Opinion
Case No. 03-CV-5184 (FB).
February 7, 2005
Justice Robles, pro se, Ogdensburg, NY, for the Plaintiff.
Jed Matthew Weiss, Esq., New York, NY, for the Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Justice Robles ("Robles"), proceeding pro se, brings an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, Thomas Cooney ("Cooney"), Vickie Thomas ("Thomas"), and Pauline Mims ("Mims"). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), defendants move to dismiss Robles' Amended Complaint on the grounds that it fails to state a claim. The Court agrees, but grants Robles leave to amend.
I.
On August 19, 2003, Robles filed a complaint against defendants in the Northern District of New York. Because the alleged conduct giving rise to Robles' claim occurred within the Eastern District of New York, the case was transferred to this Court. On March 12, 2004, Robles filed the Amended Complaint that is the subject of defendants' motion to dismiss. The Amended Complaint seeks $1,500,000.00 for "Mental Stress and Pain and Suffering." Am. Compl. ¶ 9.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court's consideration is "limited to facts stated on the face of the complaint and in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, as well as to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Automated Salvage Transp. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., 155 F.3d 59, 67 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court "take[s] as true all of the allegations contained in plaintiff's complaint and draw[s] all inferences in favor of plaintiff." Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2001). The Court construes a pro se plaintiff's complaint liberally, especially when the litigation involves the plaintiff's civil rights. See id.
The documents attached to Robles' Amended Complaint are (1) an "Inmate Grievance Form" dated May 21, 2003; (2) a "Grievant's Statement Form" dated May 23, 2003; (3) a undated, notarized letter from Robles regarding his grievances; (4) receipts dated April 16 and May 6, 2003, for deposits totaling $75.00 into Robles' mail account; (5) receipts dated May 29, 2003, for two withdrawals from Robles' mail account; and (6) a certified mail receipt dated May 30, 2003. In addition, the Court takes judicial notice of the days of the week corresponding to the dates alleged in the Amended Complaint. See Commodari v. Long Island Univ., 89 F. Supp. 2d 353, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
II.
Robles was an inmate at the George Motchan Detention Center ("GMDC"). Cooney and Thomas are members of GMDC's mailroom staff; Mims is the head of the facility's grievance staff. On May 13, 2003, Robles gave Cooney certified mail to be sent to the court presiding over criminal proceedings against Robles. Robles told Cooney and Thomas that the mail — a notice of appeal and a motion to vacate judgment — needed to be sent as soon as possible.At GMDC, certified mail is sent out on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Robles' mail was therefore supposed to be sent on May 15, 2003 (a Thursday), but was not. Nor was Robles' mail sent on May 20, 2003 (the following Tuesday). On May 21, 2003, Robles filed a grievance complaining about the delay in mailing. Robles accepted informal resolution of the grievance based on Mims' representation that she would "forward [his] request to the proper authority," Am. Compl. at 4, and that his mail would be sent on May 22, 2003. When Robles learned from Thomas that his mail had not gone out on that date, he filed another grievance. Mims "wouldn't see [him] at all," Am. Compl. ¶ 5(5), regarding the second grievance.
Robles was due to appear before the criminal court on May 29, 2003; the court was supposed to hear Robles' motion to vacate judgment at that time. Robles' mail was not actually sent until May 29, 2003, however, and did not reach the criminal court until May 30, 2003. Robles' motion was therefore not heard at his May 29th court appearance. The Amended Complaint does not set forth what happened thereafter.
III.
"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) which has taken place under color of state law." Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1997). There is a federal constitutional right of access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). To establish a deprivation of this right, a plaintiff must allege "intentional," Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1139 (2d Cir. 1986), or "deliberate," Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986), interference with the right. Moreover, a plaintiff must allege that such interference resulted in "actual injury." Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996)). Actual injury means "that an actionable claim . . . has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is currently being prevented." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356.
Interference with mail sent by an inmate to a court may implicate the right of access to the courts, provided that the interference was deliberate and caused actual injury. See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003). Thus, to state such a claim, "a plaintiff must allege that the defendant took or was responsible for actions that hindered [a plaintiff's] efforts to pursue a legal claim." Id. (citing Monsky, 127 F.3d at 247, and Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351) (internal quotation marks omitted). Unless it results in actual injury to a legal claim, "delay in being able to . . . communicate with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Jermosen v. Coughlin, 877 F. Supp. 864, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also DeLeon v. Doe, 361 F.3d 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal where "the case [plaintiff] claimed had been hindered by the alleged mail delay was dismissed on the merits after a bench trial — not for untimeliness of court submissions.").
Here, the Amended Complaint, liberally construed, alleges that, despite knowledge of its time-sensitive nature, Thomas and Cooney missed as least three opportunities to send out Robles' mail. Similarly, Robles alleges that Mims induced him to sign a grievance resolution form based on her unfulfilled promise to insure that his mail would go out on May 22, 2003. Such allegations, if proven, could support an inference that each defendant intentionally or deliberately failed to send Robles' mail.
The Amended Complaint does not state a claim, however, because it does not allege that Robles suffered an actual injury; that is, it does not allege that the criminal court rejected as untimely Robles' motion to vacate judgment or his notice of appeal, or that the delay in mailing otherwise prevented him from challenging his sentence. See DeLeon, 361 F.3d at 94; Davis, 320 F.3d at 351.
"[T]he court should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated," Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); however, leave to amend need not be granted when it would be futile, see Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Although it is difficult to comprehend how the delay in mailing could have prevented Robles from pursuing his appeal or motion to vacate judgment, see N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law §§ 440.10 (providing that motion to vacate judgment can be made at "any time after the entry of a judgment"), 460.10 (establishing time for filing notice of appeal), 460.30 (providing for extension of time to file notice of appeal in certain circumstances), the Court will afford Robles an opportunity to attempt to allege an actual injury.
The Court notes, however, that, even if Robles states a claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e will limit the types of damages available to him. That statute provides that "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." "Prisoner" is defined to include pretrial detainees, see id. § 1997e(h), and the statute applies even when the plaintiff claims constitutional violations, see Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, absent an allegation of physical injury, Robles will be limited to damages for injuries to his property, if any, along with nominal and punitive damages. See id. at 418. A claim for punitive damages is available under § 1983 only "`when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.'" DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 186 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss, but grants Robles leave to file another amended complaint, which must be designated as the "Second Amended Complaint" and filed within thirty (30) days of the date of this Memorandum and Order. Failure to comply with these directives, or to remedy the pleading defect described in this Memorandum and Order, may result in dismissal.SO ORDERED.