Opinion
No. 1:00CV415-D-A
March 4, 2002
OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Presently before the court are the Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Upon due consideration, the court finds that Defendant Winston County's motion should be granted and Defendant Bob Goodin's motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants Bob Goodin and Winston County have each filed separate motions for summary judgment.
A. Factual Background
The Plaintiff, Jesse Roberson, is an African American who was hired by the Winston County Sheriff's Department in 1994 to work as a dispatcher and a jailer. Billy Rosamond was the Sheriff when Roberson was hired. Roberson was soon promoted to deputy sheriff and completed the law enforcement training academy in 1996. Mike Estes, who is now deceased, was elected Sheriff and took office in 1996. Around 1998, Sheriff Mike Estes made Roberson his chief investigator.
Estes was re-elected for a second term but began to miss substantial periods of work due to various health problems. Michael Peterson, a supervisor of Winston County and the County's 30(b)(6) representative, stated that Estes was away a good bit and the board became "concerned that maybe we weren't providing the type law enforcement that we felt the citizens should . . . have." Gary Clark, a white man, was Estes' chief deputy and was essentially running the sheriff's department during Estes' absence. Around October or November 1999, the board spoke with Clark to ensure that someone had authority in the absence of Sheriff Estes. Eventually the board took official action and entered an order dated November 1, 1999, which stated "in the absence of sheriff of Winston County, due to illness or other matters, th[e] chief deputy [Clark] will be designated by the board of supervisors as the chief law enforcement officer for Winston County, Mississippi." Shortly thereafter, the board entered another order, upon the advice of counsel, rescinding the order appointing chief deputy as the chief law enforcement officer. For reasons not clear in the record, Clark resigned as chief deputy around January 2000.
Roberson claims that around February, Estes asked him to act as chief deputy. Roberson stated in his deposition this was for the purpose of acting as sheriff when Estes was not there. Roberson asserted that his job duties and responsibilities changed when he became chief deputy. Roberson stated that he was still acting as chief investigator at that time in addition to performing the duties of chief deputy.
Roberson asserts that Estes called him one night in mid February of 2000. In this phone conversation, Estes allegedly told Roberson that he still wanted Roberson to perform the duties of chief deputy, but that he was going to hold off on making the title official for a while. Estes told Roberson that he (Estes) had a conversation with Defendant Bob Goodin, who is the president of the board of the supervisors of the county, about making Roberson chief deputy. According to Roberson, Estes said that Bob Goodin pitched a fit when he heard this. Estes also said that "Bob said he didn't want no black man in that position." Roberson then asked Estes "when did Bob start running the department, and he [Estes] said that that's where he got his money from." Roberson admitted that no one else heard the phone conversation with Estes. Roberson stated that he "relayed the conversation to some deputies and the secretary" shortly thereafter. Goodin denied any such conversation.
The Defendants argue that the conversation is hearsay not within any exception. The court will address this summary judgment motion before ruling on any such motion in limine.
Apparently, some time after this conversation, Roberson decided that he would not perform these additional responsibilities until Sheriff Estes officially made him chief deputy. One day in March, Roberson stated he "told the secretary to tell [Estes] until he come [sic] up here and . . . put it in writing that I'm his chief deputy I wasn't going to perform those tasks anymore." Roberson stated that Estes wrote a memo that same day. Roberson submitted this memo, dated March 13, 2000, which is to "all Sheriff Deputies" and states "[t]his memo is to inform all employees of the Sheriff Dept. that Jesse Roberson is my chief deputy. Jesse Roberson has the authority to act in full capacity in my absence." Roberson states that during the time between the conversation between Estes and when Estes wrote the memo, Roberson was acting as chief deputy and that other members of the sheriff's department recognized him as chief deputy.
Approximately five weeks later, around April 21, Sheriff Estes took medical leave. The board reached an agreement with Sheriff Estes where he would take medical leave for six months and then resign. A few days later, Roberson and deputy Curtis Austin were called before the board of supervisors. Roberson states he was asked if he could "handle things" while the Sheriff was on medical leave. Roberson replied that he could.
On April 24, 2000, the board decided in a 3-2 vote, that their choice for interim sheriff was Johnny Holdiness, a white deputy who had been with the Winston County Sheriff's department for 15-20 years. The motion was made by Goodin, and seconded by Lamar Turnipseed, an African-American supervisor. Michael Peterson was one of the supervisors opposing the nomination of Holdiness. Peterson stated in his deposition that he would have preferred to nominate the former sheriff, Rosamond.
The parties dispute the significance and effect of this vote. The Defendants state that the vote was merely a recommendation to be presented to the Circuit Judge, who had the ultimate word on the position. Plaintiff states that the board made Holdiness interim deputy.
The board's decision was conveyed to Circuit Judge Clarence Morgan, III, who entered an order pursuant to Miss. Code § 19-25-9, appointing Johnny Holdiness as interim sheriff. Miss. Code § 19-25-9 provides:
If the sheriff be a party to . . . any suit, or for other cause be incapable or unfit to execute his office in any particular case, . . . and where there is no vacancy in the office of sheriff, the circuit judge or chancellor of the district in which said county is located, upon being informed of all the conditions and circumstances with reference thereto, may appoint some qualified elector of the county to execute, do and perform the duties of the sheriff.
The Defendants have submitted an agreed order, dated April 25, 2000, from the Circuit Court of Winston County. The order states:
THIS CAUSE came on for hearing on the joint motion of the Plaintiff, the Winston County Board of Supervisors and the Defendant, Winston County Sheriff, Mike Estes, . . . representing to the Court that pursuant to M.C.A. Section 19-25-9 the parties have reached an agreement. . . . IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 1. On April 24, 2000, the Plaintiffs, the Winston County Board of Supervisors, approved six (6) months medical leave for the Defendant, Mike Estes, and accepted Estes' resignation . . ., which will be effective on October 24, 2000 at 5:00 p.m. . . . .
4. During Defendant's medical leave, Johnny Holdiness is hereby appointed as Interim Sheriff of Winston County, Mississippi, with full power to execute and perform the responsibilities of said office.
Roberson claims that there was no need for an interim sheriff since he was acting as chief deputy, or in the alternative, that he should have been chosen for interim sheriff.
Roberson filed his original complaint in federal court on October 10, 2000 naming Bob Goodin and Winston County as defendants. The complaint states that Bob Goodin is sued in his individual capacity as a Supervisor of Winston County. On November 14, 2000 Roberson filed his first amended complaint which added Defendant Winston County Sheriff's Department in addition to Bob Goodin and Winston County. The amended complaint states causes of action for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The amended complaint also states that Goodin is sued for malicious interference with employment relations. Roberson has asked for actual damages and injunctive and declaratory relief.
The amended complaint does mention that Roberson filed an EEOC charge, but the amended complaint does not assert a cause of action under Title VII. Plaintiff's subsequent pleadings clearly show he does not intend to pursue any Title VII claim.
B. Summary Judgment Standard
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 275 (1986) ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case"). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986).
C. Discussion
The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs must assert a cause of action against state actors under § 1983 to remedy violations of civil rights under § 1981. Jett v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). That is, § 1981 does not provide a separate cause of action against government entities. Jett, 491 U.S. 701, 731, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598.
The Fifth Circuit has held that "employment discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 and [Title VII] are analyzed under the evidentiary framework applicable to claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Lawrence v. University of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1999). Roberson can establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing (1) that he was a member of a protected class, i.e., a member of a racial minority; (2) that he applied and was qualified for the position; (3) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) that a person outside of the class was awarded the position. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2001).
Clearly the board wanted someone to fill the position and act as interim sheriff. The board mentioned this to Clark when he was chief deputy. Roberson mentioned in his deposition that at least one board member asked someone else at the sheriff's department to consider the interim sheriff position. This is not a typical case where an employer posts a "help wanted" sign and applicants submit a resume. Without making credibility determinations and viewing Roberson's facts as true for this summary judgment motion, Goodin knew that Sheriff Estes appointed Roberson (or at least made his intention to do so clear) to chief deputy. Goodin would surely know Roberson wanted to act as an interim sheriff. While some of the board members might not have known that Roberson was acting specifically as chief deputy at the time, the fact that he and Curtis Austin were called in front of the board to ask if they could handle things suggests that the board knew they had positions of authority and/or responsibility. Shortly after this, the board chose Holdiness for the position.
As far as qualifications, Roberson has a high school diploma and took some classes from junior college for approximately two years. There is no evidence about the educational background or training of Holdiness or other candidates. Roberson does not dispute that Holdiness was the most senior deputy. Roberson nevertheless argues that he was qualified for the position. Roberson asserts that he has the necessary administrative skills the job requires. Roberson notes that the board wanted Gary Clark to act as interim sheriff when Clark was serving as chief deputy, and therefore, it should have considered him for interim sheriff since he was acting as chief deputy at the time. Supervisors Goodin and Peterson claimed they did not know that Roberson was acting as chief deputy at the time. Goodin said he based his decision to nominate Holdiness on his seniority. Roberson argues that the board did not rely solely on seniority at the time they were considering Clark for the position.
The record is unclear as to whether Clark had worked for the County Sheriff's Department longer than Holdiness before Clark resigned and while he was chief deputy.
The court is satisfied that Plaintiff has met his initial burden and that the reason he was not selected is a question for the jury. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court considers "the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law." Rios, 252 F.3d at 375 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49). The "trier of fact may still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case `and inferences properly drawn therefrom . . . on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (citation omitted).
a. Claims against Defendant Winston County
Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may not be imposed on a government entity on a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of government employees. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-37, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1992). Local governing bodies may be liable under § 1983, however, where the alleged unconstitutional activity is inflicted pursuant to official policy. Monell, at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36. In order to state a claim, therefore, Roberson must set forth facts which, if true, show that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of the county's official policy.
"[A] single action by a municipal official possessing final policymaking authority regarding the action in question constitutes the official policy of the municipality and . . . the determination of whether a municipal official wields final policymaking authority regarding a particular action constitutes a question of state law." Beattie v. Madison County Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). An official may be a policymaker for the county in a particular area or on a particular issue. Beattie, 254 F.3d at 602. The Fifth Circuit has noted that discretion alone is not enough; the official also must create policy. Id. "No matter how much power an official has, no municipal liability exists if the official does not set the policy at issue." Worsham v. City of Pasadena, 881 F.2d 1336, 1340 (5th Cir. 1989).
The fact that a particular official — even a policymaking official — has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion. The official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable.
Beattie, 254 F.3d at 602 (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)).
The Fifth Circuit has also emphasized that it is important that the official's (alleged to be the final policy maker) authority was unreviewable by any other body. Beattie, 254 F.3d at 602-03. In Worsham, the court held that the existence of a meaningful review by the City Council indicated that the city officials who discharged plaintiff were not, in that respect, final policymakers. Worsham, 881 F.2d at 1340-41. The oversight must pertain to the area of authority in question. Beattie, 254 F.3d at 603. For example, a superintendent's transfer of a teacher to another position might be a final policy decision if that action was unreviewable, even if the superintendent did not have complete control over the hiring and firing of district personnel. Id.
In the present case, there can be no doubt that Goodin was not a final policymaker as to the decision of the interim sheriff. A majority of the board had to agree on the candidate. Perhaps more importantly, Miss. Code § 19-25-9 gives "the circuit judge . . . of the district in which said county is located, upon being informed of all the conditions and circumstances with reference thereto, may appoint some qualified elector of the county to execute, do and perform the duties of the sheriff."
The cases cited by Roberson where a single act created municipal liability involved law enforcement decision by a sheriff and as such, are not factually similar. See Brooks v. George County, 84 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Sheriffs in Mississippi are final policymakers with respect to all law enforcement decisions made within their counties."); Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 1996) (same). Most of the allegations in the pleadings are directed at Bob Goodin. Roberson makes conclusory allegations about the board vote establishing official policy. The following sentences, while taken from the section in Roberson's brief addressing his claim against Goodin, really sum up the entire case.
a jury may find, that Goodin, as board president, had a racial bias since he made statements . . . about not wanting a black as chief deputy. Since the vote was three (3) to two (2), his vote made a decisive difference in the outcome. Thus, there is ample evidence to find that his racial bias is the cause of Plaintiff's not receiving the interim sheriff's job.
While this may be enough to state a claim against Goodin individually, it fails to establish the necessary elements for municipal liability. For the above mentioned reasons, Winston County's motion for summary judgment shall be granted.
b. Claims against Bob Goodin Individually
As for the § 1983 claim against Bob Goodin in his individual capacity, the court is of the opinion that summary judgment shall be denied. No similar policy or custom is required when suing a supervisor in his individual capacity. An action brought under § 1983 against a state actor in his individual capacity is subject to the defense of qualified immunity. See Burns-Toole, D.D.S. v. Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270, 1273 (5th Cir. 1994). However, Goodin has not pled qualified immunity. Taking Roberson's facts as true, Goodin's conduct was clearly unconstitutional. Thus, there are genuine issues of material fact and credibility determinations that preclude summary judgment.
Roberson has also pled a claim against Goodin based on state law for malicious interference with employment relations. Roberson states that "a jury is entitled to infer that malicious interference with employment relations was the only reason for Goodin's `pitching a fit' [and that] is why Plaintiff did not get promoted to the interim sheriff position." Goodin does not directly respond to this claim except to argue about whether any statements are hearsay. In Levens v. Campbell, 733 So.2d 753, 760-61 (Miss. 1999), the Mississippi Supreme Court stated:
Following the law of the aforementioned jurisdictions, this Court concludes that a claim for tortious interference with at-will contracts of employment is viable in this state as well. An action for tortious interference with contract ordinarily lies when a party maliciously interferes with a valid and enforceable contract, causing one party not to perform and resulting in injury to the other contracting party. Nichols v. Tri-State Brick Tile Co., 608 So.2d 324, 327 (Miss. 1992) (citation omitted). The elements of tortious interference with a contract include: 1) the acts were intentional and willful; 2) that they were calculated to cause damages to the plaintiffs in their lawful business; 3) that they were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant; and 4) that actual loss occurred. Collins v. Collins, 625 So.2d 786, 790 (Miss. 1993). It must also be proven that the contract would have been performed but for the alleged interference. Par Indus., Inc. v. Target Container Co., 708 So.2d 44, 48 (Miss. 1998).
In Levens, it was undisputed that the plaintiff filled out an employment application for the position, and that "Griffith offered [plaintiff] the RN position and she accepted." Levens 733 So.2d at 759. The plaintiff's salary, starting date, and orientation date were all explained. Id. Approximately nine (9) days later, the plaintiff received a phone call wherein she was informed that the employer could no longer offer her the RN position and that there was a hiring freeze. Id. at 756.
The court is of the opinion that the facts of this case do not meet the elements required for this state law claim. This case is a discrimination claim based on failure to promote; not a breach of contract case. In other words, at the time Goodin allegedly "interfered," there was no "valid and enforceable contract" for Roberson to act as interim sheriff. See also Wertz v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc., 790 So.2d 841 (Miss. 2001) (claim for tortious interference was stated when plaintiff was terminated from his existing job based on alleged action or statements from plaintiff's previous employer). As such, summary judgment shall be granted for Goodin as to this claim.
C. Conclusion
In sum, Defendant Winston County's motion for summary judgment shall be granted. Defendant Bob Goodin's motion for summary judgment is granted as to the state law tortious interference claim. Goodin's motion for summary judgment is denied as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983 claims as there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude judgment as a matter of law. A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
(1) the Defendant Winston County's motion for summary judgment (docket entry 34) is GRANTED;
(2) the Defendant Bob Goodin's motion for summary judgment (docket entry 33) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;
(3) Goodin's motion shall be GRANTED as to the Plaintiff's state law claim for tortious interference; and
(4) Goodin's motion shall be DENIED as to the Plaintiff's racial discrimination claims in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983.
All memoranda, depositions, declarations, and other materials considered by the court in ruling on this motion are hereby incorporated into and made a part of the record in this action.
SO ORDERED.