breathing difficulties and chest pain failed to plead a sufficiently serious injury); McArdle v. Ponte, No. 17-CV-2806, 2018 WL 5045337, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2018) (plaintiff who alleged that pepper spray exposure caused him "temporary vision loss, respiratory difficulties, and skin irritation" did not plead a sufficiently serious injury); Wright v. Trapasso, No. 15-cv-4428, 2018 WL 4688940, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018) (the plaintiff's "incredible discomfort as a result of the pepper spray does not rise to the level of seriousness required for a constitutional violation.").
In sum, the plaintiff has not alleged adequately that he suffered sufficiently serious injuries resulting from the September 24, 2020 incident. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs is dismissed without prejudice to replead.
The defendants do not advance any remaining arguments as to why the plaintiff's other causes of action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims for excessive force, municipal liability, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The Court has considered all of the parties' remaining arguments. To the extent not specifically addressed above, they are either moot or without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
The plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 28 days of the date of this Opinion. The plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint will replace, rather than supplement, the • current complaint. An amended complaint form, along with the unpublished decisions cited in this Opinion, are attached to this Opinion.
If the plaintiff does not file an amended complaint:
• The current dismissal of his claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs will be with prejudice;
• The plaintiff's remaining federal and state law claims will proceed;
• The defendants must answer the plaintiff's current complaint 14 days after the deadline for filing any amended complaint; and
• The parties must submit a Rule 26(f) report 21 days after the defendants file their answer.
If the plaintiff files an amended complaint, the defendants must move or answer with respect to the amended complaint within 21 days after it is filed. The defendants may move to dismiss any amended complaint without a pre-motion conference.
If the defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint, the plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss is due 21 days after the defendants serve the motion to dismiss on the plaintiff. The defendants' reply is due 10 days after the plaintiff files his opposition brief.
If the plaintiff files an amended complaint and the defendants answer, then the parties should file a Rule 26(f) report 21 days after the defendants file their answer.
The Clerk is directed to close all pending motions. The Clerk is further directed to mail a copy of this Opinion and its attachments to the plaintiff and to note service on the docket.
SO ORDERED.