Opinion
4-22-0314
11-02-2022
ROCKFORD HOUSING AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL HILL, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County No. 22EV36 Honorable Stephen Balogh, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HARRIS, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding that the issue of possession of the subject premises was moot, the public interest exception did not apply, and even if the collateral consequences exception applied, defendant failed to demonstrate the trial court erred in entering the eviction order.
¶ 2 Plaintiff, Rockford Housing Authority (RHA), filed a complaint for eviction against defendant, Michael Hill, seeking possession of a public housing residence (the subject premises). Hill agreed to waive his right to a trial in exchange for an extension of time in which to remain in possession of the subject premises, and the trial court subsequently entered an agreed eviction order. Thereafter, Hill filed a motion to vacate the eviction order, which was denied. Hill appeals, arguing (1) the complaint was invalid because it was not verified as required under section 9-118 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/9-118 (West 2020)), (2) the complaint failed to comply with the due process requirements of federal regulations, (3) his waiver of his right to a trial was invalid because the trial court failed to inform him of the nature of his trial rights, and (4) the agreed eviction order was invalid because Hill did not sign it. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On January 7, 2022, RHA filed a complaint for eviction against Hill alleging that it was entitled to possession of the subject premises. The complaint and accompanying documentation alleged Hill violated the terms of his lease by committing the criminal offense of possession of a controlled substance. RHA filed as an exhibit to the complaint a copy of a 10-day notice to quit along with an affidavit of service indicating the notice had been served upon Hill on December 16, 2021, by delivering a copy to him and by posting the notice on the subject premises. RHA also filed a copy of Hill's lease as an exhibit.
¶ 5 On March 2, 2022, the parties appeared for trial. Hill appeared pro se. RHA offered to give Hill until March 21, 2022, to move out of the subject premises if he agreed to forego a trial. The court advised Hill that it would not give him more than seven days to move out if he lost at trial. Defendant agreed to waive his right to a trial in exchange for RHA's offer, and the court entered an eviction order granting RHA possession of the subject premises and requiring Hill to vacate the property on or before March 21, 2022.
¶ 6 On March 14, 2022, Hill filed a motion to vacate the eviction order on the bases that he never signed the order, his criminal case was dismissed, and he did not know how to defend himself at trial without a lawyer. On March 16, 2022, at a hearing on Hill's motion, the trial court stated it did not matter that Hill did not sign the eviction order because he expressly agreed to it in court. The court also found the fact that Hill's criminal charges were dismissed was not relevant to the eviction case. The court denied Hill's motion to vacate, and this appeal followed.
¶ 7 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 8 On appeal, Hill, pro se, argues that (1 the complaint for eviction was invalid because it was not verified as required under section 9-118 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/9-118 (West 2020)), (2) the complaint failed to comply with the due process requirements of federal regulations, (3) the trial court's failure to inform Hill of the nature of his trial rights invalidated his waiver of his right to a trial, and (4) the agreed eviction order was invalid because Hill did not sign it. Hill requests that the eviction order be vacated and the matter remanded for a trial.
¶ 9 Initially, RHA argues Hill's appeal is moot because he never sought a stay of the possession order, he no longer lives at the subject premises, and the subject premises have been rented to another individual. Hill admits he has moved out of the subject premises and concedes the issue of possession is moot. However, Hill argues the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Hill also argues the issue of the validity of the eviction order is not moot because he will suffer serious harm if the order is not vacated. Specifically, Hill contends the eviction order renders him ineligible to reapply for RHA housing for at least three years, the eviction order will negatively affect his future housing opportunities, and the order was invalid due to violations of his due process rights.
¶ 10 "An appeal is moot if no actual controversy exists or when events have occurred that make it impossible for the reviewing court to render effectual relief." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 10. "As a general rule, courts of review in Illinois do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided." In re Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d 482, 491 (1998).
¶ 11 Here, the parties agree that the issue of possession is moot. As possession is the only question at issue in a forcible entry and detainer action (see Avenaim v. Lubecke, 347 Ill.App.3d 855, 861 (2004)), we may address Hill's arguments only if an exception to the mootness doctrine applies.
¶ 12 1. Public Interest Exception
¶ 13 We first consider Hill's argument that we should review his claims under the public interest exception. "The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine permits review of an otherwise moot question when the magnitude or immediacy of the interests involved warrants action by the court." Commonwealth Edison Co., 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 12. "[T]he public interest exception is invoked only on 'rare occasions' when there is an extraordinary degree of public interest and concern." Id. ¶ 13 (quoting People ex rel. Partee v. Murphy, 133 Ill.2d 402, 410 (1990)). The public interest exception applies when (1) the question presented is of a public nature, (2) an authoritative determination of the issue is desirable to guide public officers in the future, and (3) the question is likely to recur. Id. ¶ 12.
¶ 14 We find the public interest exception does not apply in the instant case. The issues presented in Hill's appeal-namely, alleged deficiencies in the complaint, lack of admonitions by the trial court, and the alleged invalidity of the agreed eviction order due to Hill's failure to sign it-are not sufficiently broad to be considered questions of a public nature. Rather, the issues raised are tied to the unique facts of this case, as they concern alleged deficiencies in the procedures employed by RHA and the trial court in this particular case.
¶ 15 2. Collateral Consequences Exception
¶ 16 In his reply brief, Hill also contends that, although the issue of possession is moot, the question of the validity of the eviction order is not moot because the eviction order will render him ineligible to reapply for RHA housing for at least three years pursuant to Title 24, section 982.553 of the Code of Federal Regulations (24 C.F.R. § 982.553 (2020)), which provides that, subject to certain exceptions, a public housing agency must prohibit an applicant's admission to the Section 8 housing program for three years from the date of eviction if a household member was evicted from federally assisted housing for drug-related criminal activity. Hill also generally argues that the eviction order will negatively affect his future housing opportunities, and the order was invalid due to violations of his due process rights.
¶ 17 We note our supreme court has recognized the "collateral consequences exception" as an exception to the mootness doctrine. See In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d 345, 361 (2009). "Under this exception, where collateral consequences survive the expiration or cessation of a court order that are likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial determination, appellate review is permissible." In re Rita P., 2014 IL 115798, ¶ 31. Though Hill does not expressly refer to the collateral consequences exception in his reply brief, his argument, in substance, is that the issues raised in his appeal are not moot because of the collateral consequences he will suffer due to the eviction order.
¶ 18 Even if we were to excuse Hill's failure to cite authority concerning the collateral consequences exception and find this exception applies due to the effect of the eviction order on his future efforts to obtain public housing, we would find he has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in entering the eviction order. First, Hill contends the eviction order was void because RHA's complaint was not verified, as required under section 9-118 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/9-118 (West 2020)). Section 9-118 sets forth emergency eviction procedures that must be followed when a landlord seeks to evict a tenant on the expedited timeline set forth in that section for engaging in criminal activity. Id. However, nothing in the record indicates that RHA sought an expedited eviction proceeding under section 9-118. When the trial court entered its eviction order, which was a form order, it did not check the box on the form indicating that the order was following an emergency housing proceeding under section 9-118. RHA did not cite section 9-118 in its complaint or notice to quit, and it did not seek possession of the subject premises on the expedited timeline provided under that section.
¶ 19 In his reply brief, Hill contends that RHA and other public housing agencies are required to bring eviction actions against public housing residents based on drug activity under the special provisions set forth in section 9-118 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/9-118 (West 2020)) rather than the general eviction provisions set forth in article 9 of the Code (id. § 9-101 et seq). However, Hill has cited no authority in support of his assertion that this is required. Nothing in the language of section 9-118 of the Code requires that public housing agencies bring eviction actions for drug activity under that section. Accordingly, we find Hill has not established that RHA was required to bring proceedings under section 9-118.
¶ 20 Hill next argues that the complaint and the 10-day notice to quit failed to advise him that he had certain due process rights, specifically the rights to: (1) adequate notice of the grounds for eviction, (2) representation by counsel, (3) the opportunity to refute the evidence presented by RHA, including the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to present an affirmative defense; and (4) a decision on the merits. Hill argues his waiver of his right to a trial was invalid because he was not admonished concerning these rights. Hill cites section 1437d(k) of Title 42 of the United States Code (42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) (2020)) and section 966.54(c) of Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations (24 C.F.R. § 966.54(c) (2020)) in support of his argument.
¶ 21 However, taken together, the foregoing statutory provisions merely indicate that a public housing agency may evict a tenant for drug-related criminal activity without conducting statutory grievance procedures if the jurisdiction in which the agency is located requires certain procedural safeguards for evictions. These provisions do not require that a tenant be explicitly advised of his procedural rights. Thus, we find Hill has not established that he is entitled to relief due to RHA's failure to advise him in the complaint or notice to quit of the rights he has identified.
¶ 22 Hill's final two arguments are that (1) his waiver of his right to a trial was invalid because the trial court failed to inform him of his trial rights, and (2) the agreed eviction order was invalid because he did not sign it. Hill's brief contains no citations to authority in support of either of these arguments, and, accordingly, he has forfeited these issues. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); International Union of Operating Engineers Local 965 v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 2015 IL App (4th) 140352, ¶ 20 ("[A] party forfeits review of an issue on appeal by failing to support its argument with citation to authorities.").
¶ 23 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 24 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 25 Affirmed.