No. 05-10-00110-CR
Opinion Filed July 30, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F08-71367-LX.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FRANCIS, and MURPHY.
Opinion By Justice MURPHY.
Willie Robinson, Jr. appeals from the adjudication of his guilt for aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years of age. In two issues, appellant contends his plea of true was not knowing and voluntary, and the written judgment should be modified to correct the spelling of trial counsel's first name. We modify and affirm the trial court's judgment. The background of this case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.
Background
Appellant waived a jury, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years of age, and pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt and placed appellant on eight years' community supervision. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated the terms of his community supervision. In a hearing on the motion, appellant pleaded true to all of the allegations in the State's motion. The trial court adjudicated appellant guilty and assessed punishment at twenty-five years' imprisonment. Involuntary Plea
In his first issue, appellant contends his plea of true was not knowing and voluntary because he believed the trial court would continue his probation and order drug treatment. The State responds that appellant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded true to the allegations in the motion to adjudicate. The record shows that during the hearing on the motion to adjudicate, appellant testified he understood that because he had prior felony convictions, the minimum punishment available was a twenty-five-year prison term. Appellant said he understood the allegations in the motion, and he was freely and voluntarily entering a plea of true. Appellant said he tested positive for cocaine on five separate occasions while on community supervision because the people he allowed to use his garage to smoke crack cocaine sometimes gave him free crack cocaine. Appellant said although he understood the prosecutor did not want him continued on community supervision, he hoped the trial court would give him drug treatment and continue his community supervision. Appellant's signed judicial confession and stipulation of evidence that he committed the violations as alleged in the motion was admitted into evidence. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (it is well settled that a judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon a guilty plea). Nothing in the record shows appellant believed he would necessarily receive probation and drug treatment. The fact that he received greater punishment than he hoped for does not render his plea involuntary. See Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). We conclude appellant entered his plea of true knowingly and voluntarily. We resolve appellant's first issue against him. Modify Judgment
In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court's written judgment adjudicating guilt should be modified to correct the spelling of trial counsel's first name. The State agrees with the modification proposed by appellant. The record shows appellant was represented at the hearing by Dwayne Corbett. The judgment adjudicating guilt, however, recites counsel's name as Dewayne Corbett. Thus, the judgment is incorrect. We sustain appellant's second issue. We modify the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt to show the "attorney for defendant" is "Dwayne Corbett." See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). In a cross-point, the State contends the judgment adjudicating guilt should be modified to reflect that appellant is subject to sex offender registration requirements. Appellant's conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child subjects him to statutory sex offender registration requirements. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.001(5)(A), 62.051 (Vernon Supp. 2009). The trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt, however, recites that the sex offender registration requirements do not apply to appellant. Thus, the judgment is incorrect. We sustain the State's cross-point. We modify the judgment adjudicating guilt to show the sex offender registration requirements do apply to appellant, and that the age of the victim at the time of the offense was twelve years of age. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt.