Opinion
2:23-cv-10255
07-15-2024
TYRONE PHIPPS ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. JODI DeANGELO, M. MATES, JEFFREY HOUCK, and DYLAN SCHATZ, Defendants.
Susan K. DeClercq District Judge
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY MDOC DEFENDANTS HOUCK AND SCHATZ'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF EXHAUSTION (ECF No. 15)
ANTHONY P. PATTI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION: The Court should DENY MDOC Defendants Houck and Schatz's motion for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion (ECF No. 15).
II. REPORT
A. Background
Tyrone Phipps Robinson was paroled from the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) on December 12, 2023 and is currently at a private address. (See www.michigan.gov/corrections, “Offender Search,” last visited July 12, 2024; ECF No. 22.) In February 2023, while located at the MDOC's Woodland Center Correctional Facility (WCC), Robinson filed the instant lawsuit concerning the alleged events of September 29, 2022 at WCC. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 8.) Robinson originally named four defendants. (Id., ¶¶ 4-7.) However, on March 30, 2023, the Court summarily dismissed with prejudice Defendants Jodi DeAngelo (WCC
Warden) and M. Mates (WCC Deputy Warden). (ECF No. 4.) Therefore, only Defendants Jeffrey Houck and Dylan Schatz (WCC Correctional Officers) remain.
Although this case was referred to the Pro Se Prisoner Early Mediation Program and scheduled for an August 22, 2023 mediation conference (ECF Nos. 5, 7), on July 12, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to lift the stay, lifted the stay, and directed service (ECF Nos. 8, 9). In a letter dated September 19, 2023, Plaintiff claims he was called to participate in mediation on August 22, 2023 (even though it had been cancelled), and he sought to know if there had been any development in his case, as he had not received any correspondence. (ECF No. 17.) The Court assumes this report will provide Plaintiff with the status he seeks.
B. Pending Motion
This case has been referred to me for pretrial matters. (ECF No. 10.) Currently before the Court is MDOC Defendants Houck and Schatz's September 21, 2023 motion for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion (ECF No. 15), as to which Plaintiff filed a timely response (ECF Nos. 16, 18), and Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 19).Defendants' motion is ready for decision.
Plaintiff also submitted a “reply to response,” dated October 30, 2023 (ECF No. 20), but it was stricken on November 2, 2023 as an unauthorized sur-reply brief (ECF No. 21).
C. Discussion
1. Plaintiff's verified pleading
Plaintiff signed his complaint under penalty of perjury. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5); therefore, it constitutes an unsworn declaration. 28 U.S.C. § 1746. He alleges that, on September 29, 2022, he was “assigned to monitor Prisoner Hall, due to him being on a ‘hunger strike'.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 8.) According to Plaintiff, Hall had a “management plan,” which required him “to be in restraints every time he exit[ed] his cell[,]” and Defendants Houck and Schatz “were aware of . . . Hall's restraint requirements[,]” presumably because Hall's cell door was “clearly marked with a big red sign that reads[,] ‘Restraints'[,]” and Hall's management plan “was easily accessible[.]” (Id., ¶¶ 9, 10, 16.)
Plaintiff alleges that, during lunch, Defendants Houck and Schatz escorted Hall “from his cell . . . across the base[] to a waiting module[,]” but they did not place him in “restraints[.]” (Id., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that, without provocation, Hall “proceeded to assault [P]laintiff[,]” after which Plaintiff “required medical attention ....” (Id., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges he “was diagnosed by a doctor with musculoskeletal injury as a result of the assault by inmate Hall.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 13.) In support of his allegations, Plaintiff attaches: (a) the declaration of Dante Webb (#359162) (ECF No. 1, PageID.9), who claims to have witnessed the incident in question; and, (b) an October 6, 2022 MDOC Kite Response (id., PageID.7), which indicates a nurse visit was scheduled and notes “musculoskeletal” under “comments.” (See also id., ¶¶ 13, 20.)
Plaintiff's legal claims are based on Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference, Fourteenth Amendment due process, and negligence. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 23-33; see also id., ¶¶ 17-19.) Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Schatz and Houck “violated [his] due process rights by not placing inmate Hall in restraints.” (Id., ¶ 17.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. (Id., ¶¶ 34-40; see also id., ¶¶ 1, 33.)
2. Exhaustion of available administrative remedies
Defendants argue that Plaintiff “did not properly exhaust administrative remedies on his claims against MDOC Defendants Houck or Schatz.” (ECF No. 15, PageID.59, 69.) “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “The PLRA's exhaustion requirement . . . requires ‘proper' exhaustion, which includes compliance with a state agency's timeliness deadlines.” Siggers v. Campbell, 652 F.3d 681, 692 (6th Cir. 2011). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). Nonetheless, “[a] prisoner need not exhaust remedies if they are not ‘available.'” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 636 (2016).
a. WCC-22-10-0213-28I
The relevant version of the MDOC's grievance procedure explains that “[c]omplaints filed by prisoners regarding grievable issues . . . serve to exhaust a prisoner's administrative remedies only when filed as a grievance through all three steps of the grievance process in compliance with this policy.” MDOC PD 03.02.130 ¶ C (Mar. 18, 2019). (ECF No. 15-2, PageID.76.) As of April 12, 2023, i.e., approximately two months after Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, Plaintiff's MDOC Prisoner Step III Grievance Report listed only five grievances pursued through Step III, only two of which concerned WCC. (ECF No. 15-3, PageID.87-88.) Moreover, the timing of the two WCC Step I grievances - one of which was received before the event in question - suggests that only one could relate to the allegations in this case. (Id.)
Plaintiff's Step I grievance form regarding the alleged events of September 29, 2022 was received at Step I on October 5, 2022 and assigned Grievance Identifier WCC-22-10-0213-28I. (ECF No. 1, PageID.11.) In response to the question(s), “[w]hat attempt did you make to resolve this issue prior to writing this grievance[,]” and, “[i]f none, explain why[,]” Plaintiff wrote: “There was no avenue to resolve issue, protocol failed.” (Id.) Then, within the text of the grievance, Plaintiff states, inter alia: “Officer Shantz and two (2) other officers (one being OJT), failed to restrain [Prisoner] Hall and prisoner Hall took that opportunity to assault me . . ., without provocation.” (Id.)
b. Step I rejection for failure to attempt to resolve the issue with staff
Grievance Coordinator Mikat rejected WCC-0213 at Step I, explaining that Plaintiff “failed to attempt to re[s]olve issue with staff.” (Id.) “A grievance shall be rejected by the Grievance Coordinator if . . . [t]he grievant did not attempt to resolve the issue with the staff member involved prior to filing the grievance unless prevented by circumstances beyond his/her control ....” MDOC PD 03.02.130 ¶ J(4). (ECF No. 15-2, PageID.77.) “As long as the state clearly rejects a grievance for a reason explicitly set forth in the applicable grievance procedure, ‘a subsequent § 1983 claim based on the grievance will be subject to dismissal for failure to properly exhaust.'” Burnett v. Howard, No. 2:09-CV-37, 2010 WL 1286256, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2010) (quoting Grear v. Gelabert, No. 07-cv-203, 2008 WL 474098, at *2 n. 1 (W.D. Mich. Feb.15, 2008)).
Based on this guidance, Defendants argue that WCC-0213 “did not exhaust any claims against Houck or Schatz[,] because it was rejected through the grievance process.” (ECF No. 15, PageID.70 (emphasis added).)Put another way, Defendants contend WCC-22-10-0213-28I “was rejected at Step I, and the rejection was affirmed through Step III.” (ECF No. 15, PageID.71 (emphases added).)
On three occasions Defendants cite “WCC-218,” (see ECF No. 15, PageID.70-71); these are scrivener's errors (see id., PageID.62; ECF No. 15-3, PageID.87), as admitted by Defendants in their reply (see ECF No. 19, PageID.110 n.1).
c. Step II appeal challenging the propriety of the Step I rejection
Plaintiff's Step II appeal challenged the propriety of the Step I rejection. By way of background, as Plaintiff alleges in his pleading, he “attempted to resolve this issue with all the named defendants[,]” further alleging that, “when confronted with the facts of the assault . . . [,]” former Defendant Mates “gave plaintiff a direct order to ‘sit down and be quiet'.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges he then filed his grievance, “alleging defendants failed to protect him from being assaulted by inmate Hall[;]” still, Grievance Coordinator Mikat rejected the grievance, because Plaintiff “did not attempt to resolve this issue with staff.” (Id., ¶¶ 15, 21.)
Plaintiff alleges he “clearly attempted to resolve[] the issue with all the defendants.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 16.) Consistent with these allegations, Plaintiff's Step II appeal explained: “It was Officer Houck, Officer S[c]hatz, that violated my 8th Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. When I tried to get answers[,] the Deputy Warden/Mates, told me to sit down and be quiet. Therefore[,] it was staff that allowed no avenue to resolve this issue.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.13 (emphasis added).)
d. Warden DeAngelo's merits-based Step II response
Plaintiff's Step II grievance appeal was received on October 24, 2022. (Id.) In her October 27, 2022 Step II Appeal Response, former Defendant Warden DeAngelo stated: “I have reviewed your Step I Grievance, the Step I Response, and your Step II Reason for your Appeal[.]” (Id., PageID.15.) DeAngelo summarized the Step II investigation as follows: “Reviewed Step I. Obtained prisoner Hall's management plan. Confirmed issue was being address[ed].” (Id.) She concluded: “This issue is [being] looked into/handled administratively.” (Id.)
In Plaintiff's motion response, he contends DeAngelo “did not reject [his] grievance but in fact confirmed the issue,” i.e., “[t]he MDOC clearly addressed the issue.” (ECF No. 18, ¶ 6.) I agree. Far from “rejecting” Plaintiff's Step II appeal (for allegedly failing to attempt resolution prior to filing the Step I grievance), Warden DeAngelo moved on from Grievance Coordinator Mikat's initial posture to addressing the issues on the merits at Step II. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). (See ECF No. 15, PageID.66; ECF No. 18, ¶ 18.) Moreover, “[a]n inmate exhausts a claim by taking advantage of each step the prison holds out for resolving the claim internally and by following the ‘critical procedural rules' of the prison's grievance process to permit prison officials to review and, if necessary, correct the grievance ‘on the merits' in the first instance.” Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90, 95) (internal quotation marks omitted). (See ECF No. 18, ¶ 10.)
Citing Jones, Reed-Bey, and other cases, Plaintiff has convincingly argued that DeAngelo “addressed the merits of Plaintiff's grievance by confirming the issue and also rejecting the issue.” (ECF No. 18, ¶¶ 25, 26.) In effect, DeAngelo's Step II response, even if implicitly, dispenses with the Step I reason for rejection by proceeding to address Plaintiff's Step II appeal on the merits. Put another way, “[t]he prison had a fair shot a[t] correcting its own alleged mistakes[,]” “[i]t created a valuable administrative record[,]” and “the defendants are merely seeking to insulate their merits-base[d] grievance denial from Federal review.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 27.) See Sweezer v. Heyns, No. 13-CV-14382, 2015 WL 417532, *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2015) (Murphy, J.) (“The prison has had a fair shot at correcting its own alleged mistakes. It has created a valuable administrative record. And, as in Reed-Bey, the Defendants are merely seeking to insulate their merits-based grievance denial from federal review.”)
Defendants' attempt to defend their position is unavailing, as their response merely states, “regardless of what happened at Step II in WCC-213, the rejection was affirmed at Step III. As such, WCC-213 did not exhaust any claims.” (ECF No. 19, PageID.110 (emphasis added).) This argument does nothing to address the fact that “[a] grievant may file a Step II grievance if s/he is dissatisfied with the response received at Step I ....” MDOC PD 03.02.130 ¶ DD. (ECF No. 15-2, PageID.81.) Perhaps the MDOC anticipated this predicament, as the subsequent, current version of the policy additionally provides: “If a pre-Step II procedural error is identified at Step II, the Step II appeal shall not be answered and the Step I response shall be returned to Step I for an amended response to correct the procedural error. All rights and timeframes for appeal of the amended Step I grievance shall be reset.” MDOC PD 03.02.130 ¶ JJ (effective Sept. 25, 2023). In any event, contrary to Defendants' contention that WCC-22-10-0213-28I “was rejected at Step I, and the rejection was affirmed through Step III[,]” (ECF No. 15, PageID.71), DeAngelo neither affirmed the “failure to attempt resolution” basis of the Step I rejection, nor did she reject Plaintiff's Step II appeal. Moreover, the Court does not just disregard what actually happened at Step II, despite Defendants' invitation to do so. Whatever misunderstanding there may have been about Plaintiff's efforts to resolve the matter before filing a Step I grievance, the merits were addressed at Step II, thereby overruling - even if implicitly - the initial, Step I rejection.
e. The Step III response “upheld” the rejection
Following DeAngelo's Step II merits-based response, Plaintiff completed a Step III appeal, which was received on November 4, 2022. (ECF No. 1, PageID.13, 14, 15.) Somewhat oddly, Plaintiff's Step III appeal “upheld” the “rejection,” further explaining, “[t]his decision cannot be appealed within the department.” (Id., PageID.13, 14.) The Step III response was mailed on November 16, 2022. (Id., PageID.14.)
As Plaintiff contends in his motion response, he “fully [took] advantage of each step the prison held out for resolving the claim internally and by following the critical procedural rules of the grievance process to permit prison officials to review and if necessary correct the grievance on the merits.” (ECF No. 18, ¶¶ 25.) See also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91; Reed-Bey, 603 F.3d at 324. Defendants should not benefit from a Step III response that upholds a Step I rejection when the respondent has “skipped over” or “ignored” a Step II merits-based response that essentially overrules the purported Step I rejection. That would be akin to “insulat[ing] the[] merits-based grievance denial from federal review.” Sweezer, 2015 WL 417532, *4.
f. Absence of Defendant Houck's name at Step I
One additional issue merits discussion. In their motion, Defendants acknowledge that Step I of WCC-22-10-0213-28I mentions “Officer Shantz and two (2) other officers (one being OJT) ....” (ECF No. 1, PageID.11; see also ECF No. 15, PageID.62.) In arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust “any claims against Houck or Schatz[,]” Defendants generically point out, inter alia, that Plaintiff needed to “file a Step I grievance where he named each individual defendant and raised - as issues being grieved - the claims asserted in the complaint[.]” (ECF No. 15, PageID.69.) They also note that, “[u]nder the Department of Corrections' procedural rules, inmates must include the ‘[d]ates, times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved' in their initial grievance.” Reed-Bey, 603 F.3d at 324 (quoting MDOC PD 03.02.130 ¶ T (effective Dec. 19, 2003). (Id., PageID.70.) There is a similar provision in the relevant version of the MDOC's grievance policy: “Dates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved are to be included.” MDOC PD 03.02.130 ¶ S. (See ECF No. 15-2, PageID.79.) Yet - notwithstanding Defendants' aforementioned acknowledgment within the “Statement of Facts” that “Schatz” was “grieved at Step I” of WCC-22-10-0213-28i (id., PageID.62), related generic statement, and related case citation - it is not until their reply that they argue that: “Robinson named Schatz but did not name Houck at Step I in WCC-213[,]” and, therefore, “Houck is subject to dismissal on this separate basis.” (ECF No. 19, PageID.113.)
There are several reasons why the issue of whether Houck was named in the Step I grievance does not aid Defendants' cause. First, “even well-developed arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief come too late.” Stewart v. IHT Ins. Agency Grp., LLC, 990 F.3d 455, 457 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Island Creek Coal Co. v. Wilkerson, 910 F.3d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 2018)). Thus, even though Plaintiff's response touched upon the issue, as will be seen below, the Court need not address an argument Defendant first makes in its reply.
Second, the MDOC did not reject WCC-213 for failure to identify the allegedly responsible individuals as required by MDOC PD 03.02.130 ¶ S. As the parties seem to acknowledge: “When prison officials decline to enforce their own procedural requirements and opt to consider otherwise-defaulted claims on the merits, so as a general rule will we.” Reed-Bey, 603 F.3d at 325. Indeed, “[t]he rules serve the State's interests: its interest in creating a prison grievance system, its interest in reviewing a complaint before another sovereign gets involved and its interest in deciding when to waive or enforce its own rules. And the State's decision to review a claim on the merits gives us a warrant to do so as well, even when a procedural default might otherwise have resolved the claim.” Id. See also Holloway v. McLaren, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14644, *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 7, 2016) (“Because MDOC officials addressed the merits of Holloway's grievance at each step and did not enforce any procedural requirements, Holloway's failure to identify the defendants named in this lawsuit and to specify any wrongdoing by them in his grievances cannot provide the basis for dismissal of his complaint for lack of exhaustion.”). (ECF No. 18, ¶ 16; ECF No. 19, PageID.112.)
Finally, Plaintiff's Step I grievance in WCC-22-10-0213-28I did provide sufficient notice. Plaintiff - who seems to have caught a faint whiff of this issue within Defendants' motion - addressed it in his response (see ECF No. 18), pointing out that even if Houck was not expressly named at Step I, Plaintiff's Step I grievance provided “sufficient notice” as to the individuals allegedly involved in the incident in question. See, e.g., Kirschke v. Schooley, No. 20-11118, 2022 WL 2192927 (E.D. Mich. June 17, 2022) (Roberts, J.) (“Although Kennedy was not named in the grievance, she and administrators had sufficient notice of Kirschke's allegations.”). (ECF No. 18, ¶ 24.) This Court has previously explained:
Although [Plaintiff]'s grievance did not include [Defendant]'s name, it put prison administration on notice and gave all a fair opportunity to address the alleged [incident]. There will always be instances where an inmate wants to file a grievance and may not know all of the involved parties until a later date. Inmates are under a strict timeline -10 days - to file a grievance. **** Inmates are not foreclosed from relief simply because they failed to include one official while attempting to comply with strict deadlines given the resources at their disposal. **** [Plaintiff]'s grievance against the named Defendants
included all the information needed for the coordinator to assess the merit of the alleged [incident].Kirschke, 2022 WL 2192927, at *6. (ECF No. 18, ¶ 23.) When Robinson wrote, “Officer Shantz and two (2) other officers (one being OJT), failed to restrain [Prisoner] Hall . . . [,]” (ECF No. 1, PageID.11), prison administrators or prison officials had sufficient information to identify those allegedly at fault.
Incidentally, Plaintiff filled in this “blank” in his Step II and Step III appeals, each of which mentions Houck and Schatz (Schatz). (ECF No. 1, PageID.13.) (See also ECF No. 18, ¶¶ 4, 7.)
Defendants' arguments in reply are, on balance, unavailing. To begin, Defendants contend that Plaintiff misunderstands Jones, which concerned a prior version of MDOC PD 03.02.130 (effective Nov. 1, 2000), observed that “[n]othing in the MDOC policy itself supports the conclusion that the grievance process was improperly invoked simply because an individual later named as a defendant was not named at the first step of the grievance process[,]” and held that “exhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 206, 218, 219. (ECF No. 19, PageID.111-112.) As Defendants accurately note - citing a post-Jones Sixth Circuit unpublished case - “a plaintiff generally fails to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to include an official's name in a grievance if it is required by the applicable grievance procedures[.]” Hall v. Warren, 443 Fed.Appx. 99, 106 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Sullivan v. Kasajaru, 316 Fed.Appx. 469, 470 (6th Cir.2009)). (ECF No. 19, PageID.111.) As noted above, MDOC PD 03.02.130 ¶ S requires “names of all those involved in the issue being grieved ....” (ECF No. 15-2, PageID.79.)
Yet, even if Plaintiff, a non-lawyer, misunderstands Jones, the second part of Defendants' argument - i.e., Plaintiff misunderstands Reed-Bey - is unavailing. In Reed-Bey, the Sixth Circuit concluded that, “[b]ecause the Michigan Department of Corrections opted to dismiss [Reed's] grievance on the merits rather than invoke its procedural bar,” - i.e., addressing it on the merits rather than rejecting it for failure “to identify the ‘names of all those involved'” - “Reed-Bey exhausted his claim.” Reed-Bey, 603 F.3d at 323 (emphasis added). To clarify Reed-Bey, Defendants cite Brown v. McCullick, No. 18-2226, 2019 WL 5436159, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 2019) (“In addition to Brown's not mentioning the defendants at steps I or II of the grievance process, the step III grievance response did not mention any of the defendants. Accordingly, because Brown failed to name Rivard, McCullick, Parsons, and Williams at step I of this grievance, he failed to exhaust his claims against them.”).
Under these circumstances, Plaintiff's failure to name Houck at Step I does not entitle Houck “to dismissal on this separate basis.” (ECF No. 19, PageID.113.)
D. Conclusion
In the end, the Court must make a decision based on the evidence before it, which includes Plaintiff's verified complaint and its exhaustion-related attachments (ECF No. 1) and the relevant MDOC policy (ECF No. 15-2), as well as the Affidavit for Step III Grievances, Step III Grievance Report, and Grievance WCC-22-10-2130-28l attached to the MDOC Defendants' motion (ECF No. 15-3). Consideration of this evidence reveals that Defendants are not “entitled to judgment as a matter of law[,]” - nor a trial on this specific factual issue - because there is no “genuine dispute” as to exhaustion. Plaintiff has shown he properly exhausted his available administrative remedies in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and as contemplated by Woodford, Jones, and Siggers, particularly where the MDOC chose to “waive [rather than] enforce its own rules.” Reed-Bey, 603 F.3d at 325. Accordingly, the Court should DENY MDOC Defendants Houck and Schatz's exhaustion-based motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15).
III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 144 (1985); Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991). Filing objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.
Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.