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affirming district court's dismissal of prisoner's § 1983 claims as legally frivolous where plaintiff offered only vague and conclusory allegations
Summary of this case from Chasteen v. BlackOpinion
No. 14-1067
06-25-2014
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-01577-LTB)
(D. Colo.)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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Plaintiff-Appellant Craig S. Robledo, a state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district court's dismissal of his civil rights claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Background
Mr. Robledo is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections. In his second amended prisoner complaint, Mr. Robledo set forth five claims against various prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for property damage and theft, double jeopardy and due process violations related to prison disciplinary proceedings, cruel and unusual conditions of confinement, denial of court access, and First Amendment violations. R. 77-98. The district court found Mr. Robledo offered only vague and conclusory allegations insufficient to state a cognizable claim for relief on any of the five grounds, and dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). R. 160, 170, 173. This appeal followed.
Discussion
We review the district court's dismissal of a prisoner's complaint for frivolousness for an abuse of discretion, but if the frivolousness determination turns on an issue of law, we review the determination de novo. See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006). A complaint is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Mr. Robledo's claims are frivolous for substantially the same reasons as the district court. His deprivation of property claim fails because he has not alleged that the prison's grievance procedure or state court claims are inadequate post-deprivation remedies. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984). As the district court found, the complaint did not allege any particular facet of due process or notice of which Mr. Robledo was deprived, R. 83-86, and he did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his prison classification, see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). His Eighth Amendment allegations do not rise to the level of the "extreme deprivation[] . . . required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim," Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), nor has he alleged that prison officials "kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [his] health or safety," Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see R. 88-89. As to his court access claim, Mr. Robledo has not alleged any "actual injury" or hindrance to "his efforts to pursue a legal claim." See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 (1996); R. 90. And we agree with the district court that Mr. Robledo's First Amendment allegations are vague and conclusory. See R. 91-92, 169. His brief on appeal has not cured these deficiencies or persuaded us otherwise.
Mr. Robledo's motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED, but he remains obligated to continue making partial payments to satisfy the fees already assessed.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge