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R.L.H. v. State

417 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
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R.L.H. v. State

2 Citing cases

  1. R.L.B. v. State

    486 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1986)   Cited 4 times
    In R.L.B., in a very brief opinion, this Court stated “Petitioner challenges the Fifth District's ruling by arguing (1) that the State has no right to appeal an adverse order in a juvenile proceeding, and (2) that an appellate court cannot afford review to the State by way of certiorari when the State has no statutory or other cognizable right to appeal.

    This "speedy file" rule grants persons accused of juvenile delinquency the substantive right to have the charging petition dismissed if not filed within the time period provided by the statute. See, e.g., D.C.W. v. State, 445 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1984); L.H. v. State, 408 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 1982); R.L.H. v. State, 417 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. R.J., 415 So.2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. D.B.C., 413 So.2d 455 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); I.H. v. State, 405 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); State v. G.B.P., 399 So.2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. G.D.C., 372 So.2d 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); T.R. v. State, 364 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The "speedy file" rule for juvenile delinquency proceedings is followed in section 39.05 by the "speedy trial" rule for juvenile proceedings, section 39.05(7):

  2. D.C.W. v. State

    445 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1984)   Cited 11 times
    In D.C.W., the state initially proceeded against the juvenile as an adult but later filed a petition for delinquency when the charges brought in circuit court were reduced.

    Petitioner relies on those cases holding that dismissal for violation of the time requirement in section 39.05(6) is a substantive and mandatory requirement. See, e.g., L.H. v. State, 408 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 1982); S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1977); R.L.H. v. State, 417 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. R.J., 415 So.2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. D.B.C., 413 So.2d 455 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. dismissed, 419 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 1982); S.M. v. State, 398 So.2d 496 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 407 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 1981); T.R. v. State, 364 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Petitioner argues that the time begins to run at the time of arrest regardless of an initial or intervening period during which the accused is prosecuted as an adult, citing Parr v. State, 415 So.2d 1353 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 424 So.2d 763 (Fla. 1982); J.M.Z.