Opinion
CIVIL 4:23-CV-1044
10-17-2023
MICHAEL ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
Mariani, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a screening review of the plaintiff's pro se civil complaint. The plaintiff, Michael Robinson, brought this action against Northumberland County, the state of Pennsylvania, Governor Josh Shapiro, and Anthony Matulewicz, the District Attorney of Northumberland County. (Doc. 1). Robinson's claims arise out of criminal charges that were initiated against him but were ultimately dismissed under Pennsylvania's Speedy Trial rule. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, CP-49-CR-0001672-2019; Pa. R. Crim. P. 600. Robinson contends that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to the county's failure to provide him with a speedy trial. (Doc. 1). He also appears to assert that he was subjected to physical harm by correctional staff at some time before his case was dismissed in 2019. (Id.).
Along with this complaint, Robinson filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). This motion for IFP status was granted, and the complaint was deemed filed pending an initial screening review of the complaint. (Doc. 5). The case was then reassigned to the undersigned. For the following reasons, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints - Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.'” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)). We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
B. This Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted.
After review, we conclude that Robinson's complaint fails as a matter of law. As best we can discern, Robinson asserts Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims alleging that his speedy trial rights were violated; a claim that he was assaulted by guards and inmates as part of a conspiracy while he was incarcerated at some unknown period; and, construing the complaint liberally as we must, a claim that he was maliciously prosecuted in violation of his constitutional rights. However, as we will discuss, these claims fail as a matter of law.
At the outset, while Robinson asserts claims of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment violations arising out of his right to a speedy trial, it is uncontested that Robinson's state criminal case was dismissed on speedy trial grounds. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, CP-49-CR-0001672-2019 (dismissing Robinson's charges on October 11, 2022). Accordingly, given that this criminal case was dismissed, and Robinson never went to trial on these charges, he cannot now assert a speedy trial claim in federal court. See Pumba v. Pennsylvania, 2022 WL 2805522, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2022) (“[B]ecause Pumba's criminal case was dismissed, he cannot pursue a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim through a section 1983 action.”); Posey v. Swissvale Borough, 2013 WL 989953, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2013) (collecting cases); see also Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431, 1446 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that there is no difference between the discussions of due process or speedy trial). Accordingly, Robinson's speedy trial claims fail as a matter of law.
Additionally, the state of Pennsylvania and Governor Shapiro are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. It is well settled that the state and state agencies are immune from lawsuits brought against them in federal court by citizens. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). Accordingly, Robinson cannot bring a § 1983 claim against the state of Pennsylvania or Governor Shapiro. See Ulrich v Corbett, 614 Fed.Appx. 572, 573-74 (3d Cir. 2015).
Further, to the extent Robinson seeks to hold liable the District Attorney of Northumberland County for the criminal charges initiated against him, any decision by the District Attorney to bring these charges and prosecute Robinson would qualify as activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Therefore, the District Attorney would be entitled to immunity from these claims against him.
Robinson's claim that he was assaulted by inmates and prison guards in a conspiracy to violate his rights also fails as a matter of law. As to this claim, Robinson's complaint is completely devoid of factual allegations to support a claim. In fact, to establish a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts from which we could infer that “persons acting under color of state law ‘reached an understanding' to deprive him of his constitutional rights.” Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Adickes v SH. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970)).
Here, Robinson's complaint fails to identify when the alleged assaults occurred, as well as the individuals who allegedly conspired with each other to assault him and violate his rights. Rather, Robinson asserts in a vague and conclusory fashion that he “was held against [his] will in jail abused by gaurds (sic) and inmates in a conspiracy to hurt [him].” (Doc. 1 at 2). In our view, this complaint runs afoul of Rule 8's basic requirement that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.
Finally, to the extent that Robinson's complaint, liberally construed, asserts a claim for malicious prosecution, the complaint falls far short from what is needed to establish such a claim. In order to state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that a criminal proceeding was initiated against him without probable cause and for a purpose other than bringing him to justice, that he suffered a deprivation of his liberty, and that the proceeding was ultimately terminated in his favor. See Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007); Watson v. Witmer, 183 F.Supp.3d 607, 612-13 (M.D. Pa. 2016). With respect to the favorable termination requirement, it is well settled that the “prior criminal case must have been disposed of in a way that indicates the innocence of the accused.” Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009).
In the instant case, Robinson believes that the criminal charges against him were unjustly initiated; however, he alleges no facts from which we could infer the charges were initiated without probable cause, or that they were initiated for a purpose other than bringing him to justice. Moreover, several courts in this circuit have suggested that a dismissal on procedural grounds, such as speedy trial grounds, does not constitute a favorable termination because it does not indicate the innocence of the plaintiff in the underlying criminal case. See e.g., Brown v. Armstrong, 2020 WL 3128271, at *5 (D. Del. June 12, 2020); Burus v. City of Phila., 2013 WL 4763840, at *2 n. 14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2013) (citing Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, at this juncture, the plaintiff has simply not alleged enough for such a claim to proceed, and this claim should be dismissed.
While we recognize that Robinson is a pro se litigant and generally would be entitled to an opportunity to amend his complaint, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004), in our view this complaint is fundamentally flawed in several ways that cannot be cured by amendment. Accordingly, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.