Opinion
CASE NO. 1268 CRD-6-91-7
MAY 15, 1992
The claimant was represented at trial by Richard Kascak, Esq. and on appeal by Paul S. Ranando, Esq., Law Office of Edward T. Dodd, Jr., Esq.
The respondents were represented by James L. Pomeranz, Esq., and Margaret Corrigan, Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton and Stabnick.
This Petition for Review from the July 23, 1991 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Sixth District was heard December 13, 1991 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi and Commissioners Frank Verrilli and A. Thomas White, Jr.
OPINION
At issue in respondents' appeal the commissioner's granting the claimant's motion under sec. 31-297(b) to preclude defenses and establish an irrebuttable presumption of compensability. Claimant sustained a low back injury during his employment with the employer respondent on May 28, 1985. The claim was initiated by an August 2, 1985 letter from claimant's counsel to the employer. The respondents contest the sufficiency of that letter as a Sec. 31-294 notice of claim.
On August 6, 1985 the counsel's August 2 letter was received by the employer; no question of its timeliness was raised as it obviously fell within the one year period prescribed by Sec. 31-294. The letter (Claimant's Exhibit I) stated:
This office represents Mr. Luis Rodriguez of 11 Orange Street, Waterbury, Connecticut for injuries he sustained earlier this year. To assist us in handling this case, we would be grateful if you would forward us copies of Mr. Rodriguez's work records and any medical reports or records you may have.
Our information is that Mr. Rodriguez was employed continuously by Bruce Manufacturing and Molding on a full-time basis from September 12, 1984 through April 25, 1985. From April 26 to about May 24, 1985 he was away from work for personal reasons over which he had absolutely no control. In late May, he returned to work full time but, after about a week was in such pain that he was required to seek medical care. We are advised that he went to St. Mary's Hospital in Waterbury and has since been under the care of Dr. Richard A. Matza, M.D., 171 Grandview Avenue, Westview Medical Building in Waterbury. We can confirm that Mr. Rodriguez has not worked since that time.
Mr. Rodriguez, we understand, worked on a machine at Bruce Manufacturing forging or casting aluminum. His job required that he constantly bend over to pick up aluminum material off the floor to put it into the machine. He sustained a severe back injury while doing this on May 28, 1985 at work. Also, he has developed pain, stiffness and muscle spasms in his left leg. Mr. Rodriguez has undergone a laminectomy and has been left with a permanent scar.
Any information you have regarding this matter would be very much appreciated. By a copy of this letter we are advising the Commissioner that we are filing a claim on behalf of Mr. Rodriguez for workers' compensation to which he is entitled. . . .
Section 31-294 requires that the notice of claim "shall state, in simple language, the data and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting therefrom . . . and the name and address of the employee and of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed." Respondents' argument is that the letter failed to state in "simple language" the information required by Sec. 31-294. In Sec. 31-297(b) preclusion litigation the more usual arguments raised by employers contend that the notice of claim failed to give sufficient information about the "nature of the injury." Pagan v. Paparazzo's Son, 6 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 38, 653 CRD-5-87 (1988) held that a notice of claim stating, "Nature of Injury: Back, right shoulder, right arm, neck" satisfied Sec. 31-294's requirement on the nature of injury. In Pagan, the trial commissioner had denied Sec. 31-297(b) preclusion holding that claimant's notice had "not described the nature of the injury." We reversed and specifically noted, "The law does not mandate that a claimant needs to articulate a medical diagnosis of his ailment in order properly to apprise his employer of the nature of injury." Id. at 41. Here, respondents seem to be arguing that the notice of claim gives too much information rather than too little specificity. In this information age, that argument must utterly fail to convince.
Another argument advanced is that the notice letter is merely a request for information which did not effectively put respondents on notice that a claim was being filed. However, as quoted infra, the letter specifically states "[B]y a copy of this letter we are advising the Commissioner that we are filing a claim on behalf of Mr. Rodriguez for workers' compensation . . ." This statement together with all the other information supplied in the letter effectively put the respondents on notice of a workers' compensation claim. Because respondents failed to file a Form 43 disclaimer of liability until 165 days after the receipt of counsel's letter, they have sought to attack the notice of claim utilizing the arguments noted. We find the arguments unpersuasive.
We therefore affirm the July 23, 1991 Finding and Award and dismiss the appeal.
Commissioners Frank Verrilli and A. Thomas White, Jr. concur.