Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-6017
March 11, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is Defendant City of Philadelphia's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Response thereto. Defendant Detective Bentancourt did not join in this motion. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss will be denied. The motion for summary judgment will be dismissed, without prejudice.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Defendants violated his Constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff's claims arise from his arrest by Police Detective Marta Betancourt on January 11, 2002 when he alleges the Defendants' actions deprived him of his right to be free from an unlawful detention, the unreasonable use of force, to be secure in his person and property, and to due process of law. In addition to the allegations of individual misconduct by the defendant officer, Plaintiff also alleges municipal liability stemming from the failure to properly train, supervise and discipline the individual defendant officer.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, moves for summary judgment.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A court should grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action only if it appears to a certainty that no relief could be granted under any set of facts which could be proved. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69. 73 (1984). The "notice pleading" approach governs the standard of specificity regarding motions to dismiss civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. InSwierliewicz v. Sorema, 122 S.Ct. 992 (2002), a unanimous Supreme Court stated,
[g]iven the Federal Rules' simplified standard for pleading, a court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. If the pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding. Moreover, claims lacking merit may be dealt with through summary judgment under Rule 56. The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus on the merits of a claim.Id. at 998-99 (internal citations omitted).
A court must accept as true all well pleaded allegations of the complaint in evaluating a motion to dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox. Rothschild. O'Brien Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, "a court need not credit a complaint's `bald assertions' or `legal conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss."Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Furthermore, because granting a motion to dismiss results in a determination on the merits at an early stage of the plaintiffs case, the district court must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989) (citations omitted).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate that, under the undisputed facts, the non-movant has failed to introduce evidence supporting a necessary element of his case." In Re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1243 (3d Cir. 1989). To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party must respond with facts of record that contradict the facts identified by the movant and may not rest on mere denials. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 n. 3 (1986). The non-moving party must demonstrate the existence of evidence that would support a jury finding in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). The evidence presented is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3rd Cir. 1983).
III. DISCUSSION
In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts violations of his Federal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a municipality to a plaintiff who has been deprived of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States when "under color of some official policy, a government `causes' an employee to violate another's constitutional rights." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692.See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To properly state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of a federally protected right and (2) the deprivation was committed by a state actor.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The Complaint avers defendant Bentancourt undertook an investigation of a homicide shooting alleged to have been committed by a member of her family in her capacity as a detective in the Philadelphia Police Department and asserting her authority as such. (Compl. at ¶ 7, 8, 16.) The Complaint also alleges a superior official authorized and/or acquiesced to the investigation. (Compl. at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff claims Defendant grabbed him, struck him in the mouth, threatened him and unlawfully arrested him. (Compl. at ¶ 12-15, 18.)
Upon review of the complaint and accepting the allegations as true, I conclude the Plaintiff's allegations are sufficiently pled to state of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I also conclude that at this early stage of litigation, without the benefit of discovery, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Officer Bentacourt was acting under color of law. Therefore, Defendant's alternative motion for summary judgment will be dismissed without prejudice. An appropriate order follows.