Robinson v. Lovell

12 Citing cases

  1. Compton v. Jay

    389 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1965)   Cited 30 times

    If there be some evidence indicating that a party was intoxicated at the time of the accident in question, to may be corroborated by evidence that he was frequently or habitually drunk. R. T. Herrin Petroleum Transport Co. v. Proctor, 161 Tex. 222, 338 S.W.2d 422 (1960); McCarty v. Gappelberg, 273 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Civ.App., wr. ref., n. r. e., 1954); Robinson v. Lovell, 238 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.Civ.App., wr. ref., n. r. e., 1951); Lewis v. Houston Electric Co., 39 Tex. Civ. App. 625 [ 39 Tex. Civ. App. 625], 112 S.W. 593 (no wr. hist., 1905). See, also McCormick Ray, 2d ed., Texas Law of Evidence, ยง 1512; 23 Tex.Jur.2d ยง 155.

  2. Gilbert v. State

    162 Tex. Crim. 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955)   Cited 13 times
    Discussing timeliness of mandatory appearance before magistrate

    " Both of these authorities were cited by the Galveston Court of Civil Appeals in Robinson v. Lovell, 238 S.W.2d 294, 298, in holding that delay in taking the accused before a magistrate until the office was open or until the prisoner became sober posed the question of whether the delay was reasonable. The provisions of Art. 6701d, V.C.S., were before the Supreme Court of Texas in Hicks v. Matthews, 266 S.W.2d 846, 849, opinion by Chief Justice Hickman, wherein is found the following:

  3. Flores v. Texas Employers Insurance Association

    515 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)   Cited 5 times

    The extent of such examination is largely within the discretion of the trial Court and its ruling will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. Kiel, 195 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Robinson v. Lovell, 238 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.Civ.App.--Galvestion 1951, writ ref'd n.r .e.). Finding no abuse of discretion upon the part of the trial Court, the second point of error is overruled.

  4. Roy L. Martin v. Renfro

    483 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)   Cited 8 times
    In Renfro, the supreme court applied Tamburello's materially-unfair-trial test, but this time, the court took a slightly different approach than it did in Tamburello, choosing not to focus on whether a properly chosen jury would have likely reached a verdict in favor of the complaining parties. Renfro, 483 S.W.2d at 851-52.

    However, this right would exist as a matter of law and would not involve any fact issue. It is urged by Fidelity Deposit that this case is controlled by the decision in Robinson v. Lovell, 238 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.Civ.App. โ€” Galveston 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Robinson, the statement was made by way of dicta, without discussion, that since the insurance company had a cross-action for indemnity for any payment under its surety bond, it was entitled to exercise six separate peremptory challenges as well as the sheriff.

  5. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n v. Charles

    381 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)   Cited 9 times

    Unquestionably the jury should not be purposely informed of the legal consequences of their answers to special issues submitted to them. McFaddin v. Hebert, 118 Tex. 314, 15 S.W.2d 213; Ex parte Fisher, 146 Tex. 328, 206 S.W.2d 1000; Robinson v. Lovell, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 294; Sisk v. Glens-Falls Indemnity Company, Tex.Civ.App.1958, 310 S.W.2d 118. This record contains no evidence that the jurors individually or collectively reasoned out the effect of their answers from the information contained in the court's charge.

  6. Compton v. Jay

    379 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)   Cited 2 times

    The evidence was admissible because appellant had been convicted of a felony offence and touching his credibility as a witness when he denied that he was intoxicated at the time of the collision. Kennedy v. International Great Northern Ry. Co., supra; Crutchfield v. State, 184 Tex.Cr.R. 399, 187 S.W.2d 911; Transport Insurance Company v. Cossaboon (Tex.Civ.App.) 291 S.W.2d 746, W.R., N.R.E.; McCarty v. Gappelberg (Tex.Civ.Appl.), 273 S.W.2d 943, W.R., N.R.E.; R. T. Herrin Petroleum Transport Co. v. Proctor, 161 Tex. 222, 338 S.W.2d 422; Robinson v. Lovell, 238 S.W.2d 294, (Tex.Civ.App.), W.R., N.R.E.; M. K. Hall Co. v. Caballero (Tex.Civ.App.) 358 S.W.2d 179, W.R., N.R.E. The point of error is overruled.

  7. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n v. Dilleshaw

    373 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)   Cited 1 times

    Such argument has been uniformly condemned by our courts as being improper. Robinson v. Lovell, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 294, ref., n. r. e.; Hurley v. McMillan, Tex.Civ.App., 268 S.W.2d 229, ref., n. r. e. In Texas N. O. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 130 Tex. 338, 109 S.W.2d 160, opinion adopted, the Court said:

  8. Sheffield Division Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones

    369 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963)   Cited 3 times
    In Sheffield Division Armco Steel, a Texas court of civil appeals held that it is error for a trial court to tell the jury that plaintiffs in an article 8306 ยง 5 suit were not seeking to recover actual damages.

    This Court has previously held that it is error and an abuse of the trial court's discretion for the court to permit counsel to advise the jury of the legal consequences of any of the jury's findings. Sisk v. Glens Falls Indemnity Company, Tex.Civ.App., 310 S.W.2d 118, 66 A.L.R.2d 1, writ ref., n. r. e.; Robinson v. Lovell, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 294, writ ref., n. r. e. It is likewise error for the trial court to so advise the jury directly. While the procedure may be artificial, the law, under the circumstances of this case, requires that the plaintiff seek actual damages by his suit, and the jury may not be instructed to the contrary.

  9. Lane v. Dallas Transit Co.

    331 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)   Cited 9 times

    "The evidence of antecedent intemperate habits would not be direct evidence upon the actual issue (viz.: was plaintiff intoxicated at the time he was injured?), but would be evidence tending to substantiate the defendant's other proof bearing upon the plaintiff's intoxication at the material time of his accident by way of corroboration. 17 Tex.Jur., "Evidence', p. 412, sec. 147, "Intoxication', and p. 416, sec. 149, "Habit'; McCormick and Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, p. 881, sec. 685, "Intoxication'; Robinson v. Lovell, Tex.Civ.App. Galveston 1951, 238 S.W.2d 294, writ refused, n. r. e., and authorities therein cited."

  10. Sisk v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co.

    310 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958)   Cited 15 times

    It is also elementary that it is an abuse of the trial court's discretion to permit counsel to make a statement to the jury of the legal consequences of any of the jury's findings. Robinson v. Lovell, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 294, writ ref., n. r. e. It follows, therefore, that the court's instruction which prevented plaintiff's attorney from 'arguing in his opinion and closing argument for 401 weeks at $25.00 per week, and showing the jury that the foot was only worth 125 weeks at $25.