Opinion
No. 10AP-647.
Rendered on March 31, 2011. REGULAR CALENDAR
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, C.P.C. No. 08MS10-742.
Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Paul Skendelas, for appellant.
Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, for appellee.
DECISION
{¶ 1} Petitioner-appellant, Julian Q. Robinson, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition to contest reclassification pursuant to R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032. For the following reasons, we reverse that judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In 1998, appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual battery in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. After a hearing, the court designated appellant a sexually oriented offender under then existing R.C. Chapter 2950.
{¶ 3} At some point, appellant was notified of his reclassification as a Tier III Sex Offender under the newly-enacted Adam Walsh Act. Appellant challenged this reclassification by filing a petition in the trial court to contest the reclassification pursuant to R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032. Appellant asserted a number of constitutional arguments against the application of the Adam Walsh Act to his case.
Appellant now resides in Franklin County and, therefore, filed his petition in the common pleas court of that county.
{¶ 4} Subsequently, in June 2010, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424. In Bodyke, the court held that the reclassification provisions of R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 were unconstitutional. Id. at paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. The court severed those portions of the Adam Walsh Act, but still provided relief to the petitioners, concluding that "the classifications and community-notification and registration orders imposed previously by judges are reinstated." Id. at ¶ 66.
{¶ 5} In light of the Bodyke ruling, the trial court in appellant's case sua sponte dismissed his petition as moot. The trial court took such action because it concluded that the Bodyke decision provided appellant with the relief he sought.
{¶ 6} Appellant appeals and assigns the following error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S RECLASSIFICATION PETITION AS MOOT IN LIEU OF GRANTING JUDGMENT IN HIS FAVOR, FOLLOWING THE DECISION OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT IN STATE V. BODYKE, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.
Assignment of Error — Bodyke Relief
{¶ 7} Appellant contends that the Bodyke decision renders his petition meritorious, not moot, and that the trial court accordingly erred by dismissing his petition. The state argues that appellant cannot obtain relief under R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 because the Supreme Court in Bodyke severed those sections, including the petition procedures found in them. See also Chojnacki v. Cordray, 126 Ohio St. 3d 321, 2010-Ohio-3212.
{¶ 8} This court recently considered the same arguments and concluded that "petitioners who filed their petitions prior to Bodyke being decided are entitled to the relief the Ohio Supreme Court granted to Bodyke." Cook v. Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-641, 2011-Ohio-906, ¶ 9. See also State v. Miliner, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-643, 2010-Ohio-6771, ¶ 13-15; State v. Hazlett, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1069, 2010-Ohio-6119, ¶ 12. Appellant filed his petition before the Bodyke decision and is, therefore, entitled to the relief granted in Bodyke. The trial court erred when it denied appellant such relief.
{¶ 9} Appellant's assignment of error is sustained. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter with instructions to vacate appellant's Tier III reclassification and reinstate appellant's previous classification as a sexually oriented offender.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with instructions.
FRENCH and CONNOR, JJ., concur.