Opinion
23-CV-10552 (LTS)
07-31-2024
LAKIEA ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. COCA-COLA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff, who resides in Bridgeport, Connecticut, is appearing pro se. She brings this complaint against her former employer and union, Coca-Cola and Teamsters Local 812, alleging that she was subjected to discrimination and retaliation in the workplace and that the union breached its duty of fair representation. By order dated December 12, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
Shortly after commencing this action, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (ECF 3.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
BACKGROUND
This action is one of six lawsuits filed in 2023 and 2024 by Plaintiff relating to or arising out of her employment at a Coca-Cola factory in Elmsford, Westchester County, New York, which ended in 2017. Using the court's amended employment discrimination complaint form, Plaintiff asserts claims of discrimination and retaliation based on race, color, sex, age, and disability, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York State and City Human Rights Law. She also asserts that other federal and state laws were violated, including laws relating to whistleblower protections, securities, “interfering in arbitration,” defamation, and privacy rights. (ECF 3, at 4.)
See Robinson v. Magna Care, ECF 1:24-CV-0869 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 5, 2024) (claims arising from disclosure of billing information by insurance provider; amended complaint filed after order to amend); Robinson v. Kelly, ECF 1:24-CV-0625, 4 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2024) (allegations of unauthorized disclosure of information to former employer; case transferred to District of Connecticut); Robinson v. Bagwell, ECF 1:24-CV-0621, 1 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 29, 2024) (defamation claims against former coworkers); Robinson v. Aetna, No. 1:23-CV-11100, 1 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 2023) (claim that FMLA leave was improperly denied); Robinson v. Sedgewick Claims Mgmt. Servs., ECF 1:23-CV-10782, 9 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2024) (dismissing claims arising from denial of application for workers' compensation benefits). Plaintiff's husband, Kenji Robinson, has also filed a purported “Bystander Lawsuit” in which he asserts claims arising from the denial of Plaintiff's application for workers' compensation benefits). See Robinson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., ECF 1:24-CV-3152, 1 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 24, 2024).
Plaintiff's amended complaint consists of the court's amended complaint form to which she attaches 183 pages of documents, including a November 17, 2023 Notice of Right to Sue from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which states that the charge was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (ECF 3-1, at 1); and 35 separate discrimination charges she filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”) (id. at 2-183). Plaintiff identifies herself in the amended complaint as an African-American woman born in 1972 who suffers from panic attacks, PTSD, anxiety, and “workplace stress disorder.” (ECF 3, at 4.) She does not provide a statement of facts, but instead refers the Court to the 35 NYSDHR charges. In those charges, she asserts that she was employed at CocaCola from August 1, 1995 to April 1, 2017, and that, during this period of more than twenty years, she was subjected to disparate treatment because of her race, color, sex, age, and disability, and retaliated against because of complaints about the alleged discrimination and other unlawful conduct. In the NYSDHR charges, Plaintiff describes multiple incidents during her two decades of employment at Coca-Cola that she perceived as unlawful discrimination and retaliation and she repeatedly asserts that she was coerced to “force quit.” (ECF 3, at 5.) She also claims that her former union failed to adequately represent her in connection with the termination of her employment in April 2017.
DISCUSSION
A. Short and Plain Statement of Claim
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court need not accept, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
As a general matter, Plaintiff's amended complaint does not comply with Rule 8. The amended complaint consists of references to 35 discrimination charges that Plaintiff filed with the NYSDHR, most of which contain conclusory and duplicative assertions about how various employees allegedly violated her rights while she was employed at Coca-Cola. The amended complaint does not include a short and plain statement showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to replead her claims in a second amended complaint that complies with Rule 8 and the standards set forth below.
B. Claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA
1. Timeliness
Before filing suit in federal court under Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA, a plaintiff must first file a timely charge with the EEOC or appropriate state or local agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating into the ADA the filing requirements for Title VII claims); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (ADEA); see also Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 77 (2d Cir. 2023). In New York, this charge must be filed with the administrative agency within 300 days of the alleged act of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B); see Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002); Buon, 65 F.4th at 77. “The filing requirement is analogous to a statute of limitations, barring all claims arising outside the 300-day period.” Kirkland-Hudson v. Mt. Vernon City Sch. Dist., 665 F.Supp.3d 412, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (citation omitted); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392 (1982). A claim under Title VII is time-barred when a plaintiff fails to file a timely charge with the EEOC. See Butts v. N.Y. Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072. This 300-day period is not jurisdictional, however, and it is subject to equitable tolling. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393.
Equitable tolling is, however, “only appropriate in rare and exceptional circumstances, in which a party is prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising [her] rights.” Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). To obtain the benefit of equitable tolling, a plaintiff must show: (1) that she acted with reasonable diligence during the time period tolled, and (2) that extraordinary circumstances justify the application of the doctrine. Id.
Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting that any of the alleged discriminatory conduct of which she complains occurred within the limitations period. She asserts that Coca-Cola discriminated against her throughout her more than twenty years of employment, and that she was forced to quit on April 1, 2017. She further asserts that Teamsters Local 812 breached its duty of fair representation in connection with the termination of her employment. Plaintiff's claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA therefore accrued, at the latest, on April 1, 2017. If this is so, she would have had 300 days, or until about January 26, 2018, to file a discrimination charge. Plaintiff does not allege when she filed her discrimination charges, but on November 17, 2023, the EEOC issued her a Notice of Right to Sue, which dismissed her charge for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF 3-1, at 1.) It therefore appears that Plaintiff filed her discrimination charges well past the 300-day period and that her claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA are untimely.
Because the failure to file an action within the limitations period is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff is generally not required to plead that the case is timely filed. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the existence of an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, is plain from the face of the pleading. See Walters v. Indus. and Com. Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 293 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss an action sua sponte on limitations grounds in certain circumstances where the facts supporting the statute of limitations defense are set forth in the papers plaintiff himself submitted.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint as frivolous on statute of limitations grounds); see also Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640 (concluding that district court should grant notice and opportunity to be heard before dismissing complaint sua sponte on statute of limitations grounds).
It is clear from the face of the pleadings that Plaintiff's Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claims are time-barred. Nothing in the complaint suggests that Plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling because she was unaware of the alleged discrimination when it occurred or that she was prevented from filing a timely charge. The Court, however, grants her leave to include in her second amended complaint any facts showing that she is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. See Roberts v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 11-CV-1321 (NAM), 2014 WL 1312371, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (relying on Delaware State College v. Packs, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980), and holding that the charge-filing limitations period “may be tolled by evidence of a continuing violation, or waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling”).
2. Sufficiency of pleading
Even if Plaintiff had asserted timely claims, she does not allege facts suggesting that she was subjected to adverse employment actions that “give rise to a plausible inference of discrimination” or retaliation in violation of Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA. Buon, 65 F.4th at 83 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual because of her race, color, religion, sex or national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); the ADA makes it unlawful for covered employers to discriminate against an otherwise qualified employee on the basis of a disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); and the ADEA protects an individual from employment discrimination based on her age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
The ADEA protects workers who are at least forty years old from discrimination because of their age. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.”); Feldman v. Nassau Cnty., 434 F.3d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 2006).
These statutes prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual's protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Protected characteristics include an individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or age. Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee's protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
At the pleading stage in a Title VII employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against [her], and (2) [her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). A plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. The same pleading framework has been applied to disability-based employment discrimination claims under the ADA. See Ciulla-Notto v. Xerox Corp., No. 16-CV-6362, 2017 WL 491688, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2017) (noting that, although Vega set forth the pleading standard in the context of Title VII, courts routinely use the same framework to analyze claims under the ADA). To plead a cause of action under the ADEA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that her age was the but-for cause of the employer's adverse employment action. See Vega, 801 F.3d at 86 (quoting Gross v. FBL Fins. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009)).
Plaintiff also invokes the Rehabilitation Act, but that statute applies only to entities that receive federal funding, and has no apparent relevance to Plaintiff's claims against Coca-Cola and the Teamsters Local 812. See T.W. v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 996 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2021).
Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting that Defendants discriminated or retaliated against her based on her race, color, sex, age, or on account of a disability. Beyond identifying herself as being an African-American woman born in 1972 who suffers from panic attacks, PTSD, anxiety, and work-related stress, Plaintiff does not allege any facts in support of her race, color, age, or disability discrimination claims. She refers the court to her NYSDHR charges, which describe multiple incidents during her over two decades of employment at Coca-Cola that she perceived as harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. Plaintiff's allegations in the NYSDHR charges are insufficient to state a claim under the antidiscrimination statutes she cites, but the Court grants her leave to file a second amended complaint should she wish to do so.
C. Claims under Section 1981
Plaintiff also invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as a basis for her race-based claims. Section 1981 “protects the equal right of ‘[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States' to ‘make and enforce contracts' without respect to race.” Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). The statute “sets forth a remedy for employment discrimination that is independent of Title VII.” Ofori-Tenkorang v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 2006).
There is a three-year or four-year limitation period in which to bring a claim under Section 1981. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004) (claims under Section 1981 are governed by a four-year statute of limitations “if the plaintiff's claim against the defendant was made possible by” an Act of Congress enacted after Dec. 1, 1990); Richardson v. City of New York, No. 17-CV-9447 (JPO), 2018 WL 4682224, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018) (“Where a Section 1981 claim asserts the sort of discrimination in contract formation that would have been actionable prior to 1991, it is subject to the state statute [of limitations] applicable to personal injury claims, which in New York is three years.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “A § 1981 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action.” Mamot v. Bilingual, Inc., No. 21-CV-6716 (LTS), 2021 WL 4429566, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
From the face of the amended complaint, Plaintiff's Section 1981 claims are time-barred. The last allegedly adverse employment action against Plaintiff occurred on April 1, 2017, when her employment was terminated. She filed this action on December 1, 2023, more than six years and eight months later. Plaintiff's Section 1981 claims are untimely.
Furthermore, as with her other employment discrimination claims, Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that Defendants subjected her to any adverse actions because of her race in violation of Section 1981. She does not provide non-conclusory allegations that plausibly suggest that her race or color was a “but-for” cause for the termination of her employment or any other action taken against her. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020) (“[A] plaintiff must . . . plead . . . that, but for race, [the plaintiff] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.”). Plaintiff therefore does not state a viable claim of discrimination in violation of Section 1981.
If Plaintiff decides to pursue a claim under Section 1981 in a second amended complaint, she must allege facts suggesting that, but for her race, she would not have been subjected to an adverse action and that her claims should be equitably tolled.
D. Claims under the FMLA
Plaintiff invokes the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), but alleges no facts with respect to that claim. The FMLA allows covered employees to take up to twelve weeks of leave per year to care for the employee's own serious health condition or to care for a parent, spouse, or child who has a serious health condition. Higgins v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 836 F.Supp.2d 182, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612). Claims under the FMLA are generally subject to a two-year limitations period, but claims based on “willful” misconduct are subject to a three-year limitations period. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1), (2). A plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an FMLA claim, see Manos v. Geissler, 377 F.Supp.2d 422, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), and the limitations period is not tolled while an administrative discrimination charge is pending, see Redman v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs., No. 10-CV-5368 (VB), 2011 WL 5119574, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2011).
Any FMLA claims Plaintiff is asserting arising out of her employment with Coca-Cola is time-barred. Because Plaintiff's employment terminated on April 1, 2017, the limitations period for any FMLA claims she may have expired two years later, on April 1, 2019, or, if the FMLA violations could be considered willful, expired three years later, on April 1, 2020. Plaintiff filed her complaint more than three years and eight months after the latest possible date to bring any FMLA claims she may have.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to provide facts in support of viable FMLA claims in the second amended complaint. Should Plaintiff assert FMLA claims, she must allege facts showing that her claims should not be dismissed as untimely because she acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled, and she faced circumstances so extraordinary that equitable tolling should apply. See Bento v. New York City Dep't of Citywide Admin. Servs., No. 19-CV-5003 (LTS) (SDA), 2020 WL 1434570, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020) (citing Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff must also allege sufficient facts to state a claim under the FMLA, such as that Coca-Cola violated the FMLA by interfering with her rights under the FMLA, or retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the FMLA.
The Second Circuit has recognized two types of FMLA claims: interference claims and retaliation claims. See Smith v. Westchester Cnty, 769 F.Supp.2d 448, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2004)). To state a claim for FMLA interference, Plaintiff must allege: (1) she is an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) Coca-Cola is an employer as defined in the FMLA; (3) that she was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) that she gave notice of her intention to take leave; and (5) that she was denied benefits to which she was entitled under the FMLA. Higgins, 836 F.Supp.2d at 182. The FMLA also prohibits employers from retaliating against an employee from having exercised or attempting to exercise FMLA rights. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c); 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); See Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 175 (2d Cir. 2006); Potenza, 365 F.3d at 167 (discussing the distinction between interference and retaliation claims under the FMLA). An employer who fails to provide an employee FMLA leave may be held liable for damages. Id. § 2617.
E. Breach of Duty of Fair Representation Claim
Because Plaintiff sues her union and appears to allege that it failed to represent her appropriately, the amended complaint can be construed as attempting to assert a “hybrid Section 301/duty of fair representation (“DFR”)” claim. This type of claim arises under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, which governs the employer's duty to comply with the collective bargaining agreement, and under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which implies the union's duty of fair representation. DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983); see also Price v. Int'l Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 795 F.2d 1128, 1134 (2d Cir. 1986) (union's duty of fair representation is implied from § 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)). To state a hybrid Section 301/DFR claim, a plaintiff must allege “both (1) that the employer breached a collective bargaining agreement and (2) that the union breached its duty of fair representation vis-a-vis the union members.” White v. White Rose Food, 237 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164-65). The employee may sue the union or the employer, or both, but must allege violations on the part of both regardless of which entities she chooses to sue. Id. at 179.
Here, the complaint suffers from deficiencies that prevent the Court from analyzing a potential hybrid Section 301/DFR claim. For example, Plaintiff does not allege that Coca-Cola breached a collective bargaining agreement, or explain the nature of any duty owed to her by her union or what the union did or failed to do that breached that duty.
Furthermore, any Section 301/DFR claims Plaintiff may be asserting appears to be time-barred. The limitations period on a hybrid Section 301/DFR action is six months, see DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169, which begins to run when the employee knew or should have known of the breach of the duty of fair representation, see Cohen v. Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 68 F.3d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 1995); Gharty v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[A] breach of duty by the union is apparent to the member at the time she learns of the union action or inaction about which she complains.”). Even if the Court assumes that the union breached its duty on April 1, 2017, when Plaintiff's employment was terminated, she alleges no facts suggesting that she became aware of the breach within six months of filing this action on December 1, 2023.
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to allege facts in a second amended complaint suggesting a viable Section 301/DFR claim. She should also allege facts demonstrating that her claim is timely or that equitable tolling should apply.
F. Remaining Federal Claims
Along with her employment discrimination claims, Plaintiff refers to federal laws relating to whistleblower protections, securities, and interference with arbitration, but she does not plead any facts showing how these claims are relevant and why she is entitled to relief. Because Plaintiff does not allege any facts in support of these claims, the Court declines to address them specifically in this order. Should Plaintiff wish to proceed with any of those claims, she must provide facts that establish the basis for these claims against Defendants. In addition, as with all the other claims asserted in this action, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that her assertions concerning whistleblower protections, securities, and interference with arbitration are timely.
G. State law claims
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).
Because Plaintiff has been granted leave to file a second amended complaint, the Court will determine at a later stage whether to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims she is asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).
H. Motion to seal
On May 24, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a motion asking the Court to seal this case. She asserts the following:
Due to the circumstances surrounding the case and to Coca-Cola international connections and ties within more than 200 countries, ties with other corporations/mom & pop stores, political ties, law enforcement ties, etc. and the fact that Coca-Cola has exposed my name already to two other countries other than the United States that I am aware of and the two other countries I have never vis[i]ted in person nor know anyone that lives there. I would like my file/case to be sealed to protect my family and myself identities.(ECF 8, at 2-3.)
Both the common law and the First Amendment protect the public's right of access to court documents. See Nixon v. Warner Comms., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1978); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2004). This right of access is not absolute, and “the decision as to access [to judicial records] is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598-99.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has set forth a three-part analysis to determine whether a document relating to a lawsuit should be made available to the public. See Lugosch v. Pyramid Co., 435 F.3d 110, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2006). First, the Court must determine whether the document is indeed a “judicial document,” to which the public has a presumptive right of access. Id. at 119. Judicial documents are those that are “relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, if the Court determines that the materials to be sealed are judicial documents, then the Court must determine the weight of the presumption of access. Id. “[T]he weight to be given the presumption of access must be governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts.” United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995). Finally, “the court must balance competing considerations against it.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Such countervailing factors include but are not limited to the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency and the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The fact that documents have been publicly available for some time weighs against sealing them. See United States v. Basciano, Nos. 03-CR-0929, 05-CR-0060, 2010 WL 1685810, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010) (privacy interest in sealing documents was weakened by the fact that the public was already aware of the relevant information). “The burden of demonstrating that a document submitted to a court should be sealed rests on the party seeking such an action.” DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 826 (2d Cir. 1997).
Here, Plaintiff is essentially asking the Court to seal her pleadings in this case, which are clearly judicial documents. Plaintiff, however, does not allege any facts suggesting that any privacy risks or potential harm she may experience as a result of publicly litigating this action outweigh the presumed public access to the judicial process. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff's motion to seal this case.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state valid federal claims as provided by this order, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend her complaint for a second time.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her complaint for the second time to provide more facts showing that she has valid Title VII, ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and Section 301/DFR claims. If she chooses to assert any other claims, she must also provide facts showing that they are valid and she is entitled to relief. In the “Statement of Claim” section of the second amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the second amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the second amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's second amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's second amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the amended complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the amended complaint must be repeated in the second amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the second amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as a “Second Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-10552 (LTS). A Second Amended Complaint form is attached to this order. No summonses will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, this action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Court denies Plaintiff's motions for an order of service (ECF 5) and to seal this action (ECF 8) without prejudice. All other pending matters in this case are terminated.
Plaintiff may receive court documents by email by completing the attached form, Consent to Electronic Service.
If Plaintiff consents to receive documents by email, Plaintiff will no longer receive court documents by regular mail.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.