Opinion
E073262
02-05-2020
In re J.F., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.F., Defendant and Appellant.
Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Anna M. Marchand, and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. SWJ1200076) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Judith C. Clark, Judge. Affirmed. Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Anna M. Marchand, and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
J.F. (Father) has a history of living an unstable life and abusing controlled substances, resulting in the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) removing his three-year-old twin boys, Ju. and Ja., from his care and custody. Father appeals from the juvenile court's orders denying his petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating his parental rights to his sons and selecting adoption as their permanent plan. On appeal, Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his section 388 petitions and that the juvenile court violated his constitutional rights by not allowing him an "escape mechanism." Based on our reasoning below, we affirm the judgment.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
S.H. (Mother) is not a party to this appeal.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 28, 2017, DPSS received an immediate response referral, alleging general neglect of then 15-month-old twins, Ja. and Ju. It was reported that Father was homeless and resided in his car with his sons. Father's demeanor also suggested he had a substance abuse history and suffered from mental health issues. Mother had been recently arrested on a domestic violence charge.
The social worker spoke with Father on December 28, 2017, who stated that he did not want to be involved with the juvenile court and wished for DPSS to take the children into protective custody. Father confirmed he was homeless and living a transient lifestyle. He also stated that he had difficulty caring for the boys alone. He further reported a history of substance abuse and a prior history of participating in substance abuse treatment programs. He noted that he had last used methamphetamine and marijuana the day before, on December 27, 2017. Father emphasized that he did not want to be involved with DPSS and declined the option to reunify with his children. Father had a lengthy criminal history, which included arrests for burglary, grand theft, and providing false identification to a peace officer, and was on formal probation until January 14, 2020.
On December 28, 2017, the social worker interviewed Mother at the correctional facility. Mother reported that she had been the sole care provider for the twins since they were born, and that Father was not involved at their birth. She also stated that she and Father had reconciled about one week earlier and that before her incarceration, she and Father were homeless with their children. Mother further disclosed a prior dependency history, in which her parental rights had been terminated to her older children. Mother had a long history with child protective services, dating back to 2010.
Ju. and Ja. were taken into protective custody. On January 2, 2018, DPSS filed a petition on behalf of the children pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). The children were formally detained at the detention hearing on January 3, 2018.
Father enrolled in a substance abuse program in January 2018. However, he left the program when he was arrested for outstanding warrants. Father returned to the program upon his release from jail. He completed phase one of the program and moved on to phase two on March 25, 2018. He also participated in group therapy. Father wanted the children returned to him and Mother and was willing to participate in reunification services.
The parents regularly visited the children together. The caregiver expressed concern regarding the quality of the visits because the parents appeared more interested in visiting with each other than with the children. The caregiver referred to a visit in March 2018, in which Father asked the caregiver to watch the children while the parents got something to eat.
At a hearing on April 4, 2018, the juvenile court was concerned that the parents were not drug testing through their substance abuse program and ordered the parents to submit to hair follicle testing. The parents' hair follicle test results showed the parents were negative for all controlled substances.
On April 30, 2018, DPSS filed a first amended petition on behalf of the children pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), amending the parents' current address. On that same day, the parents filed a waiver of their rights and submitted the amended petition on the social worker's reports.
At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on June 28, 2018, the juvenile court found true the allegations in the first amended petition and declared the children dependents of the court. Physical custody of the boys was removed from the parents, and the parents were provided with reunification services.
On July 20, 2018, Father left his sober living home to go to work and did not return to the sober living home. On July 23, 2018, Mother learned that Father had been arrested for being under the influence and trespassing. Father's probation officer confirmed that Father had been arrested and was being charged with being under the influence, trespassing, and providing false identification to a police officer. Father's probation officer also reported that Father had a history of entering inpatient substance abuse treatment programs but leaving those programs and relapsing. Father's probation officer was thus going to recommend to the criminal court that Father be ordered to complete his substance abuse program in jail. Father admitted that he had relapsed and used methamphetamine.
Due to Father's incarceration, on August 21, 2018, the social worker recommended the juvenile court order jail visits between the children and Father. The juvenile court granted the request. However, Father did not want the children visiting him in jail, and his visitation with the children ceased during his incarceration.
On August 28, 2018, Father's probation officer informed the social worker that Father's probation had been terminated and that Father was sentenced to 100 days in jail to complete his remaining term of probation. On this same day, the social worker learned that Mother was pregnant. Mother later gave birth to her sixth child.
On November 17, 2018, Father was released early from jail and entered a residential inpatient substance abuse treatment facility. He planned to stay at the inpatient facility for 30 days and then move to a sober living home. Father had completed a correspondence parenting course while incarcerated.
Father did not visit the children from July 23 to November 25, 2018. Once he was released from incarceration, however, Father began to visit his boys. Prior to his incarceration, Father visited the boys twice a week and was described as being more like a playmate than a father at the visits.
By December 7, 2018, due to the parents' lack of substantive progress, the social worker recommended terminating the parents' reunification services.
On January 24, 2019, the juvenile court terminated the parents' reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The court also reduced the parents' visitation to once a month.
By April 29, 2019, DPSS recommended terminating parental rights. The children had been in the same placement with their prospective adoptive parents (caregivers) since December 28, 2017. The caregivers had provided for all of the children's physical and emotional needs. They desired to adopt the children and were committed to providing them with a permanent, stable, and loving home. The children appeared happy and were attached to their caregivers who loved "them as their own."
Father had regularly visited his boys and was always ready and prepared for visits. However, the social worker noted some concerns during some of the visits. During one visit, Father allowed the boys to pet a stray dog and cross the street in the middle of the road rather than using a crosswalk. During another visit in March 2019, Father was walking in a parking lot with his boys following him, and a car pulled out and almost hit the children. The caregiver had to yell at Father to get his attention regarding the car.
The parents moved to a sober living home on or about December 14, 2018. A referral was made as to the parents' newborn child, but it was closed as unfounded because the parents had remained sober and had provisions for the baby. The parents also continued to attend therapy and a 12-step group program, but were not participating in a substance abuse treatment program.
On May 13, 2019, the caregivers filed a request for de facto parent status. The juvenile court granted the request on May 16, 2019.
On May 10 and 13, 2019, Mother and Father, respectively, filed section 388 petitions, requesting the juvenile court to reinstate reunification services and vacate the section 366.26 hearing. The matter was set for a hearing on whether the juvenile court should grant or deny an evidentiary hearing. On May 20, 2019, the court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing in July 2019.
In their report filed June 26, 2019, DPSS recommended that the section 388 petitions be denied. The parents had moved several times since January 24, 2019. They had been living at an inpatient substance abuse treatment facility and then moved to a sober living home around December 14, 2018. In March 2019, the social worker was informed that the parents were asked to leave the sober living home because Father had several verbal outbursts during a religious sermon. During the sermon, he stood up and shouted criticisms about the way the sober living home was run. He refused to keep quiet when asked. In addition, when asked to leave the home, Father became angry and physically attacked the pastor by hitting him in the eye, causing bruising. This incident was later investigated by the social worker, and Father presented evidence which appeared to show he was a victim in the physical altercation. However, the pastor explained that during a meeting, Father had become upset at a female church leader and rapidly approached her with clenched fists. The male leaders of the church came to the aid of the female leader and restrained Father. Father was escorted out of the meeting and was asked to leave the sober living home. Father subsequently charged at the pastor, who was bigger than Father, and the pastor used his body weight to push Father to the ground. The pastor told Father several times he did not want to fight with Father and would release him once Father calmed down. The pastor let Father get up after about 20 minutes and Father had run out of energy. At that time, Father "'squared up as if he wanted to box,'" and Father punched at the pastor and elbowed the pastor in the nose. The leaders then restrained Father until he was calm and willing to go to the van to leave the property. The pastor believed that Father received the majority of his injuries when he was wrestling with the pastor on the ground and when Father was being restrained by others. The pastor's version of the incident was corroborated by several witnesses.
After the physical altercation with the pastor, the pastor arranged for Father, Mother, and their newborn son to move into a rescue mission. However, Father refused to go to the rescue mission and instead asked the church deacon to take them to a motel in Indio. Eventually, the family moved to San Bernardino, but abruptly left that home in June 2019 without giving any notice to their roommate. The parents later informed the social worker that they had left that residence because the roommate was using heroin. Subsequently, the family moved into a two-bedroom apartment with a couple and their three children in Redlands. The couple was going through a divorce. The home was cluttered but adequate. The parents did not work and lived off of cash aid and Cal Fresh aid.
Father failed to enroll in an outpatient substance abuse program and believed he did not need one. He reasoned that he had lived in a sober living home, which he thought was like an outpatient program. He attended Celebrate Recovery, a faith-based 12-step program once a week, beginning in March 2019, had a substance abuse sponsor, and attended church regularly. He did not have a relapse prevention plan. Father submitted to a hair follicle drug test on June 17, 2019, which was negative for all controlled substances.
The social worker spoke with Father's sponsor of three months. The sponsor informed the social worker that he and Father had worked on steps five through eight of the 12-step program, and they were just beginning to work on step nine. The sponsor believed that he needed to see Father continue to participate and grow in his sobriety before he felt comfortable making a long term evaluation of Father's progress.
Father enrolled in therapy on March 15, 2019. According to his therapist, Father attended regularly and appeared to open up and be honest during sessions. The therapist was impressed with the way Father worked towards his treatment goals, which included recognizing behaviors and symptoms of bipolar disorder, as well as reducing impulsivity. The therapist believed that medication would help Father. However, Father declined medication due to his history of substance abuse. The therapist also opined that Father had potential for growth, but that Father needed more time to overcome his past.
The parents visited the children on a monthly basis, usually at a park, and described the visits as positive. The parents noted that they would bring lunch for the boys, and the boys would run, play, and explore their environment. The parents also stated that the boys interacted with their newborn brother and that they cried when the visits ended. The children's caregivers, however, reported the parents and the children played and had fun with each other but interacted more as friends. The caregivers explained that when they would inform the boys about a visit, the boys would get excited and identify the parents as friends. The caregivers described the visits as concerning, noting the parents did not "parent the children." The caregivers had to stop the children from running into the street multiple times. In addition, during the visits, the parents did not provide close supervision to the boys, and the caregivers had to yell at the parents to get either the parents' or the children's attention. During one visit, the children had picked oranges from a field and threw them, with no parental supervision. The caregivers had to intervene because homeless people occupied the orange grove. On another visit, Father encouraged the children to run after a stray dog. The caregivers also noted that the children did not show any interest in interacting with their newborn brother spontaneously, but interacted with him when the parents encouraged it. After most of the visits, the caregivers had to help the children get into the car and buckle them into their car seats. When discussing the differences in the observations of their visits, the parents believed that the caregivers wanted to adopt the children, "so they embellished the visits to make them seem worse then [sic] what they were." However, Mother commented that it was difficult for her to parent during her visits, as she wanted to enjoy her time with the children.
The children continued to grow and thrive in the home of their caregivers. The children had behavioral problems when they were first placed with the caregivers. Ju. was clingy and would often become upset if he could not see his caregivers. Ja. was very aggressive and would hit, kick, bite, and pull the hair of Ju. and the caregivers. However, the children's negative behaviors slowly decreased due to the caregivers' love, care, and consistency. The caregivers noted that Mother had noticed a difference in the children's behaviors during the most recent visit. The caregivers had taken the children to the doctor, dentist, and had followed up with all of their mental health and Inland Regional Center (IRC) assessments. The children had been placed with the caregivers since they were detained at 15 months in December 2017, and the caregivers had a strong relationship with the children. The caregivers enrolled both children in a community soccer league, which they both enjoyed, and were planning on enrolling them in preschool by September 2019. The caregivers believed the children had become a part of their family and were willing to proceed with adoption.
DPSS acknowledged that since January 24, 2019, the parents had engaged in services, had made progress, had remained sober, and had taken care of their four-month old child. However, DPSS was concerned that both parents had a long history of abusing drugs, had not shown stability, and required more time being sober. DPSS believed the parents' circumstances were changing but had not changed enough to return the children. Therefore, it was not in the children's best interest to grant the section 388 petitions.
An evidentiary hearing concerning the section 388 petitions was held on July 15, 2019. Following presentation of stipulated testimony and argument from counsel, the juvenile court found that Father had met his burden of showing his circumstances had changed with regards to controlled substance use. However, the court expressed it had "real concerns about dad's aggressive behavior at Set Free Ministries . . . ." The court found that Father had failed to show his circumstances had changed with regards to establishing he had a stable residence or the ability to provide safe and stable care for the children. The court also concluded that the parents had not met their burden of proof to show that granting the section 388 petition was in the best interest of the children. Therefore, the juvenile court denied the parents' section 388 petitions. Thereafter, the court held the section 366.26 hearing. After argument from the parties, the juvenile court terminated parental rights and found the children adoptable.
On July 19, 2019, Father filed a timely notice of appeal.
III
DISCUSSION
Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his section 388 petitions and that the court's decision did not allow him any "'escape mechanism'" in violation of his constitutional rights. In particular, he contends the three Kimberly F. factors militate in favor of reversal. He asserts the court erred by finding his circumstances had not changed with respect to having a stable residence and his ability to provide safe and stable care to the children, and that granting the section 388 petitions would not be in the children's best interest. We disagree.
In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519 (Kimberly F.). --------
Under section 388, a juvenile court order may be changed or set aside "if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child." (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806, italics added; see In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.); In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157; In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250 (Anthony W.).) "The parent bears the burden to show both a legitimate change of circumstances and that undoing the prior order would be in the best interest of the child. [Citation.] Generally, the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the child's welfare requires the modification sought. [Citation.]" (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 611-612 (A.A.); accord, In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 959.) "In determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. [Citation.]" (In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 127.)
The decision whether to grant or deny a section 388 petition is within the discretion of the juvenile court. (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 920.) On appeal, a reviewing court will not disturb a discretionary decision by the juvenile court unless it abuses its discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318; In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 642; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 460 (Angel B.).) The appellant has the burden on appeal to affirmatively show that the juvenile court abused its discretion. (A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.) "It is rare that the denial of a section 388 motion merits reversal as an abuse of discretion . . . ." (Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 522.)
Assuming that Father showed changed circumstances, he did not establish that reinstating reunification services would be in the children's best interest.
"In any custody determination, a primary consideration in determining the child's best interests is the goal of assuring stability and continuity." (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) By the time of a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a child's permanent plan, the interests of the parent and the child have diverged. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254.) Therefore, "[a]fter the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point, 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability' [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child." (Stephanie M., at p. 317; accord, In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 (Marilyn H.).)
At the time Father filed his section 388 petitions, the children's interest in stability was the juvenile court's foremost concern, outweighing any interest in reunification. The prospect of allowing Father additional reunification services to see if Father would and could do what he was required to do to regain custody would not have promoted stability for the children, who already had been in the dependency system for approximately 20 months, and thus would not have promoted the children's best interest. (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.) The boys were both 15 months when they were removed from Father's care in December 2017. By the time Father filed his section 388 petitions in May 2019, the boys had been in their prospective adoptive home for approximately 18 months. The boys had found stability and permanency and had been thriving in a loving home with caregivers who desired to adopt both children. The children's caregivers had a strong bond with the boys. And, due to the love, care, and consistency provided by their caregivers, the children's negative behaviors had decreased.
On the other hand, Father had minimal contact with the boys throughout their young lives. Mother reported that before the dependency proceedings commenced, she was the sole care provider of the children since they were born, and Father was not involved in their lives. The parents reconciled approximately one week before DPSS's involvement. Father could not visit the boys from July 23 to November 25, 2018, while he was incarcerated, and in January 2019, visitation was reduced to once a month. The children viewed the parents as playmates and friends during visitation, not as parents. The parents did not provide structure, show a protective capacity, or parent the children throughout the visits. Reinstating reunification services for Father would only prolong the children's adoption in a stable and loving home.
The children were placed with their caregivers on December 28, 2017. The children and the caregivers had a reciprocal bond and attachment. The boys had known the caregivers for most of their short lives and were comfortable in their care. The caregivers provided for the boys' emotional, educational, and physical needs. Indeed, the caregivers had been providing the boys with their everyday parental needs on a regular basis. The caregivers desired to adopt the children and also provide them with love, stability, and security. Delaying the children's adoption in the hopes of Father achieving reunification was not in the children's best interest.
In arguing that the requested change in this case is in the children's best interest, Father focuses on the three factors set out in Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pages 530-532. The Kimberly F. court, after rejecting the juvenile court's comparison of the biological parent's household with that of the adoptive parents as the test for determining the child's best interest, identified three nonexclusive factors that juvenile courts should consider in assessing the issue of the child's best interest: (1) the seriousness of the problem that led to dependency and the reason the problem had not been resolved by the time of the final review; (2) the strength of the relative bonds between the child to both the child's parent and the child's caretakers and the length of time the child has been in the dependency system in relation to the parental bond; and (3) the degree to which the problem that led to the dependency may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been. (Id. at pp. 530-532.)
However, Kimberly F. has been criticized for its focus on the interests of the parent. The Kimberly F. factors conflict with our Supreme Court's holding in Stephanie M. that stability and continuity are the primary considerations in determining a child's best interest in the context of placement. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) Furthermore, Kimberly F. also fails to take into account the Supreme Court's analysis in Stephanie M. of the child's best interest once reunification efforts have failed. Moreover, the same appellate court that decided Kimberly F. declined to apply the Kimberly F. factors "if for no other reason than they do not take into account the Supreme Court's analysis in Stephanie M., applicable after reunification efforts have been terminated." (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 (J.C.).) The J.C. court explained, "[t]o understand the element of best interests in the context of a 388 petition filed, as in this case, on the eve of the .26 hearing, we turn to the Supreme Court's language in Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th 295 . . . ." (J.C., at p. 526.) The court instead followed the direction of our Supreme Court, "holding that after reunification services have terminated, a parent's petition for either an order returning custody or reopening reunification efforts must establish how such a change will advance the child's need for permanency and stability." (Id. at p. 527.)
On this record, Father did not establish that the children's need for permanency and stability would be advanced by reunification efforts. It is important to keep in mind that, where, as here, the juvenile court's ruling is against the party who has the burden of proof, it is extremely difficult for Father to prevail on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a ruling in his favor. Unless the juvenile court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the moving party, we presume the juvenile court found Father's evidence lacked sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof. (See Rodney F. v. Karen M. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 233, 241.)
In denying Father's section 388 petitions in regard to the best interest of the child, the juvenile court stated: "These children have been out of these parents' care longer than they have been in these parents' care. And the reality is for dad, dad wasn't even involved with these children early on with regards to these children's lives because he was in jail for a substantial period of that time. So for dad they've been out of his custody even longer than that. [¶] . . . [¶] What these children have found with the current caretakers is a long period of consistent stability with stable expectations and rules and schedules and the ability to provide comfort and reassurance that has allowed them to set aside some of their more destructive aspects of their personality or the inhibiting aspects of their personality and be able to be confident, independent toddlers. And that's important because it's only children that are comfortable and safe and stable in their environment that have the ability to then sort of start to grow into their own in terms of exploring their world, learning how to relate to other individuals appropriately, being able to be curious and investigatory with regards to their surroundings." "At this point in the proceedings, on the eve of the selection and implementation hearing, the children's interest in stability was the court's foremost concern, outweighing any interest [Father] may have in reunification." (Anthony W., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 251-252.) It is not in the children's best interest for permanence to be delayed for an unknown or indefinite period of time, with no certainty or even likelihood Father could progress to the point of obtaining custody of the children.
Father also asserts the juvenile court's decision did not allow him an "'escape mechanism,'" in violation of his constitutional rights, and that the court failed to "'meaningfully consider'" his section 388 petitions. The record belies Father's contention.
Father is correct that section 388 serves as an "'escape mechanism' when parents complete a reformation in the short, final period after the termination of reunification services but before the actual termination of parental rights." (Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 528.) "[It] provides a means for the court to address a legitimate change of circumstances" to afford the parent one last opportunity to reinstate reunification services prior to final resolution of custody status. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) "[S]ection 388 is vital to the constitutionality of our dependency scheme as a whole, and the termination statute, section 366.26, in particular. [Citation.]" (Kimberly F., at p. 528.) It follows that to deprive a parent of this last opportunity is contrary to law and a denial of due process. (In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1416 (Jeremy W.).)
The statutory scheme of section 388 is constitutional because of the many safeguards. (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 461.) "One such safeguard . . . is that if a parent makes a prima facie showing of a change of circumstance such that a proposed change in custody might be in the child's best interest, then the juvenile court must hold a hearing [on a section 388 petition]." (Ibid.) The Angel B. court determined, "Thus, the real issue here is not whether this statutory scheme is constitutional, but whether [the parent] made the requisite prima facie showing; if she [or he] did, then we shall simply reverse and direct the juvenile court to hold the hearing due process does require." (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court did not deprive Father of his last opportunity or due process of law. The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on Father's section 388 petitions, during which he provided both evidence and argument. Father's arguments to the contrary are not supported by the record. The record demonstrates that the juvenile court carefully considered Father's section 388 petitions, and the court's findings span approximately 12 pages of the reporter's transcript. The court analyzed in detail the parents' circumstances, and noted that, in anticipation of the hearing, the court reviewed the history of the case. The court thoroughly examined the history of the case, and even acknowledged Father's efforts and found that he had met his burden of showing that circumstances had changed concerning his use of controlled substances. However, the court found that Father's circumstances had not changed with respect to establishing a stable residence and his ability to provide safe and stable care for the boys. The juvenile court also made findings as to whether or not granting the section 388 petition was in the children's best interest, and the court commented on the quality of visitation.
The record shows that, contrary to Father's claim on appeal, the juvenile court gave "meaningful consideration" to Father's section 388 petitions, but found that Father had failed to show his circumstances had changed as to his stability and as to the best interest of the children. At the time of the section 388 hearing, the children were in a prospective adoptive home where they had been for approximately 18 months. It was not in the children's best interest to further delay permanency and stability in favor of reinstating reunification services and reward Father for his belated efforts to reunify with the children. (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) Father's interests were "simply no longer the focus." (Ibid.) Delaying permanency for the children at this late stage in the dependency process would not have promoted their stability and plainly would not have been in their best interest. "'When custody continues over a significant period, the child's need for continuity and stability assumes an increasingly important role. That need will often dictate the conclusion that maintenance of the current arrangement would be in the best interests of that child.' [Citations.]" (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.)
In sum, there is insufficient evidence that the delay in permanency planning would be in the children's best interest. While Father is to be commended for his efforts to become an effective parent and resolve his drug addiction, the fact remains that Father has not established that the children can be safely maintained in his home. Under these circumstances, Father's showing did not compel the juvenile court to find that reinstating Father's reunification services would be in the children's best interest. Therefore, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's section 388 petitions.
IV
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order denying Father's section 388 petitions is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. FIELDS
J.