Opinion
Civil No. 19-cv-410-JL
08-05-2019
Christian ROCHA v. William BARR, Attorney General of the United States, et al.
Gilles R. Bissonnette, Henry Klementowicz, SangYeob Kim, American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire, Concord, NH, for Petitioner. Michael T. McCormack, US Attorney's Office (NH), Concord, NH, Thomas P. Velardi, Strafford County Attorney's Office, Dover, NH, for Respondent.
Gilles R. Bissonnette, Henry Klementowicz, SangYeob Kim, American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire, Concord, NH, for Petitioner.
Michael T. McCormack, US Attorney's Office (NH), Concord, NH, Thomas P. Velardi, Strafford County Attorney's Office, Dover, NH, for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Joseph N. Laplante, United States District Judge
Christian A. Rocha has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") on constitutional due process grounds. He seeks habeas relief in the form of a bond hearing before an Immigration Court.
This court has jurisdiction over Rocha's petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Nielsen v. Preap, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 954, 961-962, 203 L.Ed.2d 333 (2019). After oral argument, the court denies Rocha's petition. Although 15 years elapsed between Rocha's criminal convictions and his immigration detention, this type of time gap does not undermine the reasoning supporting mandatory detention as articulated by the First Circuit Court of Appeals and so does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Separately, Rocha's detention has not yet become unreasonable in duration.
I. Applicable legal standard
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend V.
II. Background
Rocha is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic and entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1986. Between 1992 and 2005, he was charged and convicted of several criminal offenses. In 2003, Rocha was convicted in Massachusetts of two separate offenses of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and sentenced to 2.5 years in the House of Correction in each case. He was released on parole in August 2003. Although ICE was legally entitled and required to take custody of Rocha when he was paroled, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) ; Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 964-65 ; see infra Part II.A, it did not do so. He has no criminal record after 2005. In 2013, Rocha renewed his lawful permanent residency.
Petition (doc. no. 1) ¶ 9.
Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 9-1) at 2-4.
Id. at 3-4. Rocha is currently seeking to vacate the pleas that led to both convictions.
Petition (doc. no. 1) ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 11; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 9-1) at 2.
Pet.'s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 12) at 12.
A. Immigration proceedings
On December 4, 2018, ICE arrested Rocha. The Notice to Appear filed on the day of his arrest alleged that he was subject to removal from the United States because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(b), 1227(a)(2)(iii). It identified one of Rocha's 2003 convictions as the felony in question, but incorrectly specified the offense as trafficking in a controlled substance. ICE detained Rocha at the Strafford County House of Correction as a criminal alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which requires mandatory detention without a bond hearing. See Preap, 139 S. Ct. at 960-61.
Petition Ex. 5 (doc. no. 1-5).
Id. Rocha was initially charged with trafficking in cocaine when the case began in 1998, but ultimately pleaded guilty in 2003 to unlawful possession with intent to distribute. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 9-1) at 3.
Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 9-1) at 4.
At Rocha's first two master calendar hearings, on December 27, 2018 and January 3, 2019, he moved for and was granted brief continuances to review the allegations and potential relief. At the third hearing, on January 10, 2019, the Immigration Judge noted the discrepancy between the docket sheets submitted by the government and the Notice to Appear, directed the parties to address the issue, and scheduled a hearing for later in the month. Due to a clerical error, the hearing was not held until February 11, 2019. The Immigration Judge granted Rocha's motion to terminate and dismissed his removal proceedings without prejudice.
Petition (doc. no. 1) ¶¶ 14-15.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id.
Id. ¶ 18.
ICE maintained custody of Rocha and filed a second Notice to Appear on February 20, but Rocha alleges that his counsel did not receive the document until another hearing on March 14. At oral argument, the government was unable to offer a justification for maintaining Rocha's detention between the dismissal of the first proceedings and the filing of the second notice. The new notice cited both of Rocha's 2003 convictions. Rocha denied the charge of removability, moved to terminate the proceedings, and requested release on bond. The Immigration Judge denied the motion to terminate and scheduled a further hearing for March 28 to address the other issues. At that hearing, the government requested a continuance to provide evidence of Rocha's convictions, while Rocha argued that he was entitled to a bond hearing under the terms of an injunction issued in the District of Massachusetts. On April 4, the Immigration Judge ruled the injunction was limited to detainees held in Massachusetts and ruled Rocha removable based on at least one of the 2003 convictions. The Immigration Judge scheduled a hearing on Rocha's requests for relief for June 3, 2019.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20-21.
Id. ¶ 22. See Gordon v. Kelly, 3:13-cv-30146-MAP (D. Mass. Feb. 10, 2017) (doc. no. 191)
Petition (doc. no. 1) ¶¶ 23-24. According to the petition, the Immigration Judge ruled on April 4 that the government only submitted sufficient evidence of one of the convictions. Id. at 24. But the Immigration Judge's June 28, 2019 written order found both convictions adequately established. Document no. 21-1 at 9.
Id. ¶ 25.
Rocha filed his petition for habeas corpus with this court on April 19, 2019. Three days later, the government filed a petition with the Immigration Court to expedite Rocha's hearing, which Rocha opposed and the Immigration Judge denied. On May 31, ICE transferred Rocha to Massachusetts, but returned him to New Hampshire the same day after realizing that transfer without advanced notice to this court violated this court's April 19, 2019 order. During this confusion, his immigration counsel filed an emergency motion for a continuance of the scheduled hearing because of her inability to reach Rocha. Rocha was given additional time to consult with his counsel on June 3, and the Immigration Judge ultimately conducted only brief proceedings before continuing the hearing to June 11. On June 11, the Immigration Judge made an interim decision that Rocha is not eligible for cancellation of removal or asylum because his drug convictions are aggravated felonies. On June 28, the Immigration Judge issued a written decision additionally denying Rocha's claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture. Rocha intends to appeal the Immigration Judge's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Petition (doc. no. 1).
Pet.'s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 12) at 20.
See Notice of Transfer (doc. no. 14).
Pet.'s Surreply (doc. no. 17) at 3.
Id.
Parties' Joint Resp. to the Court's June 11, 2019 Order (doc. no. 18) at 1.
Pet.'s Resp. to the Court's June 18, 2019 Order (doc. no. 21) at 8.
B. Rocha's petition
Rocha's habeas petition sets out two claims for relief. First, he argues that subjecting him to mandatory detention based on a conviction received more than 15 years ago violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. He contends that this kind of constitutional challenge to mandatory detention was explicitly contemplated by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Preap. 139 S. Ct. at 972 ("Our decision today on the meaning of that statutory provision does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to applications of the statute as we have now read it."). Second, Rocha claims that his current mandatory detention without a bond hearing is unconstitutionally prolonged. He seeks declaratory relief and a bond hearing before this court or an Immigration Judge.
Petition (doc. no. 1) ¶¶ 49-53.
Petition (doc. no. 1) ¶¶ 54-57.
Id. at 19.
The government moved to dismiss Rocha's petition because of his membership in a pending class action seeking a blanket rule requiring a bond hearing or reasonableness hearing after six months of detention under § 1226(c). Reid, et al. v. Donelan, No. 3:13-cv-30125-PBS, 2018 WL 5269992 (D. Mass Oct. 23, 2018), ECF no. 416 at 23. Rocha argued that he asserts two due process claims distinct from the class action: (1) the time gap between his criminal convictions and current mandatory detention violates the Due Process Clause; and (2) his detention is unconstitutionally prolonged under the particular facts of his case. The court agreed that these claims were distinct from the class action and denied the motion to dismiss.
On July 9, 2019, Judge Saris issued a summary judgement order in Reid. 390 F.Supp.3d 201 (D. Mass 2019). She held that the permissibility of mandatory detention without a bond hearing is a fact-specific analysis, and the most important factor in determining whether the detention has become unreasonably prolonged is the length of the detention. Id. at 209-10. She rejected the plaintiffs' proposed six-month bright-line rule, but did find that detention exceeding one year is likely to be unreasonable. Id. at 219. Judge Saris also acknowledged that an alien's individual circumstances might render mandatory detention of less than one year unreasonable if the Government unreasonably delays or the case languishes on a docket. Id. at 220-21.
Judge Saris did not determine how time attributable to a petition to a circuit court would affect the reasonableness analysis. Reid, 390 F.Supp.3d at 219 n.4.
III. Analysis
The limited available authority discussed by the court and the parties' counsel does not support due process limitations on the time between criminal conviction or release from criminal custody and immigration detention under § 1226(c). And Rocha's detention has not become unreasonably prolonged. Rocha's detention cannot be said to violate his Fifth Amendment due process rights under the facts and circumstances of this case as presented on this record.
A. Time-gap claim
"Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process." Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 530, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003). And the mandatory detention of criminal aliens under § 1226(c), for the limited period of their removal proceedings, is generally constitutional. Id. This detention is based on Congress's "justifiable concern[ ] that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers." Id. at 513, 123 S.Ct. 1708.
In Nielsen v. Preap, the Supreme Court recently held that, as a matter of statutory construction, § 1226(c) requires the government to take a criminal alien into custody and detain the alien without a bond hearing even if substantial time has passed since the alien was released from criminal custody. 139 S. Ct. at 959. The Court did not reach any constitutional questions. Plaintiffs in the case did not raise a head-on constitutional challenge to the statue, and the Court did not employ the familiar statutory construction canon of constitutional avoidance because it found that "the statute is clear." Id. at 972. The Court thus advised that "its decision "on the meaning of that statutory provision does not foreclose as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to applications of the statute as we have now read it." Id. Rocha suggests that the Court would have indicated if it believed no valid constitutional challenge was possible. The government contends that the Court found that a time gap does not generally create a constitutional issue, and that "unique factual circumstances" are required for an as-applied challenge. Neither inference is supported by Preap. The Court expressed no view on the merits of a constitutional challenge. Rocha has now brought the type of "as-applied constitutional challenge" that the Court acknowledged as likely to follow after its ruling, but Preap provides no guidance for the resolution of his claim.
Pet.'s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 12) at 10.
Reply on Mot. to Dismiss (doc. no. 15) at 2.
Rocha points to three sources of authority in support of his claim that the extended delay between his criminal convictions and mandatory immigration detention violates the Due Process Clause. First, he cites several district court decisions from other circuits prior to Preap that either directly found a due process violation based on a time gap or applied the canon of constitutional avoidance while interpreting the text of § 1226(c) and determined that such a due process issue would likely exist. See Rodriguez v. Shanahan, 84 F. Supp. 3d 251, 264-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ; Araujo-Cortes v. Shanahan, 35 F. Supp. 3d 533, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y 2014) ; Martinez-Done v. McConnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 535, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ; Nabi v. Terry, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D.N.M. 2012) ; Monestime v. Reilly, 704 F. Supp. 2d 453, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ; Figueroa v. Aviles, No. 14 Civ. 9360, 2015 WL 464168 2015 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2015) ; Espinoza v. Aitken, No. 5:13-cv-00512, 2013 WL 1087492, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013). The parties and the court have not identified any post- Preap decisions considering a time-gap claim.
Second, Rocha highlights a passage from Saysana v. Gillen, in which the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) did not apply to a criminal alien whose only triggering criminal offense pre-dated the effective date of the statute, even if the alien was released from unrelated criminal custody after the effective date. 590 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2009). The Court of Appeals found it:
counter-intuitive to say that aliens with potentially longstanding community ties are, as a class, poor bail risks. The affected aliens are individuals who committed an offense, and were released from custody for that offense, more than a decade ago. They have continued to live in the United States. By any logic, it stands to reason that the more remote in time a conviction becomes and the more time after a conviction an individual spends in a community, the lower his bail risk is likely to be.
Id. at 17-18.
Third, Rocha cites a similar passage from the withdrawn panel opinion in Castañeda v. Souza. 769 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn (Jan. 23, 2015), on reh'g en banc, 810 F. 3d 15 (1st Cir. 2015). The panel, examining the statutory interpretation question later decided by Preap, reasoned that "[w]hen the government has delayed several years before arresting an alien, the presumption of dangerousness and flight risk is eroded by the years in which the alien lived peaceably in the community," and proceeded to quote Saysana. Castañeda, 769 F.3d at 43. Both Saysana and the panel opinion in Castañeda thus suggested that a time gap during which an alien resides peacefully in the community erodes any presumptions of dangerousness and flight risk, undermining the justification for mandatory detention.
But the Castañeda opinion was withdrawn and reconsidered en banc. The Court of Appeals split 3-3 on the statutory interpretation question. Castañeda, 810 F. 3d 15 (1st Cir. 2015). Judge Kayatta, joined by Judges Howard and Lynch, discussed the constitutional avoidance canon and found no constitutional issue based on a time gap between the triggering criminal offense and immigration custody. Id. at 59-62. They held that "the length of time an alien managed to avoid detention post-release" does not affect the constitutionality of mandatory detention. Id. at 60-61. They rejected the logic of Saysana and the Castañeda panel opinion:
Petitioners' argument rests on the premise that, once a law-breaking alien has been out of custody for several years, one can no longer regard him as presenting a sufficiently heightened risk of danger or flight, even once the alien finds out ICE now wants to deport him on grounds that will be hard to successfully contest. Neither petitioners nor the vacated panel opinion cite any controlling authority for this proposition, and we have great difficulty accepting this view of flight risk as a matter of common sense. It seems to us that Congress could have—and did—reasonably regard this group of aliens as categorically posing a flight risk because their commission of the designated crimes makes it highly likely that they will be deported if ICE comes knocking. Hence, there is little to lose by trying to hide, especially once a removal order issues. The incentive to flee peaks once the criminal alien knows that ICE has decided to come after him. And while the incentive may be depressed while ICE ignores the alien, once ICE manifests an intention to proceed forthwith, the incentive to flee before the deportation proceeding ends would seem to be unrelated to any delay in making that manifestation.
Id. at 61 (citations omitted). They thus rejected the view that "an individual fact showing a person poses a lesser risk of flight or danger," including living in a community for years, means "that person is constitutionally entitled to a bail hearing". Id.
On the other side, Judge Barron, joined by Judges Torruella and Thompson, did not explicitly reach the constitutional avoidance canon. But Judge Barron did cite the relevant passage from Saysana in support of a statutory interpretation argument, and acknowledged that the Second Circuit had read a time-gap limitation into the statute "to avoid serious constitutional concerns." Castañeda, 810 F. 3d at 41 n.38. Judge Torruella also wrote separately to suggest broader constitutional concerns with § 1226(c). Id. at 43-46. For Rocha, Castañeda at best reflects an evenly divided First Circuit Court of Appeals, with three judges rejecting any constitutional concern based on a time gap, and three other judges at least recognizing the possibility of such concern.
There is no binding authority on this court as to any due process limitations on a time gap between criminal convictions or custody and mandatory immigration detention. The relevant First Circuit authority is deeply conflicted. Opposing accounts of whether flight risk meaningfully degrades over a time gap are described as supported "by any logic," Saysana, 590 F.3d at 17 (flight risk diminishes), and "a matter of common sense." Castañeda, 810 F. 3d at 61 (Kayatta, J.)(flight risk does not diminish). Rocha has not provided any empirical evidence to evaluate these accounts, although it is admittedly unclear whether any useful evidence could be gathered. See Reid, 390 F.Supp.3d at 216-17. ("Plaintiffs challenge the congressional presumption that criminal aliens are likely to be dangerous or risks of flight, but they have presented no evidence on point. And Congress implemented § 1226(c) based on statistics showing that released criminal aliens were committing new offenses and absconding.")
Given the lack of binding authority, limited persuasive authority from other circuits, and half of the judges of the First Circuit have rejected the basis of Rocha's argument, this court is not inclined to find that even a substantial time gap (which Rocha's certainly is) between conviction or criminal custody and immigration detention violates the Due Process Clause. The text of the statute, as interpreted in Preap, imposes no limit on any time gap. This suggests that Congress "regard[ed] this group of aliens as categorically posing a flight risk because their commission of the designated crimes makes it highly likely that they will be deported if ICE comes knocking." Castañeda, 810 F.3d at 61 (Kayatta, J.). Congress could reason that a high risk of flight coincides not only with the commission of certain crimes, but also with the high likelihood of deportation resulting from any deportation-triggering criminal record. A time gap after conviction or release from criminal detention has only minimal effect on this latter line of reasoning. Id. at 61. Absent contrary evidence and with limited guiding authority, the court declines to disturb "Congress's ability (affirmed in Demore ) to say categorically that criminal aliens should not have the ability to flee while awaiting the reasonably prompt conclusion of their deportation hearings." Id.
While Rocha's time-gap claim is thus denied, the court acknowledges that the circumstances of his case are difficult and concerning. The government allowed him to reside in the community for many years and even renewed his permanent residency. If the First Circuit reconsiders the apparent deadlock in Castañeda and concludes that there are due process limits on a time gap prior to mandatory detention, the facts of Rocha's case would likely fall outside such limits. On the other hand, Rocha has received significant process, both at the time of his conviction and in his current removal proceedings.
B. Prolonged-detention claim
Rocha also argues that his mandatory detention has been unreasonably prolonged. The best framework for assessing a due process constitutional challenge to continued detention without a bond hearing is the non-exhaustive list of reasonableness factors set out in the withdrawn First Circuit opinion in Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 500 (1st Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded in part, Nos. 14-1270, 14-1803, 14-1823, 2018 WL 4000993 (1st Cir. May 11, 2018). That opinion was premised on reading a statutory reasonableness limitation into § 1226(c). Id. at 502. The Supreme Court later determined that the statue contains no implicit limitation. Jennings v. Rodriguez, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 830, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018). But courts, including this one, have applied the Reid factors or a similar listing to evaluate whether detention under § 1226(c) has been unconstitutionally prolonged. See Hussein v. Brackett, 18-cv-921-JL (D.N.H. Nov. 9, 2018) (ECF no. 18); Muse v. Sessions, 18-cv-0054, 2018 WL 4466052 at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2018) ; Sajous v. Decker, No. 18-cv-2447, 2018 WL 2357266 at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018).
The Reid factors are "the total length of the detention; the foreseeability of proceedings concluding in the near future (or the likely duration of future detention); the period of the detention compared to the criminal sentence; the promptness (or delay) of the immigration authorities or the detainee; and the likelihood that the proceedings will culminate in a final removal order." 819 F.3d at 500. Courts also consider whether the immigration detention facility is meaningfully different from a penal institution for criminal detention. See Hussein, No. 18-cv-921-JL (D.N.H. Nov. 9, 2018); Muse, 2018 WL 4466052 and *5 ; Sajous, 2018 WL 2357266 at *11. The court reviews each factor in turn.
1. Total length of the detention
The length of the detention is "the most important factor in determining whether detention has become unreasonably prolonged." Reid, 390 F.Supp.3d at 209-10. Rocha has now been detained for approximately eight months. This is longer than the time periods considered standard in Demore. 538 U.S. at 530, 123 S.Ct. 1708 ("In sum, the detention at stake under § 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.") It is similar to the length involved in Hussein, where this court ordered habeas relief in the form of a bond hearing. 18-cv-921-JL (D.N.H. Nov. 9, 2018) (ECF no. 18). But it is significantly shorter than the one-year period that Judge Saris found to be a key marker based upon the Government's policies and more current statistics. Reid, 390 F.Supp.3d at 209-10, 219. Judge Saris's analysis is persuasive, and so this "most important" factor disfavors habeas relief.
2. Foreseeability of proceedings concluding
Rocha intends to appeal the Immigration Judge's ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and would likely appeal any unfavorable ruling there to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. So at least a few more months of further proceedings are likely. But there is nothing suggesting any unusual future delays in these proceedings and no suggestion that removal will be delayed once proceedings are concluded. This factor disfavors habeas relief.
3. Comparison to criminal sentence
Rocha was sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment for each of his 2005 convictions. He was released on parole after only a few months. Rocha argues that the remoteness of the sentence should impact this factor. To the degree the remoteness of the convictions and sentences are relevant, it is better considered as a separate factor from the one specified in Reid. Rocha's current detention is shorter than the criminal sentence for his triggering offense, so this factor appears neutral, favoring neither side at this point.
4. Promptness or delay
Rocha is certainly not responsible for any unreasonable delay in the proceedings thus far. But the government is clearly responsible for the 2.5 month delay caused by the error in the original Notice to Appear. That error is especially egregious here where ICE brought Rocha into custody many years after his release from criminal custody. There were not exigent circumstances that might explain the government's oversight. The court is also concerned that the government kept Rocha in custody for the week between the dismissal of the first Notice to Appear and the filing of the second notice without apparent justification. The government is also responsible for the brief delay caused by its transfer of Rocha out of this district, even if the delay was brief and the transfer inadvertent. Because of these delays, this factor favors Rocha's habeas request.
5. Likelihood of a final removal order
The Immigration Judge has rejected Rocha's arguments for relief from removal. Rocha seeks state court orders vacating his 2005 Massachusetts convictions, but these efforts are speculative at best at this stage. The Immigration Judge's ruling is the best available evidence of the likelihood of removal, so this factor provides no support for habeas relief.
6. Conditions of confinement
Rocha is detained at the Strafford County House of Correction, which is a penal facility. This factor thus favors Rocha's petition.
7. Other factors
The Reid factors are not exhaustive. Reid, 819 F.3d at 501. Here, potential additional factors include the remoteness of the convictions and criminal custody, and the fact that Rocha's permanent residency was renewed during the intervening period. These favor Rocha and heighten the concern caused by the government-caused delays in his proceedings.
8. Overall weighing
The most important factor, length, favors the government's position. So do the other major factors touching directly on the likely future length of detention and likelihood of removability. The most significant factor favoring Rocha is that of government delay, but this is mitigated by the inclusion of these delays in the length factor. The duration of Rocha's detention under § 1226(c) has not become unreasonably prolonged, and nothing in the record suggests that his detention is for any reason other "than to facilitate deportation." Demore, 538 U.S. at 532, 123 S.Ct. 1708 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Of course, if Rocha remains in custody for a further four months, the length of his detention will exceed the one-year period recently identified as significant in the recent Reid order. 390 F.Supp.3d at 219-21. While this is "not a bright line," such detention "is likely to be unreasonable," at least if proceedings remain before the agency. Id. Depending on the course of proceedings, Rocha may have a strong claim of unreasonably prolonged detention in the foreseeable future.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the available applicable authorities, on this record, and under the facts and circumstances of this case, the court declines to find that Rocha's detention under § 1226(c) violates the Due Process Clause, and his detention has not become unreasonably prolonged. Rocha's petition is DENIED without prejudice.
Document no. 1.
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