Opinion
2015-04-09
Raiser & Kenniff, P.C., Mineola (James M. Ingoglia of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Pamela Seider Dolgow of counsel), for respondent.
Raiser & Kenniff, P.C., Mineola (James M. Ingoglia of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Pamela Seider Dolgow of counsel), for respondent.
GONZALEZ, P.J., MAZZARELLI, SAXE, MANZANET–DANIELS, CLARK, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Larry S. Schachner, J.), entered November 1, 2013, which, to the extent appealed from, denied petitioner's motion for leave to file a late notice of claim, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, and the motion granted.
Upon consideration of the factors relevant to deciding a motion for leave to file a late notice of claim, we find that the motion should have been granted ( seeGeneral Municipal Law § 50–e[5]; see also Rosario v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 119 A.D.3d 490, 990 N.Y.S.2d 506 [1st Dept.2014] ). Petitioner alleged that in April 2012, while walking past a construction site in Bronx County, she tripped over debris on the walkway, and fell head-first, suffering, among other things, a traumatic brain injury, which required a lengthy hospitalization and has caused her to suffer from sporadic seizures and speech impediments. She further alleged that her medical condition has required ongoing medical treatment, and that her physicians have advised her that she cannot leave her home unaccompanied. Given these specific factual allegations, petitioner sufficiently showed that she was medically incapacitated, thus excusing her failure to timely file a notice of claim within 90 days of the accident ( seeGeneral Municipal Law § 50–e[5]; see also Matter of Olsen v. County of Nassau, 14 A.D.3d 706, 707, 789 N.Y.S.2d 264 [2d Dept.2005], and Matter of Ferrer v. City of New York, 172 A.D.2d 240, 567 N.Y.S.2d 734 [1st Dept.1991] ).
After petitioner retained counsel in September 2012, she did not unreasonably delay in making the application for leave to file a late notice of claim. Petitioner's counsel explained that his public records search revealed that respondent the City of New York was only one of multiple owners of the property where the construction occurred, and that he had no way of identifying the company that performed the construction work at the site, or of knowing whether the City, or another owner, had contracted with that company for the project. Petitioner's attempts at obtaining this information before filing the motion at issue were rebuffed by the City's failures to promptly respond to her requests for information under the Freedom of Information Law. Petitioner made the motion after her search proved fruitless. Under these circumstances, where the City contributed to the delay, and the motion was made within the one-year and ninety-day statute of limitations ( seeCPLR 217–a; see alsoGeneral Municipal Law § 50–e[5] ), the City cannot argue that petitioner unduly delayed in making the motion, or that it did not acquire essential knowledge of the facts underlying petitioner's claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90–day period for filing a timely notice of claim ( see Matter of Drysdale v. City of New York, 182 A.D.2d 566, 582 N.Y.S.2d 716 [1st Dept.1992], lv. dismissed 81 N.Y.2d 759, 594 N.Y.S.2d 718, 610 N.E.2d 391 [1992]; Matter of Mazzilli v. City of New York, 115 A.D.2d 604, 496 N.Y.S.2d 266 [2d Dept.1985]; Cassidy v. County of Nassau, 84 A.D.2d 742, 443 N.Y.S.2d 742 [2d Dept.1981] ).
The City has not shown that it has suffered substantial prejudice by the delay, especially given the transitory nature of the alleged defective condition ( see Matter of Mercado v. City of New York, 100 A.D.3d 445, 446, 953 N.Y.S.2d 206 [1st Dept.2012] ). The City's conclusory claim that the passage of time may affect the availability or memories of potential witnesses is insufficient to establish prejudice ( see id.).