For that reason, a court may decide proximate causation as a matter of law only when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion from the evidence. Roberts v. Fisher, 455 P.2d 871, 872 (Colo. 1969) (en banc). For the first time on appeal, State Farm now appears to challenge actual causation.
Plaintiffs move for the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs under eight years of age, notwithstanding the jury's verdict against all of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, citing Roberts v. Fisher, 169 Colo. 288, 455 P.2d 871 (1969), contend that individuals under the age of eight cannot be found negligent, and therefore the jury's verdict, that those plaintiffs under eight years of age were fifty percent negligent, cannot stand. Plaintiffs did not move for a directed verdict on this issue at the close of the evidence.
In Colorado a finding of negligence does not create liability on the part of a defendant unless that negligence is a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Langdon, 187 Colo. 425, 532 P.2d 337 (1975); Roberts v. Fisher, 169 Colo. 288, 455 P.2d 871 (1969); Kent Mfg. Co. v. Zimmerman, 48 Colo. 388, 110 P. 187 (1910). Further, questions of negligence and proximate cause are issues of fact to be determined by the jury, and the appellate courts are bound by the jury's findings when there is competent evidence in the record supporting those findings.
There, as here, the law favors a prompt, efficient remedy for the injured person. Roberts v. Fisher, 169 Colo. 288, 455 P.2d 871 (1969); Matt Skorey Package Co. v. Canino, 142 Colo. 411, 350 P.2d 106 (1960; Reaves v. Horton, 33 Colo. App. 186, 518 P.2d 138 (1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1973); Colo. J. I. 9:1, 9:26.[4] Therefore, we hold that C.R.S. 1963, 81-18-13(1), when considered in light of the purpose and intent of the entire Workers' Compensation Act, must be read to refer to the last Colorado employer when it designates the employer who shall be liable.
We believe that the issue of proximate causation presented in the instant case involves close factual determinations to be resolved by the finder of fact.See Roberts v. Fisher, 169 Colo. 288, 455 P.2d 871 (1969); Rosevear v. Rees, 77 Idaho 270, 291 P.2d 856 (1955). In conclusion, we hold that the defendant did owe the plaintiff a duty of due care, that there was evidence from which a jury could have found that he breached that duty, and that there was evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant's negligence proximately caused the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
We hold as a matter of law that this testimony, standing alone, is insufficient to raise a question of contributory negligence for the jury to determine. See Roberts v. Fisher, 169 Colo. 288, 455 P.2d 871 (1969); Camacho v. Mennonite Board of Missions, 703 P.2d 598 (Colo.App. 1985). The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and causation are ordinarily questions of fact to be determined by the jury, and the concept of contributory negligence rests on the principle that a plaintiff must exercise a reasonable degree of care to avoid undue risk of harm to himself. Roberts v. Fisher, 169 Colo. 288, 455 P.2d 871 (1969); Fay v. Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., 644 P.2d 68 (Colo.App. 1981). Here, the court gave instructions defining negligence, reasonable care, special standards of care applicable to doctors and nurses, and the word "cause."
The jury was given the proper instruction relative to the ordinance and the effect of a violation thereof, if any. Roberts v. Fisher, 169 Colo. 288, 455 P.2d 871, reiterates the well recognized rule that the issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are not to be taken from the jury and decided as a matter of law except 'on the clearest of cases where facts are undisputed and reasonable minds could draw but one inference' therefrom. This is not such a case and the issues of negligence and contributory negligence were properly admitted to the jury.
Remley v. Newton, Supra. Only in the clearest of cases, where facts are undisputed and reasonable men could draw but one inference from them, is the question of negligence to be taken from the jury and decided by the court as it was in this instance. Roberts v. Fisher, 169 Colo. 288, 455 P.2d 871. Judgment reversed and remanded for new trial on all issues.