Opinion
2018–00612 Docket Nos. V–22350–17, V–22352–17, V–22353–17, V–22354–173
02-06-2019
Rhea G. Friedman, New York, NY, for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Claude S. Platton and Jessica Miller of counsel), for respondent-respondent. Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, NY, attorney for the children.
Rhea G. Friedman, New York, NY, for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Claude S. Platton and Jessica Miller of counsel), for respondent-respondent.
Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, NY, attorney for the children.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., COLLEEN D. DUFFY, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In related proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the maternal grandmother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Ilana Gruebel, J.), dated November 28, 2017. The order granted, without a hearing, the motion of the respondent ACS–Kings to dismiss the maternal grandmother's petitions pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72 for grandparent visitation with the four subject children, and dismissed the proceedings.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In these related proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6 for grandparent visitation with the four subject children, the Family Court granted, without a hearing, the motion of the respondent ACS–Kings to dismiss the maternal grandmother's petitions for visitation on the ground that she lacked standing to seek visitation. We affirm. " ‘When a grandparent seeks visitation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72(1), the court must make a two-part inquiry’ " ( Matter of Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 128 A.D.3d 1070, 1070, 9 N.Y.S.3d 674, quoting Matter of Brancato v. Federico, 118 A.D.3d 986, 986, 988 N.Y.S.2d 678 ; see Matter of Broomfield v. Evans, 140 A.D.3d 748, 748, 30 N.Y.S.3d 915 ). "First, it must find that the grandparent has standing, based on, inter alia, equitable considerations" ( Matter of Gray v. Varone, 101 A.D.3d 1122, 1123, 956 N.Y.S.2d 573 ; see Matter of Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 128 A.D.3d at 1070, 9 N.Y.S.3d 674 ). "If it concludes that the grandparent has established standing to petition for visitation, then the court must determine if visitation is in the best interests of the child" ( Matter of Gray v. Varone, 101 A.D.3d at 1123, 956 N.Y.S.2d 573 ; see Matter of Broomfield v. Evans, 140 A.D.3d at 748, 30 N.Y.S.3d 915 ).
"In considering whether a grandparent has standing to petition for visitation based upon ‘circumstances show[ing] that conditions exist which equity would see fit to intervene’ ( Domestic Relations Law § 72[1] ), ‘an essential part of the inquiry is the nature and extent of the grandparent-grandchild relationship,’ among other factors" ( Matter of Lipton v. Lipton, 98 A.D.3d 621, 621, 949 N.Y.S.2d 501, quoting Matter of Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 78 N.Y.2d 178, 182, 573 N.Y.S.2d 36, 577 N.E.2d 27 ; see Matter of Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 128 A.D.3d at 1070, 9 N.Y.S.3d 674 ). "A hearing to determine the issue of standing is not necessary where there are no triable issues of fact raised in the submitted papers" ( Matter of Broomfield v. Evans, 140 A.D.3d at 749, 30 N.Y.S.3d 915 ; see Matter of Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 128 A.D.3d at 1070, 9 N.Y.S.3d 674 ).
Here, taking into account all of the relevant circumstances of this case, equitable considerations did not warrant judicial intervention to confer standing upon the maternal grandmother (see Domestic Relations Law § 72 ; Matter of Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 128 A.D.3d at 1071, 9 N.Y.S.3d 674 ; Matter of Lipton v. Lipton, 98 A.D.3d at 622, 949 N.Y.S.2d 501 ). The maternal grandmother's petitions failed to allege facts that would show the existence of ongoing relationships with the subject children sufficient to establish standing (see Domestic Relations Law § 72[1] ; Matter of Broomfield v. Evans, 140 A.D.3d at 749, 30 N.Y.S.3d 915 ; see also Matter of Diane T. v. Shawn N., 147 A.D.3d 463, 463, 47 N.Y.S.3d 16 ).
Since the maternal grandmother failed to allege facts sufficient to establish standing to petition for visitation, the issue of the best interests of the children need not be reached (see Matter of Broomfield v. Evans, 140 A.D.3d at 748–749, 30 N.Y.S.3d 915 ).
Accordingly, we agree with the Family Court's determination granting, without a hearing, the motion to dismiss the maternal grandmother's petitions for visitation, and dismissing the proceedings (see Matter of Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 128 A.D.3d at 1070–1071, 9 N.Y.S.3d 674 ).
LEVENTHAL, J.P., DUFFY, CONNOLLY and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.