Opinion
FSTCV186034927S
08-16-2018
Daniel RIVAS v. Robert A. PEPI
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Jacobs, J.
BACKGROUND
This defamation action arises out of comments made at a public January 20, 2016 Stamford Parks & Recreation Commission meeting. In his February 1, 2018 complaint, the plaintiff, owner and founder of the Central American Soccer League of Stamford (the League), alleges that defamatory statements were made by six defendants: Bob Pepi, Fernando Vega, Julio Ramos, Elio Gudiel, Luis Orellana, and Marvin Orellana. Each of the six counts of the complaint is addressed to one of the six defendants. In Paragraph 6 of each count of his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that, at the meeting, the defendants stated that the plaintiff "was overcharging, was corrupt, and condoned violence." The plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the defendants’ statements, the plaintiff’s league permits were revoked by the City of Stamford, which in turn, caused the plaintiff to suffer financial harm. The plaintiff also alleges that he suffered emotional anguish and reputational harm.
Hereinafter, the court will collectively refer to these six men as the defendants.
On March 19, 2018, pursuant to Public Act No. 17-71(b) of the Connecticut General Assembly [codified as General Statutes § 52-196a, effective January 1, 2018], the defendants filed the current special motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed an objection on April 23, 2018 [#103]. On May 7, 2018, both parties filed supplemental briefs with exhibits [#106, #107]. The motion and objection were heard at short calendar on May 7, 2018.
Pursuant to § 52-196a(e)(2), the court, in arriving at its decision, has considered the pleadings and the supporting and opposing affidavits. In addition, the court has considered the other exhibits and the legislative history of the statute.
DISCUSSION
General Statutes § 52-196a, effective as of January 1, 2018, sets forth the procedures for the special motion to dismiss. Section 52-196a(a)(1) defines a matter of public concern as "an issue related to (A) health or safety, (B) environmental, economic or community well-being, (C) the government, zoning and other regulatory matters, (D) a public official or public figure, or (E) an audiovisual work." It defines free speech in (a)(2) "as communicating, or conduct furthering communication, in a public forum on a matter of public concern." Id. Section 52-196a(b) states: "In any civil action in which a party files a complaint, counterclaim or cross claim against an opposing party that is based on the opposing party’s exercise of its right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of public concern, such opposing party may file a special motion to dismiss the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim." Section 52-196a(e)(3) states in relevant part: "The court shall grant a special motion to dismiss if the moving party makes an initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the opposing party’s complaint, counterclaim or cross claim is based on the moving party’s exercise of its right of free speech ... unless the party that brought the complaint ... sets forth with particularity the circumstances giving rise to the complaint ... and demonstrates to the court that there is probable cause ... that the party will prevail on the merits of the complaint ..."
The title of this section is "Filing of special motion to dismiss based on exercise of certain state or federal constitutional rights in connection with matter of public concern. Court procedure."
The Connecticut General Assembly has made the transcripts of the House and Senate debates pertaining to § 52-196a available on its website. Senator Doyle of the 9th District stated during the Senate debate that the "real intent of the legislation [§ 52-196a] is to assist people that are sued on their free speech rights to have a means to quickly get rid of frivolous lawsuits." (Senate Debate Transcript). It was further stated that § 52-196a is "a mechanism that can save money for defendants that are wrongly targeted for simply exercising their rights really on the 1st Amendment and other matters of public concern." Id. According to the session transcripts from the debate concerning § 52-196a, the general intent was to protect the free flow of ideas amongst people and to get lawsuits that would jeopardize this notion dismissed as early as possible.
Defendants’ Burden: An Initial Showing That Plaintiff’s Claim is Based on Defendants’ Right of Free Speech
The January 20, 2016 Stamford Parks & Recreation Commission meeting was open to the public. Neither party disputes the fact that the meeting was a public forum. The topics of discussion concerned use of the city’s park spaces and sports fields. The minutes of the January 20th meeting were submitted by both parties for the court’s consideration [#101, exhibit H, #104, unnumbered exhibit]. The minutes, in relevant part, include the following:
Bob Pepi came in front of the Commission with members of the Central American Soccer League to express their discontent and frustration with the League. They feel that they are being over charged and taken advantage of.
Mr. Pepi stated that the history of the Central American Soccer League has been sketchy; it has been marked by corruption and violence. At one point they had to pay for Police to be there so they could play, it was a difficult situation. The League had a bad reputation in town and the guys present tonight are embarrassed by it and want a change.
The last few years there has been less of the violence, but corruption seems to have gone thru the roof.
Mr. Pepi also stated that several of the teams have left the league, and that seven of the teams which left the league have stated that they would rejoin the league if the leadership were changed. He requested that the Commission sanction the defendants, as opposed to the plaintiff, as the Central American Soccer League. The court finds that the defendant Bob Pepi’s comments relate to a matter of public concern as defined in § 52-196a.
The plaintiff’s affidavit states that he is the founder, owner, operator and president of the Central American Soccer League and that no other individual is authorized to conduct or transact business for the league. The court finds that the "leadership" of the Central American Soccer League to which the defendant Bob Pepis’ comments refer is the plaintiff.
Pursuant to § 52-196a(e)(3), the court concludes that the defendants have made an initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff’s complaint is based on the defendants’ exercise of their right of free speech in connection with a matter of public concern.
Plaintiff’s Burden: Demonstrating Probable Cause That He Will Prevail on the Merits of His Complaint
"To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff’s reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., 291 Conn. 620 (2009).
A defamatory statement is defined as a negligent misstatement of objective fact, as opposed to a mere opinion. Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Company, 249 Conn. 766 (1999). In the instant case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants stated that the plaintiff "was overcharging, was corrupt, and condoned violence."
As to overcharging, the plaintiff offered this court no evidence as to the amount of money the plaintiff charged the participants in the Central American Soccer League or any other league. Absent any such evidence, this court cannot conclude that the plaintiff has demonstrated probable cause that he will prevail on the merits of his complaint as to the allegedly defamatory statement of "overcharging."
Similarly, the plaintiff offered this court no evidence upon which the plaintiff has demonstrated probable cause that he will prevail on the merits of his complaint as to the allegedly defamatory statement that the plaintiff "condoned violence."
The plaintiff has also alleged that the defendants’ statement that the plaintiff "was corrupt" was defamatory. At short calendar, plaintiff’s counsel argued that the defendants’ comments constituted defamation per se. This court disagrees. It is true that certain statements about an individual’s criminal behavior have historically been considered defamatory per se where the crime was a crime of "moral turpitude" or "infamous penalty," Yavis v. Sullivan, 137 Conn. 253 (1950), or punishable by imprisonment. Gleason v. Smolinski, 319 Conn. 394 (2015). It is also true that a specific crime need not be stated, as along as the words used can be reasonably interpreted to charge a crime. Battista v. United Illuminating Company, 10 Conn.App. 86 (1987). The court does not find that the defendants’ statement that the plaintiff was "corrupt" can be reasonably interpreted to charge a crime. The court considers the word "corrupt" to have been used to express a negative opinion of the plaintiff, not as a statement that the plaintiff had committed a crime.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
The court has considered the parties’ pleadings attesting to the facts upon which liability is based and finds as follows:
1. The special motion to dismiss was timely filed.
2. The defendants have made an initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff’s complaint is based on the defendants’ exercise of their constitutional right of free speech, to petition the government, or of association in connection with a matter of public concern.
3. The plaintiff has not demonstrated to the court that there is probable cause, considering all valid defenses, that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of the complaint.
4. The special motion to dismiss is granted. The defendants are awarded reasonable attorneys fees and costs, including costs and fees incurred in connection with the filing of the special motion to dismiss. The defendants shall submit an itemization of the fees and costs within ten days from the date of this order.