Opinion
A159456
05-15-2020
R.N., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF MARIN, Respondent, MARIN HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, ET AL., Real Parties in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Marin County Super. Ct. Nos. JV26732A, JV26733A)
Petitioner R.N. (Father) challenges the juvenile court's order terminating reunification services and setting a selection and implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to two of his children, Ti.N., born in 2005, and Tu.N., born in 2004. He contends the court should have ordered further reunification services and argues that reasonable services were not provided. We will deny the petition.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 26, 2018, respondent Marin County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) removed Ti.N., Tu.N., and a sibling from Father and Mother's home.
A. Dependency Petition and Detention Hearing
The Department filed dependency petitions on October 30, 2018, alleging Ti.N., Tu.N., and the sibling were neglected within the meaning of section 300. The court appointed counsel for the children, Mother, and Father, and ordered continued detention based on a finding of substantial danger.
B. Jurisdiction
The Department's Jurisdiction Report of December 2018 asserted that the family had 23 child welfare referrals dating back to 1998. Multiple extended family members had contacted the Department in November 2018 concerning Mother's unaddressed mental health issues and past suicide attempt, Father's paranoia and distrust of school officials and medical professionals, Mother's history of drug use, and domestic violence between Father and Mother. An adult son and a sibling reported past abuse and Mother's erratic behavior, methamphetamine use, and physical violence. The children had not had well-child appointments for years. Ti.N. expressed ongoing suicidal ideation and was psychiatrically hospitalized and diagnosed with Unspecified Depressive Disorder. Mother acknowledged having post-traumatic stress disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Father denied any domestic violence.
The Department filed a Second Amended Petition on December 7, 2018 alleging neglect of Ti.N. and Tu.N. under section 300, subdivision (b) and neglect of the sibling under section 300 subdivision (g). Father and Mother submitted on jurisdiction. The court found jurisdiction and set a disposition hearing.
C. Disposition
The Department's January 2019 Disposition Report recommended that the children remain detained and the family receive reunification services. The report noted that Mother and Father blamed the sibling for the Department's involvement with the family, they lacked insight into the situation, and Mother's domestic violence against Father continued. A First Addendum Report contained information from law enforcement confirming numerous calls regarding fights between the parents.
Mother and Father requested a contested disposition hearing. On the day of the hearing, Mother submitted to the dispositional recommendations but Father proceeded to trial. The court admitted the Department reports into evidence. The social worker testified about the Department's concerns, including the domestic violence between the parents, mental health issues, and inability to meet the children's needs. Father testified that he and Mother had domestic arguments but denied there was domestic violence. He claimed he failed to follow up on a referral to a domestic violence resource (Center for Domestic Peace) because he thought there was a conflict between that agency and the Department. He pledged to enroll the children in school, if the judge returned them to his custody. He claimed his positive drug test for opiates was due to eating a poppy seed muffin.
The court found there was global neglect in the home and Father and Mother were unable to meet the children's needs. The court ordered family reunification services with a case plan that included services for the children, Mother, and Father. Father was specifically required to participate in individual therapy, undergo a psychological evaluation, and participate in regular randomized drug tests.
D. Six-Month Review
The Department filed a Status Review Report on July 5, 2019, recommending that the court order reunification services for an additional six months. Father continued to live with Mother in the family home in Fairfax. Due to Ti.N.'s mental health needs, the Department requested and the court ordered placement of Ti.N. at a short-term residential treatment program (STRTP). Tu.N. remained in a Marin County foster home and was diagnosed with social anxiety and post traumatic stress disorder.
As to the case plan requirement that Father comply with medical and psychological treatment, the Department arranged for Father to have a psychological evaluation with Dr. Albert Kastl on March 5, 2019, to ascertain the best treatment plan. Dr. Kastl diagnosed Father with Other Specified Personality Disorder with Narcissistic and Paranoid Features. He noted that Father projected blame on others, including family members and the Department, and lacked any understanding of how his interactions with Mother could harm the children and impact their emotional well-being. Because personality disorders are deeply ingrained and generally persist, Father had a poor prognosis for making and maintaining positive change and was unlikely to benefit from reunification services. Dr. Kastl concluded there were no services or supports that could assist Father to safely and effectively parent within the customary time limits of child welfare cases.
In a follow-up phone call with the Department, Dr. Kastl recommended that Father participate in group work with similarly-situated individuals to improve his perception of reality and acceptance of the current situation. The Department shared the psychological evaluation with Father's individual therapist, Jeff Levin, who agreed with Dr. Kastl's assessment that Father was unlikely to change but incorporated Dr. Kastl's recommendations into his treatment.
Levin noted that Father's "capacity to parent is limited." Father still showed little insight into how his and Mother's conduct affected the children, maintaining that the information presented by the Department to the court was false and his civil rights had been violated. He continued to blame the children's sibling for their removal and claimed that the allegations reported to the Department were made by disgruntled relatives and friends seeking revenge. Given the children's struggles with anxiety, the Department was concerned that Father's fear of public places, fear of being attacked if using a public restroom alone, and fear of the children being abducted while shopping could impact the children's mental health.
Although Father's case plan required him to take appropriate action to avoid being a victim of domestic violence, Levin thought it unlikely that the dynamics in Mother and Father's relationship would change, and Father was unwilling to separate from Mother even if it were necessary for the return of the children. Father visited the children and appeared to be free from substance abuse.
At the Six-Month Review Hearing on July 23, 2019, the court ordered six additional months of reunification services.
E. Twelve-Month Review
The Department's November 2019 Twelve-Month Review Report recommended that the court terminate reunification services for Mother and Father and set a selection and implementation hearing for the children pursuant to section 366.26.
Ti.N. remained at the STRTP and continued to struggle with mental health issues, while Tu.N. was placed with her maternal grandparents in Oregon. Father continued to participate in therapy and drug testing and visited regularly with the children. Mother had ceased participation in services and had even helped Ti.N. to "elope" from the STRTP; Ti.N was found shortly after Mother took her to a relative's home. Father denied knowledge of Mother's involvement in the elopement, but Ti.N. later disclosed that she had stayed at the family residence.
In light of the psychologist's recommendation that Father might benefit from group therapy, the Department referred Father to a domestic violence support group, Mankind, through the Center for Domestic Peace in June 2019. Father attended several Mankind sessions, but on August 7, 2019, reported that he did not think he belonged in Mankind because it was designed to treat perpetrators of domestic violence. The Department referred Father to the Empowerment Group, which provided the recommended curriculum. Father initially expressed interest, but despite the Department's encouragement, he did not attend a single session.
Father continued to attend individual therapy with Levin, who believed Father could safely parent his children if he separated from Mother. However, Father continued to live with Mother and did not think separating from her would benefit the children.
Father's visits with the children remained supervised due to concerns about him engaging in inappropriate conversations and failing to set appropriate boundaries between the children and Mother. Although he knew Mother was limited to one supervised call with Ti.N. per month, he allowed her to speak to Ti.N. during their weekly supervised calls. Knowing that the Department had suspended Mother's in-person visitation, he asked if Mother could attend his visits with Ti.N. at the STRTP. Father had not reported Ti.N.'s flight from STRTP or the fact that Mother brought Ti.N. to the home.
Despite his acknowledgement of Mother's past physical violence in front of the children and other conduct, Father had not participated in group domestic violence services other than Mankind classes. He continued to lack meaningful insight into his domestic violence relationship with Mother and the reasons the children were removed, and he had not made the necessary changes to his behavior to allow return of the children.
At a contested review hearing on January 22, 2020, the social worker testified to events since the filing of the Department's report. Father continued to reject the Department's concerns about Mother being in the home and around the children. Although Mother was currently away at college, there was a possibility of her return and Father stated he would welcome her back any time; at any rate, Mother's absence from the home did not change the Department's recommendation regarding Father in light of his inability to meet the children's dental, medical, mental health, and educational needs.
The social worker acknowledged that Father participated in two or three meetings related to Tu.N.'s individualized education plan (IEP) and was responsive when notified about school meetings, was consistent with visits, drug-tested and received negative results, and attended individual therapy. Father's therapist did not think he posed a safety risk to the children and believed his parenting issues could be addressed through therapy. Father also participated in wraparound services through Seneca House in Tu.N.'s case, although meetings were often dominated by the parents' animosity towards the Department and it was challenging to accomplish even minor tasks with the parents due to their conflict and arguing.
Father had not, however, participated in group domestic violence services. The Department's initial referral to Mankind, although a group for perpetrators of domestic violence, was for Father's benefit because it addressed healthy relationships, the cycle of violence, and anger management, and the Department believed Father might be more amenable to attending since Mother was referred to a parallel program (Womankind). When Father reported he did not feel he belonged at Mankind after several sessions, the Department immediately referred him to another domestic violence program, the Empowerment Group, but Father never attended.
Father testified about his involvement with services, including individual therapy, drug testing, and Mankind sessions. He still rejected the Department's concerns about domestic violence and insisted Mother was not a danger to the children, claiming she cares so strongly about them that if they defy her authority she becomes "very passionate about making a point that they need to obey the rules of the home." He confirmed that he would welcome Mother back to the home if she returned from Texas.
The court adopted the Department's recommendations. The court concluded that Father lacks the capacity to properly care for the children and his defense of Mother's treatment of the children indicates he lacks insight into what they suffered and he would not protect them in the future. The court found that returning the children would present a substantial risk of detriment, there was no substantial probability of return if the court were to extend services, and the Department had provided reasonable services to Father, noting that as soon as Father expressed concerns about the Mankind program, the Department referred him to a different and more appropriate one. The court terminated reunification services and set the section 366.26 hearing for May 19, 2020.
Father filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition under California Rule of Court 8.450 et seq. This petition followed, we issued an order to show cause, and the Department filed its response.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Termination of Reunification Services
At the twelve month review hearing, the juvenile court has discretion to continue reunification services, rather than terminate services and order a section 366.26 hearing, if it finds a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the parent's custody and safely maintained there during the extended reunification period. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3); § 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
To find a substantial probability of return, the court must find that the parent (1) consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child, (2) made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the child's removal, and (3) demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the objectives of the treatment plan and provide for the child's safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(A)-(C).)
The court's order finding no substantial probability of return and terminating reunification services was supported by substantial evidence. Although Father consistently and regularly visited the children, he had neither made significant progress in resolving the problems that had led to their removal nor demonstrated the capacity to complete the objectives of his case plan and provide for the children's protection and well-being.
The problems that led to the children's removal were domestic violence, the parents' inability to provide for the children's basic needs, and possible substance abuse. Despite therapy and other services provided by the Department, by the time of the 12-month review Father still lacked insight into the domestic violence dynamic in his relationship with Mother and the risks she posed to the children, defended Mother's abusive conduct with the children, believed she did not pose a risk to the children, and refused to separate from her. Moreover, he demonstrated little understanding of his children's needs and did not have a clear plan to meet them, was unaware of Ti.N.'s mental health diagnoses, had not participated in her treatment team meetings at the STRTP or inquired about her progress, had no plan for ensuring Ti.N. would receive appropriate therapy and mental health treatment, and was not involved in her IEP meetings. His visits with the children remained supervised because he discussed inappropriate topics and failed to maintain appropriate boundaries with Mother.
Nor had Father demonstrated the capacity to complete the objectives of his case plan. The March 2019 psychological evaluation concluded he was unlikely to benefit from services and make the behavioral changes necessary to safely parent his children within traditional child welfare timelines. After more than a year of services, Father continued to deny the Department's allegations and minimized the Department's concerns about Mother.
Father argues that he submitted to drug testing for more than a year (and all but two or three tests were negative), completed his psychological evaluation, regularly and consistently engaged in individual therapy, participated in Seneca services, attended Tu.N.'s IEP meetings, and regularly visited the girls even though one was in Oregon and one was in Ventura County. While those efforts are commendable, compliance with the case plan does not necessarily equate to an ability to address the children's needs or substantial progress towards reunification. (E.g., Fabian L. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1029-1030.) Father also argues that his therapist opined that parenting deficits could be addressed in ongoing therapy, but it is not our role to reweigh the evidence before the juvenile court; there was ample evidence from which the court could reasonably make its findings.
B. Reasonable Services
The juvenile court may continue reunification services at the twelve-month review hearing if it finds that the Department failed to provide reasonable services to the parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3); § 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) Father contends he was not offered or provided reasonable services.
"To provide reasonable services, the Agency must identify the problems which led to the loss of custody, design services to remedy the problems, maintain reasonable contact with the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent when compliance has proved difficult." (San Joaquin Human Services Agency v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 215, 224.) The standard is not whether the services were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that the Department provided Father with reasonable services. The Department developed a case plan addressing the family's needs and the reasons for the children's removal -- domestic violence, inability to meet the children's basic needs, and potential substance abuse. As to Father, the plan required a psychological evaluation, therapy, and drug tests, and focused on Father not being a victim of domestic violence in the future, improving his parenting capacity, and demonstrating he was free of substance-abuse. The Department then offered Father relevant services: it arranged for a psychological evaluation with Dr. Kastl; it connected Father to a therapist with specialized training in domestic violence for weekly individual therapy to address both domestic violence and parenting issues; it arranged for random drug tests; it arranged for wraparound services through Seneca House in Tu.N.'s case (including weekly meetings and team meetings); it passed along Dr. Kastl's evaluation to Father's therapist and kept in regular contact with him; and it facilitated visitation between Father and the children. Even when Dr. Kastl concluded Father was unlikely to benefit from services, the Department followed up with Dr. Kastl and asked if any service might benefit Father. When Dr. Kastl recommended group therapy with similarly situated individuals, the Department referred Father to a group domestic violence class at Mankind; and when Father said Mankind was not a good fit, the Department promptly provided a referral to another domestic violence program.
Father contends the Department failed to refer him to an appropriate group therapy program because Mankind was for perpetrators of domestic violence and the second referral was to a group for women domestic violence victims. His argument fails. Although Father was not a perpetrator of domestic violence, the initial referral to Mankind was made because of its beneficial curriculum, the likelihood that Father would resist being in a group for victims of domestic violence (since he insisted he was not one), and the fact he might be willing to attend Mankind because Mother was attending Womankind. When he finally objected, the Department promptly made its second referral - to the Empowerment Group - a group for domestic violence victims. Contrary to Father's assertion, there is no indication in the record that the group was only for women - or why that would make any substantial difference. In short, the Department's referrals in this aspect of the services it provided may not have been perfect, but Father fails to show that the court erred in concluding he was provided reasonable services.
III. DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
/s/_________
NEEDHAM, J. We concur. /s/_________
JONES, P.J. /s/_________
BURNS, J.