Opinion
C. A. 8:21-cv-1690-SAL-JDA
11-17-2022
Kenneth Rivera, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kenneth Rivera (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas on March 30, 2021, at case number 2021-cp-40-1433. [Doc. 1-1.] Plaintiff is a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Broad River Correctional Institution, and he sues the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“Defendant” or “SCDC”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”), SC Code §§ 15-78-10, et seq. [Id. at 3.] On June 7, 2021, Defendant removed the action to this Court purportedly on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction. [Doc. 1.]
Upon review of the pleadings and notice of removal, the undersigned entered a Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”) dated June 10, 2021, recommending that this matter be remanded to the state court for lack of jurisdiction. [Doc. 9.] On November 15, 2022, the Honorable Sherri A. Lydon entered an Order accepting and rejecting the R&R in part, declining to remand the case to the state court, and recommitting the matter to the undersigned for further proceedings and additional screening to determine whether Plaintiff stated a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 17.]
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge, who is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's federal causes of action be dismissed and that this action be remanded to the state court.
BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff contends that he received an Order to Report (“OTR”) to medical for an examination on June 5, 2020. [Doc. 1-1 at 4.] However, Plaintiff was not permitted to attend his OTR appointment. [Id.] From June 2020 through February 2021, Plaintiff submitted several Requests to Staff Members (“RTSM”) concerning the issue. [Id.] Thereafter, on January 28, 2021, Plaintiff received an OTR for a dental appointment for a dental procedure. [Id.] However, the appointment was not honored. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that he has been complaining to medical for four months about his ear and back pain, but he has not received an OTR for those issues. [Id.]
Plaintiff contends Defendant violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and under the SCTCA. [Id. at 4-5.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment, an injunction ordering SCDC to honor Plaintiff's OTRs, $20,000 in compensatory damages, and $20,000 in punitive damages. [Id. at 6.]
Based on these allegations and in light of the liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings, the Court construes Plaintiff's Complaint as alleging a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in addition to a state law claim under the SCTCA.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and he “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Accordingly, this Court is charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts SCDC failed to honor his OTRs for medical and dental appointments. [Doc. 1-1 at 4.] Plaintiff alleges that SCDC violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with negligence and deliberate indifference to his medical needs and he seeks money damages and relief pursuant to the SCTCA. [ Id. at 3, 5-6.] Failure to state a claim under § 1983
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, Plaintiff names SCDC as the only Defendant in this action. [Doc. 1-1 at 2.] However, although SCDC “is amenable to suit in state court for tort pursuant to the [SCTCA], it is not amenable to suit in federal court for damages based on an alleged violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights.” Green v. SCDC, No. 9:11-cv-3407-DNC-BM, 2012 WL 360144, at *1, n.1 (D.S.C. Jan. 13, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted and aff'd by 2012 WL 360105 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2012). This is so because SCDC is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. It is well settled that inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds do not qualify as “persons” and cannot act under color of state law. See Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a detention center is a building and is not amenable to suit under § 1983); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”). SCDC is “a department, group of buildings, or a facility, and it is not considered a person subject to suit under . . . § 1983.” Harrison v. SCDC, No. 8:14-cv-1196-JMC-JDA, 2014 WL 10060932, at *2 (D.S.C. July 8, 2014), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2015 WL 4095882 (D.S.C. July 6, 2015). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim asserted pursuant to § 1983 is subject to summary dismissal because he has failed to name a defendant amenable to suit under § 1983. See Weddington v. SCDC, No. 8:08-cv-1652-GRA-BHH, 2009 WL 473510, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2009) (“As to SCDC, it is well-settled that an agency of the state is not a person within the meaning of § 1983, and thus is not a proper defendant.”); Peoples v. SCDC, No. 8:07-cv-1203-CMC-BHH, 2008 WL 4442583, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2008) (same).
Indeed, in another recent case filed by Plaintiff against SCDC, this Court previously explained as follows:
Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot lie against this Defendant. [SCDC] is not a “person” amenable to suit under section 1983.Rivera v. SCDC, No. 8:20-cv-3356-SAL (D.S.C. Jun. 28, 2021), Doc. 31 (dismissing Plaintiff's federal claims brought against SCDC under § 1983 and remanding Plaintiff's state law claims under the SCTCA to state court).
Supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
Because Plaintiff's federal causes of action should be dismissed, “this Court must determine whether to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to entertain the remaining state court claims.” Rivera, No. 8:20-cv-3356-SAL, Doc. 31 at 4. The undersigned concludes that this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, as it has before, over the remaining state court claims.
“In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a court should consider ‘the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.'” Bishop v. County of
Macon, 620 Fed. App'x 148, 150 (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). Here, the Court finds that the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity all favor the resolution of this matter in state court. The remaining claims are state court causes of action against an agency of South Carolina under the SCTCA. No underlying issues of federal policy remain. If the case were brought in state court with the remaining claims, it would not be removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Accordingly, the Court finds that resolution in state court will serve the convenience and fairness of the parties, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.Rivera, No. 8:20-cv-3356-SAL, Doc. 31 at 4-5. The same considerations apply to the present case as in Plaintiff's prior cases against SCDC under the SCTCA. See id.; see also Rivera v. SCDC, No. 8:18-cv-2539-JMC, 2019 WL 642916, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2019) (dismissing Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against SCDC and remanding his state law claims under the SCTCA to the state court). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the remaining state law claims be remanded to the state court.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Plaintiff's federal causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim, that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, and that this matter be REMANDED to the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas of Richland County.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).