Defendant argues Plaintiff had the burden to prove in this attorney fee collection case that its fee was reasonable and, because Plaintiff presented no evidence on this issue, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Plaintiff. When an attorney enters into a contract for a fixed fee with a client after the attorney's representation of the client has commenced, the attorney bears the burden of proving, in an action to recover fees under the contract, that the fees were "fair and reasonable."Stern v. Hyman, 182 N.C. 422, 424, 109 S.E. 79, 80 (1921) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds, Rock v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 99, 209 S.E.2d 476 (1974); see Vernon, Vernon, Wooten, Brown Andrews, P.A. v. Miller, 73 N.C. App. 295, 298, 326 S.E.2d 316, 319 (1985) (attorney had burden of proving reasonableness of fee when contract was, presumably, entered into after commencement of representation). This is so because there is a presumption of undue influence when an attorney enters into a fee contract with a client during representation.

We address separately each of plaintiff's contentions. In reviewing the trial court's entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we note at the outset that the defendant-attorney in this action had the burden of proving that the fee charged to plaintiff-client was fair and reasonable. Rock v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 99, 104, 209 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1974); Randolph v. Schuyler, 284 N.C. 496, 504, 201 S.E.2d 833, 838 (1974). For this reason the Court must closely scrutinize the granting of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

However, the question then arises as to what compensation the attorney is entitled to receive after such a premature termination. The Plaintiffs contend that the case of Casket Co. v. Wheeler, 182 N.C. 459, 109 S.E. 378 (1921) is controlling and compels a finding that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the value of their contract less the quantum meruit of the Defendant Rubin. Also citing Higgins v. Beaty, 242 N.C. 479, 88 S.E.2d 80 (1955) and Rock v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 99, 209 S.E.2d 476 (1974). The Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Casket Co. case is factually distinguishable in that the attorney there had fully performed and was trying to collect from a reluctant client, whereas in the present case the Plaintiffs were prevented from full performance by Defendant Mitchell's act of discharge. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs contend that the rationale of Casket Co. is applicable to the case at bar and stands for the proposition that the contract constituted an equitable assignment of the judgment pro tanto and vested the Plaintiffs with an equitable lien attaching to any ensuing judgment.

Accordingly, any attorney seeking to enforce a contract of this kind has the burden of proving that it is fair and reasonable, and that the client had full knowledge "of the facts and of his legal rights with relation thereto." Lady v. Worthingham, 57 Cal.App.2d 557, 560, 135 P.2d 205, 207 (1943); Rock v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 99, 104, 209 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1974). Although this case did not involve actual litigation, as Spilker did, the distinction is not crucial. Mr. Whalen was clearly the subject of an investigation dealing with a large number of transactions, his relationship with attorney Terzis was well established, and when he signed the documents at issue here, he was faced with what might easily be called a crisis.

568 (1968); Greenbaum Browne, Ltd. v. Braun, 43 Ill.Dec. 303, 88 Ill. App.3d 210, 410 N.E.2d 303 (1980); Paxton v. La Barre, 253 So.2d 248 (Miss. 1971); Rock v. Ballou, 22 N.C. App. 51, 205 S.E.2d 540 (1974), modified, 286 N.C. 99, 209 S.E.2d 476 (1974); In the Matter of Marine, 82 Wis.2d 602, 264 N.W.2d 285 (1978). Moreover, we agree with these remarks from Carmichael v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 219 N.W.2d 658, 664-65 (Iowa 1974), where the court, in dealing with a claimed contingent-fee contract, noted the provisions of EC 2-19 and 2-23, and stated: "We cannot release this appeal without noting the lawyer-applicants are responsible for the ambiguous and obscure nature of their employment agreement. . . . [N]o lawyer retained on a contingent fee basis should be too busy to prepare a written instrument precisely detailing all terms of the employment contract."

00 per month from her estate which had a net worth of $761,975.00. It found that defendant had a gross income of $116,660.00 and a net income of $61,702.00 in 1977 from his estate which had a net worth of $870,165.00 and from his salary as president of Alfred Williams and Company. All of the trial court's findings noted above are supported by competent evidence in the record and are therefore binding on us on appeal. Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976); Rock v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 99, 209 S.E.2d 476 (1974). The dependent spouse here was thus "substantially in need of maintenance and support" from the supporting spouse.

When the trial judge is authorized to find the facts, his findings, if supported by competent evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal despite the existence of evidence which would sustain contrary findings. Rock v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 99, 209 S.E.2d 476 (1974); 7 Strong, N.C. Index 2d Trial 58 (1968). Defendant's remaining twelve assignments of error challenge the court's findings and the conclusions based thereon that defendant should be compelled to pay (1) alimony to plaintiff in the amount of $300.00 per month until her death or remarriage and child support of $200.00 per month until the month in which a child becomes 18 years of age; (2) specified "family debts" in the amount of $4,291.

In Rock v. Ballou, our Supreme Court held: "it is not a prerequisite to such a finding that the attorney introduce evidence [of] a detailed, itemized statement of the time spent by him in rendering the service[.]" Id. 286 N.C. 99, 105, 209 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1974).

Where the trial court makes findings of fact, they must be sufficient to support the judgment. Rock v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 99, 209 S.E.2d 476 (1974). When findings on matters material to the dispute are not made, the case must be remanded for those findings.

When crucial findings of fact are absent from the trial court's judgment, the case must be remanded for further findings. Rock v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 99, 209 S.E.2d 476 (1974). We need not discuss the evidence of the parties' respective knowledge, or reasons to know, of the other's meaning.