Opinion
C. A. 6:24-cv-00146-HMH-JDA
02-12-2024
Joshua Robinson, Plaintiff, v. Greer Police Department, Michael Kimbler, Eric Pressley, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
Joshua Robinson (“Plaintiff”), a non-prisoner litigant, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
Plaintiff has paid the full filing fee and is therefore not proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. [Doc. 18.]
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard form. [Doc. 1.] By way of summary, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Kimbler falsified a CDV “complaint form completely when he fill[ed] it out with his body cam footage, committing the act in uniform.” [Id. at 1.] Plaintiff contends that he recorded Defendant Pressley on his “go pro footage violating [his] rights.” [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant Kimbler has often done this to Plaintiff and that he is no longer in law enforcement. [Id. at 2.]
For his relief, Plaintiff contends that he has been subjected to false imprisonment, that his reputation and business have suffered as a result, that he has to wear an ankle monitor, that he spent three months in jail, and that he is not able to leave the state for work. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff contends he has “lost a tremendous amount of money.” [Id.] Plaintiff contends that he has not seen his child in two years and “DSS just let that woman take the baby.” [Id.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions with domestic violence, first degree, at case number 2021A2320500776; domestic violence, first degree, at case number 2021A2320500775; and resisting arrest at case number 2023A2330210443. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/ PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers listed above) (last visited Jan. 22, 2024).
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
As noted, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, purportedly seeking to vindicate his constitutional rights. [Doc. 1.] That statute “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
As noted, Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Despite Plaintiff's contentions, this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
Younger Abstention
First, the Court should abstain from hearing Plaintiff's claims to the extent he seeks injunctive relief that would interfere with his state court criminal proceedings. The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to the charges pending against Plaintiff in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions as well as his prior detention in the Greenville County Detention Center on those charges and his present ankle monitoring as a result of those charges.
Plaintiff does not appear to seek release from custody and, in any event, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus). “Release from pretrial detention is simply not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.” El v. Fornandes, No. 2:19-cv-3045-RMG-MGB, 2019 WL 7900140, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (explaining a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to get out of jail), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6712057 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2019).
Further, as Plaintiff appears to seek injunctive relief related to his pending state court criminal charges, including dismissal of those charges, such claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that the pending state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are improper and violate his constitutional rights. Granting Plaintiff any injunctive relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin the pending state court criminal proceedings against him. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Hum. Rels., 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state court criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations related to his pending criminal actions; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted “that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from adjudicating Plaintiff's claims.
Failure to State a Claim
Further, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal because his allegations fail to state a claim for relief. The Complaint appears to assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment for false imprisonment and/or malicious prosecution. Plaintiff may also be asserting claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for due process violations. The Court will address each claim in turn below.
Further, the undersigned concludes that, to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert claims not addressed herein, those claims also would be subject to dismissal for failing to state a claim.
Fourth Amendment, False Imprisonment
First, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting claims for unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, and/or malicious prosecution, his claims are without merit. The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Section 1983 actions premised on claims including false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead the minimum facts necessary to state a cognizable claim for a Fourth Amendment violation. This is so because, under § 1983, a public official cannot be charged with unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, or malicious prosecution when the search and arrest are based on probable cause. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause.”). Moreover, “an indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Provet v. S.C., No. 6:07-cv-1094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (explaining § 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded based on the filing of an indictment). Here, the grand jury sitting in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit filed indictments for the charges pending against Plaintiff. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/ Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers 2021A2320500775 and 2021A2320500776) (last visited Jan. 22, 2024). The indictments act as a bar to Plaintiff's claims as to those charges. Therefore, any Fourth Amendment claims related to those charges are subject to summary dismissal.
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Due Process
Likewise, to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations may be construed as asserting due process claims under the Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendments, any such claims fail because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing he was subjected to any deprivation of due process to support such a claim. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a procedural due process violation with regard to the charges pending against him, the investigation into the crimes he is charged with, or his purportedly unlawful incarceration, he has failed to allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible. Additionally, such claims are subject to dismissal for the reasons already stated. Thus, the Court should abstain from deciding such claims under Younger. Further, at this stage, the indictments against Plaintiff act as a bar to any such claims as previously discussed. In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state any cognizable constitutional claim, and this action is therefore subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
Consequently, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action without issuance and service of process and without leave to amend.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).