Summary
In Robinson, supra, the Court of Appeals held that "[a] mental injury which arises from the loss of employment simply cannot logically `aris[e] out of and in the course of employment.'"
Summary of this case from Calovecchi v. StateOpinion
Docket No. 73867.
Decided September 24, 1984.
Conrad J. Ceglowski, for plaintiff. Lacey Jones (by Gerald M. Marcinkoski), for defendant.
Steven E. Robinson, a mentally incompetent person, by and through his legal guardian, Delores Robinson, appeals by leave granted from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board which reversed an award of workers' compensation benefits to plaintiff. Plaintiff was employed by Chrysler Corporation on September 28, 1978, and was discharged the following day. Shortly thereafter, he was hospitalized as a result of his mental condition. The guardian filed a petition seeking a determination as to whether plaintiff was disabled and, therefore, entitled to workers' compensation benefits. The hearing referee found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded benefits. The WCAB reversed that decision and denied the continuation of plaintiff's benefits. Plaintiff's application for leave to appeal to this Court was granted.
Plaintiff contends that the WCAB erred in finding that his disability arose out of the termination of his employment rather than due to his employment. Also, plaintiff argues that the WCAB's determination that an injury suffered by termination was not compensable constituted an error of law.
As to the first contention, there was sufficient competent evidence to support the board's finding. Therefore the finding is conclusive. Mitchell v Metal Assemblies, Inc, 379 Mich. 368; 151 N.W.2d 818 (1967).
As to the second question, whether there was an error at law, neither side has cited a Michigan court case directly on point.
In Blom v Baraga County Memorial Hospital, 1964 WCABO 366, the board decided that emotional distress resulting from loss of employment is not a compensable injury under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. While that decision was rendered under the former act, MCL 412.1; MSA 17.151, the new act reads substantially the same:
"An employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is subject to this act at the time of the injury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act." MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301)(1) (emphasis supplied).
An "injury" under the act also includes a mental work-related injury. Carter v General Motors Corp, 361 Mich. 577, 593; 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
Accordingly, we agree with the WCAB's longstanding interpretation of the act holding that mental injury caused by a termination of employment is not compensable under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. Magreta v Ambassador Steel Co (On Rehearing), 380 Mich. 513, 519; 158 N.W.2d 473 (1968). A mental injury which arises from the loss of employment simply cannot logically "aris[e] out of and in the course of employment". Cf. Milton v Oakland County, 50 Mich. App. 279, 284; 213 N.W.2d 250 (1973) (mental injuries created by employer's alleged breach of an employment contract cannot be classified as industrial injuries within the meaning of the act), and Jamison v Storer Broadcasting Co, 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1298 (ED Mich, 1981) (an emotionally based injury resulting from discharge is not within the scope of the act).
Affirmed.