Roberts v. the State

9 Citing cases

  1. Krucheck v. State

    671 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1983)   Cited 16 times
    Analyzing Sandstrom

    Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-147, 94 S.Ct. 396 [400], 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). Accord, Scheikofsky v. State, supra, 636 P.2d 1107; Loy v. State, 26 Wyo. 381, 185 P. 796 (1919); Flanders v. State, 24 Wyo. 81, 156 P. 1121 (1916); Roberts v. State, 11 Wyo. 66, 70 P. 803 (1902). Instruction No. 1, in pertinent part:

  2. Green v. State

    161 S.W.2d 1074 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942)   Cited 1 times

    The only controverted issue is the intent with which he took it. It seems to be a fairly well settled rule in this State that where there is direct and positive evidence that the accused took the property in question and that his fraudulent intent is to be inferred from the main facts proven, there is no necessity for a charge on circumstantial evidence, because the case, in a legal sense, does not rest wholly upon circumstantial evidence. See Rundell v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. R.; Roberts v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 267; Flagg v. State, 51 Tex.Crim. R.. It seems from the record that upon the trial of his case appellant was represented by able counsel who secured for him every legal right to which he was entitled.

  3. Westerman v. State

    144 Tex. Crim. 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942)   Cited 7 times
    Holding defendant guilty of offense of theft where he pushed car few blocks down street, but then abandoned it when car would not start because "it was not necessary that the appropriation be consummated or completed"

    There being direct evidence of such taking no charge upon circumstantial evidence was required. See Branch's Ann. Tex. P. C., p. 1341, Sec. 2480, and cases cited, including Roberts v. State, 44 Tex.Crim. R., 70 S.W. 423. Objection to the court's charge was made because there was no instruction upon misdemeanor theft.

  4. Smith v. State

    51 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1932)   Cited 4 times

    This is the matter complained of in the first bill of exception. Referring to the complaint set out in bill of exception No. 3, we are of opinion that the court properly told the jury that evidence showing that appellant had been convicted of a felony prior to the instant prosecution, could only be considered in passing on his credibility as a witness, if at all, and that same must not be considered for any other purpose. Roberts v. State, 44 Tex.Crim. Rep., 70 S.W. 423. A charge similar in verbiage and principle was given limiting the effect of testimony showing that a defense witness had been convicted of a felony prior to this trial. There was no error in the giving of this charge.

  5. State v. Wilson

    32 Wyo. 37 (Wyo. 1924)   Cited 33 times
    In State v. Wilson, 32 Wyo. 37, 228 P. 803 (1924), where the defendant was charged with an assault with intent to have carnal knowledge (intercourse), we held that penetration "though to no particular depth" must be proved, thereby holding with the sense of the previously quoted cases to the effect that it is possible, in law, to have carnal knowledge ("sexual intercourse") given the slightest degree of penetration.

    Counsel may be correct from a strictly logical standpoint, but their contention would lead to the conclusion that in every case where the intent is the gist of the crime an instruction on circumstantial evidence should be given. We have not been cited to any case which so holds. The prosecutrix in this case gave what we should consider direct testimony, relating in detail what defendant did, and from which the conclusion as to the intent could be drawn, and if that were the only evidence in the case, we are clear that no instruction on circumstantial evidence would be necessary. 16 C.J. 1009, 1010; Roberts v. State, 44 Tex.Crim. R., 70 S.W. 423; Dobbs v. State, 51 Tex.Crim. 629, 103 S.W. 918; Williams v. State, 58 Tex.Crim. 82, 124 S.W. 954. Thompson on Trials, Sec. 2505. There was, however, also considerable circumstantial evidence in this case.

  6. State v. Swarens

    241 S.W. 934 (Mo. 1922)   Cited 69 times
    In State v. Swarens, 294 Mo. 139, recently decided in Banc, it was held that the presumption arising from the possession of recently stolen property is one of fact and not of law, overruling all the Missouri cases on the subject, and the giving of an instruction that unless such possession is explained, etc., the jury should find the defendant guilty, was reversible error for two reasons: (1) the presumption is one of fact and not of law, and (2) the instruction is an unwarranted comment on the evidence.

    [Williams v. State, 44 S.W. (Tex. Cr.) 1103.] See also People v. Kaatz, 3 Parker, Cr. (N.Y.) 129. A like rule applies where the accused confesses the taking but insists that he did so without a fraudulent intent, under which state of facts it was held that the case was removed from the realm of circumstantial evidence so as to require a special charge thereon, the only issue left being that of intent. [Roberts v. State, 44 Tex.Crim. 267; Baxter v. State, 43 S.W. (Tex. Cr.) 87; Reed v. State, 46 S.W. (Tex. Cr.) 931.] On a trial for theft of cattle where the accused testified that he took the animal by virtue of purchase from a stranger, this relieved the court of the necessity of charging on circumstantial evidence on the theory that there was direct testimony as to the taking.

  7. Rundell v. the State

    90 Tex. Crim. 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1920)   Cited 9 times
    In Rundell v. State, 235 S.W. 908, it is shown that the appellant represented that she had a secret connection with a certain oil driller from whom she would receive inside information about wells which were drilling, before they were completed, which information would enable her to double and treble the money turned over to her to be invested in such venture.

    Where, upon trial of theft of a certain check with intent to defraud and appropriate, the evidence was direct and not circumstantial, there was no error in the court's refusal to charge on circumstantial evidence. Following Roberts v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 267, and other cases. 8. — Same — Concurring Opinion.

  8. Egbert v. the State

    76 Tex. Crim. 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 1915)   Cited 17 times

    Flagg v. State, 51 Tex.Crim. Rep.; Roberts v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 267; Alexander v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 395; Russell v. State, 38 Tex.Crim. Rep.; Williams v. State, 58 Tex.Crim.

  9. Burton v. the State

    65 Tex. Crim. 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1912)   Cited 1 times

    Rep., 124 S.W. 954; Flagg v. The State, 51 Tex.Crim. Rep.; Dobbs v. The State, 51 Tex. Crim. 629, 103 S.W. 918; Roberts v. The State, 44 Tex. Crim. 267; Alexander v. The State, 40 Tex. Crim. 395; Becker v. The State, 59 S.W. 949, and cases there cited. Appellant complains that the court erred in failing to give special charges Nos. 1 and 2 requested, relating to his defensive evidence.