Opinion
Civil Action 21-cv-29J
03-07-2023
JOSHUA ROBERTS Plaintiff, v. SHAWN ALLWEIN, CO1 GAYDOS, CO1 PHILLIPI, and CO 2 SGT. RINGLING, Defendants.
Honorable Stephanie L. Haines United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: ECF NO. 73
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Joshua Roberts, an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, brings this pro se civil rights action for injuries sustained in an inmate attack and for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. ECF No. 10 at 4-5. Presently before the Court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed on behalf of Defendants CO1 Gaydos, CO1 Phillipi, and CO2 Sgt. Ringling (collectively, “DOC Defendants”). ECF No. 73. DOC Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims are barred by his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). They also argue that judgment is properly entered on the merits of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim as a matter of law.
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust to exhaust administrative remedies and because Plaintiff has failed to assert a claim upon which relief may be granted.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 3, 2019, Plaintiff was assaulted by fellow inmate Shawn Allwein at the State Correctional Institution at Somerset (“SCI - Somerset”) when Allwein entered Plaintiff's cell block carrying a sock filled with bars of soap, and struck Plaintiff in the head, causing injuries (“splitting open my head”). ECF No. 10 at 4. According to Plaintiff, the assault occurred because the DOC Defendants were “neglecting their duty as officers” by “play[ing] around on the computer or not watching what was happening.” Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff was taken to the medical department and his wound was photographed and cleaned. Plaintiff complains that he was refused further treatment, including an eye test, concussion tests, an MRI, and an ice bag. Id. at 5.
On May 20, 2019, Plaintiff submitted an Official Inmate Grievance at Grievance No. 802634 complaining that the officers on his unit and “institutional security staff” failed to prevent Allwein's assault. ECF No. 10-1. Plaintiff complained that prison security staff assigned Allwein to general population despite his history “of violent assaults and wielding weaponry,” and failed to provide adequate security measures. Id. Plaintiff alleged that such conduct “exhibited deliberate indifference” to his safety, and failed to protect him from assault with a deadly weapon. Plaintiff requested as relief: “(1) diagnostic and classification training regarding placement of dangerous and violent prisoners; (2) disciplinary action against the officers; and (3) monetary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars.” Id.
The grievance was initially denied on June 14, 2019. Id. at 3. Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Facility Manager, who upheld the denial on August 2, 2019. Id. at 2. As relevant to the pending motion, Plaintiff's grievance did not address the issue of medical treatment provided after the assault or the DOC Defendants' involvement in the alleged denial of medical care. Id.
Plaintiff initiated this litigation by lodging his Complaint with the Court on February 23, 2021. ECF No. 1. After complying with two deficiency orders related to required paperwork, Plaintiff was granted leave to prosecute without prepayment of costs. ECF No. 9. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the DOC Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from Allwein's assault. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff also alleges an Eighth Amendment claim for the failure to provide necessary medical treatment for his injuries.
On September 13, 2021, the DOC Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), contending that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted. ECF No. 30. On February 28, 2022, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court grant the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 44. On June 9, 2022, District Judge Stephanie L. Haines issued a Memorandum Order adopting the Report and Recommendation as the opinion of the Court. Judge Haines ruled as follows: (1) Plaintiff's claims against Defendant SCI-Somerset were dismissed with prejudice; (2) Plaintiff's Ninth Amendment claim was dismissed with prejudice; (3) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim was dismissed without prejudice; and (4) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint by July 11, 2022 to correct identified pleading deficiencies. Plaintiff was instructed that if he failed to file an amended complaint, his remaining claim for denial of medical care would be permitted to proceed but all other claims would be dismissed with prejudice. ECF No. 56. Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint. Thus, this Court issued a Memorandum Order on October 19, 2022, holding that the Complaint docketed at ECF No. 10 is the operative complaint, and directing the DOC Defendants to file their Answer. ECF No. 62.
On November 4, 2022, the DOC Defendants filed their Answer to the operative complaint. ECF No. 70. On November 7, 2022, the Court issued an initial case management order directing that fact discovery was due by February 8, 2023. ECF No. 72. The following day, the DOC Defendants filed the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Brief in Support, raising Plaintiff's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies and his failure to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition. ECF Nos. 73 - 74. By Order dated November 28, 2022, the Court notified the parties that because the DOC Defendants present grievance records to support the failure to exhaust argument, the Court would treat Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as a Motion for Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. ECF No. 76. See Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2010) (district court must provide notice to pro se prisoners when converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment). Plaintiff was granted to leave to file exhibits and a response in opposition to the motion by December 30, 2022. Id. Plaintiff's response was filed on December 28, 2022. ECF No. 77. Plaintiff did not provide any additional exhibits to support his contention that his claim related to his medical care has been exhausted. Id.
The motion is now ripe for consideration.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: “[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion should be granted only if, “viewing all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no material issue of fact remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2012); see also DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2008) ([u]nder Rule 12(c) judgment will only be granted where the moving party clearly establishes there are no material issues of fact, and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); Sikirica v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2005).
2. Motion for Summary Judgment
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue of material fact is in genuine dispute if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof”). Thus, summary judgment is warranted where, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... a party ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
3. Pro Se Pleadings and Filings
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, thus he is entitled to liberal reading of his pleadings and documents filed in opposition to the pending motion. Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 440 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[t]he obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”)). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should … be read ‘with a measure of tolerance'”); Freeman v. Dep't. of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991).
Even so, as related to exhaustion, at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the Court need not credit bald assertions or legal conclusions unaccompanied by evidentiary support. Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). “[A] pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion for summary judgment.” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F.Supp.3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). See also Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F.Supp.2d 402, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“merely because a non-moving party is proceeding pro se does not relieve him of the obligation under Rule 56(e) to produce evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact”); Winfield v. Mazurkiewicz, No. 11-584, 2012 WL 4343176, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2012).
Thus, because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
The DOC Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff's remaining Eighth Amendment claim alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. ECF No. 73. In support of the instant motion, Defendants make two arguments; first, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies for this discrete claim; and second, that Defendants are otherwise entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits of Plaintiff's claim.
Because Defendants raise exhaustion as a defense to this action, the Court must consider it as a threshold matter before reaching the merits of the pending motion. Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2013).
1. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies
a. PLRA requirements
The PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust available administrative remedies before filing an action challenging prison conditions or experiences. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner, confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id.
“Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). “This has the potential to reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to improve the quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful administrative record.” Id. Thus, the benefits of the exhaustion requirement “include allowing a prison to address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit, reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” Id. at 219.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
The PLRA requires inmates to exhaust prison grievance procedures before suing in court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,' rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218, 127 S.Ct. 910 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006)).Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 2016).
The exhaustion requirement of the PLRA is one of “proper exhaustion.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84. Failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the available grievance system will result in a claim being found procedurally defaulted. Id. at 90; Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-32 (3d Cir. 2004); Robinson, 831 F.3d at 153. In assessing default, the prison's grievance policy is what “define[s] the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 218.
While exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory under the PLRA, “[a] prisoner need not exhaust remedies if they are not ‘available'” to the inmate. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 636 (2016). “The only limit to § 1997e(a)'s mandate is the one baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies as are ‘available.'” Id. at 648 (quoting § 1997e(a)). In other words, “the exhaustion requirement hinges on the ‘availability' of administrative remedies: An inmate, that is, must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.” Id. at 642 (cleaned up). “[T]he ordinary meaning of the word ‘available' is ‘capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose,' and that which ‘is accessible or may be obtained.'” Id. (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737-38 (2001)). “Accordingly, an inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are ‘capable of use' to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.'” Id. (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 738).
The United States Supreme Court has described three times when an administrative remedy is unavailable as a practical matter: “(1) ‘it operates as a simple dead end-with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates'; (2) it is ‘so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use,' such as when no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it; or (3) ‘prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.'” Shumanis v. Lehigh Cnty., 675 Fed.Appx. 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44).
“The burden to plead and prove failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense rests on the defendant.” Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002)). “But once the defendant has established that the inmate failed to resort to administrative remedies, the onus falls on the inmate to show that such remedies were unavailable to him.” Id. (citing Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2011)).
b. DC-ADM 804
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' administrative remedies for inmate grievances are provided for in DOC Administrative Directive 804 (“DC-ADM 804”). See DOC Policies, DC-ADM 804, Inmate Grievance System Policy. DC-ADM 804 provides a three-step process through which inmates can seek to resolve issues relating to their incarceration. Id. The three steps are: (1) file an initial grievance; (2) appeal to the superintendent; and (3) final appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). Redshaw v. Pillai, No. 12-190J, 2013 WL 3802464, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 18, 2013).
https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Pages/DOC-Policies.aspx
An initial grievance must include: a statement of the facts relevant to the claim that includes the location of the events giving rise to the grievance, the individuals directly involved in the events, and “specifically state any claims he/she wishes to make concerning violations of Department directives, regulations, court orders, or other law.” DC-ADM 804 §1.A.11.
Once submitted, an inmate must follow each of the steps to properly exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA and uncontroverted evidence of the failure to do so warrants the entry of summary judgment in Defendants' favor. See Spearman v. Morris, 643 Fed.Appx. 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 299 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff did not take full advantage of the administrative procedures available to him in failing to perfect his appeal for final review and thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies)).
If an inmate is dissatisfied with the response received from the Facility Grievance Coordinator, an appeal may be submitted in writing to the Facility Manager within fifteen working days. Id. at 20 (DC-ADM 804 §2.A.1.a). Failure to comply with the listed appeal requirements may result in the appeal being dismissed. Id. (DC-ADM 804 §2.A.1.e).
Once an appeal is filed, the Facility Manager “will determine whether the appeal in in accordance with the procedures manual.” Id. (DC-ADM 804 § 2.A.2). If the appeal is found to be in accordance with procedures, it will then be entered into the Inmate Grievance Tracking System. Id. Once entered in the system, the Facility Manager or designee must respond in writing within fifteen working days. Id.
If the inmate remains dissatisfied following this second level appeal, the inmate must submit an Appeal for Final Review to the SOIGA within fifteen working days, and then the inmate will receive a final determination in writing within thirty days. Id. at 23-28 (DC-ADM 804 § 2.B). The policy provides that a response to an appeal to the Facility Manager must be received by the inmate before the inmate may submit a final appeal. In addition, the final appeal must contain the reasons for appealing the Facility Manager's decision. Id.
c. Plaintiff's failure to exhaust
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and thus he has procedurally defaulted his claim. ECF No. 74 at 4-6. Specifically, the DOC Defendants assert that after the incident at issue, Plaintiff submitted a single grievance at Grievance No. 802634. The grievance addresses only the substance of Plaintiff's previously dismissed failure to protect claim. Id. at 5. Plaintiff's grievance history reveals that he never filed a grievance regarding his medical care or health needs related to the assault at SCI-Somerset and his first grievance related to health care was filed on May 10, 2021, over two months after the commencement of this litigation. ECF No. 74-1. Thus, as related to Plaintiff's remaining Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs, Defendants contend Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his lawsuit.
In response to the pending Motion, Plaintiff fails to address Defendants' argument related to the content of his grievance. ECF No. 77 at 1-2. Instead, Plaintiff argues that his grievance was properly exhausted because the “central office” failed to respond. Id. (citing Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2019)).
Upon review, the substance of the sole grievance relied upon by Plaintiff did not serve to put prison officials on notice of his medical claim so that, consistent with the purpose of PLRA, the prison would have the opportunity to resolve the claim before Plaintiff pursued litigation. His failure to include facts in his grievance related to medical treatment, unless otherwise excused, bars Plaintiff's remaining Eighth Amendment claim and judgment in Defendants' favor is appropriately entered.
Plaintiff seeks to avoid this result based on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit holding in Shifflett that a plaintiff has fully discharged the PLRA's exhaustion requirement when a prison fails to respond to a properly submitted grievance or appeal within the time limits prescribed by its own policies because it has made its administrative remedies unavailable. Shifflett, 934 F.3d at 365. Plaintiff asserts that his claims were properly exhausted because he never received a response to his final appeal to SOIGA. See ECF No. 77 at 1-2, 10-11. However, even if the Court accepts as true Plaintiff's assertion that SOIGA failed to respond to Grievance No. 802634, judgment for the DOC Defendants remains appropriate because Plaintiff's grievance includes no facts related to his medical claim.
In Shifflett, the Third Circuit reviewed the plaintiff's grievances and held that dismissal was proper for a First Amendment retaliation claim because the plaintiff failed to include the claim in any grievance, including grievances that were treated as exhausted by administrative delay. Id., 934 F.3d at 364 (“Exhaustion is considered separately for each claim brought by an inmate, and if a complaint includes both exhausted and unexhausted claims, courts will dismiss the latter but not the former.”).
Here, without any evidence of a timely submitted grievance related to Plaintiff's medical treatment, Shifflett confirms that judgment is properly entered in Defendant's favor as to Plaintiff's remaining Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court grant the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and enter judgment in favor of the DOC Defendants because Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for his remaining Eighth Amendment claim.
2. Presence of material issues of fact as to medical treatment
In the alternative, the DOC Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff does not allege that any named DOC Defendant denied him medical care. ECF No. 74 at 6-10. To that end, Plaintiff alleges that the DOC Defendants, identified as corrections officers, took him to the medical unit, where he was examined and his wound was treated. ECF No. 10 at 5. Because no named Defendant interfered with medical treatment, Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. ECF No. 74 at 7 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
In response to the pending Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Plaintiff addresses only his failure to protect claim. Plaintiff asserts that the DOC Defendants failed to ensure that Allwein could not enter his housing unit and failed to maintain vigilance over the unit as required by the Department of Corrections Code of Ethics. ECF No. 77 at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that the DOC Defendants' conduct, whether as a corrections officer or as a supervisor, showed a callous indifference to his safety, and that evidence in support of his failure to protect claim was not preserved. Id. at 3-5. He alleges that this conduct exhibits a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's safety sufficient to establish the violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 5-7. Thus, Plaintiff does not address the issue before the Court: whether he alleges facts sufficient to establish that any named Defendant denied him necessary medical treatment in deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs or had reason to believe that Plaintiff's medical condition was being mistreated.
Plaintiff previously was granted leave to “file an amended complaint within thirty days reasserting his Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendants CO1 Gaydos, CO1 Phillipi, and CO2 Sgt. Ringling and any claim for the denial of medical treatment only.” ECF No. 56 at 4-5. Plaintiff opted not to file an Amended Complaint. As a result, the Court may only consider the claim as originally pleaded.
To sustain an Eighth Amendment violation related to an alleged deprivation of medical treatment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). See also Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235. A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). A serious medical need may also be found to exist where the denial or delay of treatment causes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id.
To establish deliberate indifference, a “plaintiff must make an ‘objective' showing that the deprivation was ‘sufficiently serious,' or that the result of defendant's denial was sufficiently serious. Additionally, the plaintiff must make a ‘subjective' showing that defendant acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002), citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Wilson v. Burks, 423 F. App'x. 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011), quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In assessing claims of deliberate indifference, “courts in this Circuit distinguish between non-medical prison officials - typically corrections officers - and medical prison officials -doctors and nurses providing medical care.” Carter v. Baumcratz, No. 18-96, 2021 WL 4443767, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2021) (citing Williams v. Doe, 2017 WL 4680636, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2017) and citing Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236)). Thus,
[i]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts … a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands. This follows naturally from the division of labor within a prison. Inmate health and safety is promoted by dividing responsibility for various aspects of inmate life among guards, administrators, physicians, and so on. Holding a non-medical prison official liable in a case where a prisoner was under a physician's care would strain this division of labor. Moreover, under such a regime, non-medical officials could even have a perverse incentive not to delegate treatment responsibility to the very physicians most likely to be able to help prisoners, for fear of vicarious liability.Spruill, at 236. Here, the DOC Defendants are corrections officers who are not alleged to have provided medical care. “Thus, to state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference against non-medical corrections personnel, [Plaintiff] must point to evidence demonstrating that they possessed actual knowledge or a reason to believe that prison doctors or their assistants were mistreating (or not treating) him.” Carter, 2021 WL 4443767, at *9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Trainor v. Wellpath, 2021 WL 3913970, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2021) (quoting Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236)).
“[A] non-medical defendant's refusal to follow a medical directive can, in some circumstances, constitute deliberate indifference.” Id. “For a corrections officer to be liable, the inmate-plaintiff must show that the officer knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner's health.” Id. (citing Perkins v. Schwappach, 399 Fed.Appx. 759, 761 (3d Cir. 2010) and Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “Even if the corrections officer knows of a risk to the prisoner's health, he must still personally draw the inference that the prisoner faced a substantial risk of injury.” Id.
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint and his response to the pending motion and concludes that Plaintiff fails to allege facts upon which a reasonable factfinder could find that any DOC Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical needs. Even if the Court agrees that Plaintiff sustained a serious injury, Plaintiff fails to plead facts that support an inference that any DOC Defendants knew that he suffered a serious medical need that was not properly treated by medical personnel. Without facts supporting a claim that the DOC Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's medical or mental health, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Thus, should the Court determine that Plaintiff's claims are not barred by his failure to exhaust, it is recommended that the Court grant the DOC Defendants' alternative motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to medical health needs.
3. Futility
When a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend a deficient complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, the court must inform the plaintiff that he has leave to amend within a set time, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has been granted leave to amend his Complaint and failed to do so. Additionally, the undisputed evidence establishes that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim related to medical treatment after the assault. Under these circumstances, allowance for further amendment would be inequitable and futile. Accordingly, it is recommended in the alternative that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs remaining Eighth Amendment claim without further leave to amend to file an amended complaint.
D. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended, for the reasons set forth herein, that the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 73, be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties may file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.