Opinion
Civ. No. 99-2742 c/w 99-3352, SECTION "K" (1).
February 1, 2000.
Raphael Rivas ("Rivas") has filed a motion in each of the above-captioned consolidated cases. As claimant in the limitation proceeding (no. 99-3352), Rivas has filed a Motion to Lift the Stay Order. As plaintiff in civil action number 99-2742, Rivas filed a Motion to Remand to Civil District Court for Parish of Orleans. The court will address each motion in turn.
1. Background
This case arose out of personal injuries Rivas allegedly sustained while working as a sandblaster/painter for Production Management Industries, Inc. ("PMI"). On January 7, 1999, Rivas was being transferred via personnel basket from a fixed offshore oil platform owned by Energy Partners, Ltd. ("Energy Partners") to the deck of an offshore supply vessel owned by Coast Crafts, Inc. ("Coast Crafts"). During the transfer, the personnel basket tipped over, and Rivas landed on the deck of the vessel.
Energy Partners is Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Louisiana.
Coast Crafts, Inc. was formerly known as Coast Trawlers, Inc. Coast Crafts is a corporation organized under the laws of Louisiana and has its principal place of business in Louisiana.
Rivas brought a civil action for damages in Louisiana state court, alleging acts of negligence by both Energy Partners and Coast Crafts. Specifically, Rivas alleges that Energy Partners failed to properly execute the his transfer to the vessel. Rivas additionally alleges that his accident was caused by Coast Crafts' failure to properly position the vessel, failure to call off the transfer when the weather and seas made it unsafe, and failure to provide proper signals to the crane operators in connection with the transfer. Defendants timely joined in filing a notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Defendants' notice of removal states that this court has federal question jurisdiction of this action because plaintiff's petition implicates the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA") and thus arises under the laws of the United States, in accordance with § 1441.
Plaintiff asks the court to remand this action to state court and argues that it was improvidently removed. Rivas contends that his decision to bring this action in state court is within the protection afforded him under the Savings to Suitors Clause.
Coast Crafts and BJ Martin also filed a limitation action in this court, and both Rivas and Energy Partners have filed claims. On November 15, 1999, the court ordered a stay on Rivas' state court proceedings. Rivas has signed a stipulation to protect Coast Crafts' right to limit, and seeks to have the court lift its stay order.
BJ Martin is owner and owner pro hac vice of the M/V WHITE DOVE, the supply vessel to which Rivas was being transferred.
2. Motion to Lift Stay
Rivas' argues that this court's November 12, 1999 order staying the state court proceedings should be lifted because Rivas has executed the requisite stipulation. Rivas contends that this court must grant the motion provided that the language of the stipulation is appropriate to protect the interest of the shipowner to limit its liability and protect the adjudication of that right in the federal forum.
Complainants Coast Crafts, and BJ Martin argue that Rivas' motion is fatal because Rivas does not have the concurrence of co-claimant Energy Partners.
The motion must be denied because the other claimant has not concurred in the stipulation. A claimant may proceed in state court pursuant to the Savings to Suitors Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 if he files a stipulation in the federal court proceeding designed to protect the vessel owner's rights under the Limitation Act. Texaco, Inc. v. Williams, 47 F.3d 765, 767 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 907, 116 S.Ct. 275, 133 L.Ed.2d 196 (1995). The stipulation must state that the admiralty court reserves exclusive jurisdiction to determine all issues related to the shipowner's right to limit liability and that no judgment against the shipowner will be asserted to the extent it exceeds the value of the limitation fund. Magnolia Marine Transport Co., Inc. v. LaPlace Towing Corp., 964 F.2d 1571, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992). The claimant must also waive any claim of res judicata relevant to the issues of limitation of liability or exoneration. In the Matter of Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 1996 WL 240005 *2 (E.D.La.).
In order to filly protect the vessel owner's rights, all claimants must so stipulate. Odeco Oil Gas Co. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 1996). Courts read "claimants" broadly, to include parties seeking contribution and/or indemnity, as these are liabilities that must be addressed in order to protect the shipowner's rights. Id.
Here, the stipulation made by claimant Rivas does not adequately protect the vessel owner's rights vis-á-vis the other claimant. While the Stipulation would appear on the surface to protect Coast Crafts adequately, under Fifth Circuit precedent, this court must still deny the motion. The Odeco case concerned an analogous situation, where the stipulation included similar language to that which Rivas has offered to add to its stipulation:
Claimants/Defendants herein stipulate and agree that if ODECO is held responsible for attorneys' fees and costs which may be assessed against it by a co-liable defendant or a party seeking indemnification for attorneys' fees and costs, then such claim shall have priority over the claim of claimants/defendants herein. Odeco, 866 F. Supp. 295, 297 n. 2.
Even with the safeguards provided by this language, the Fifth Circuit still reversed the district court in Odeco, stating that "we are not in a position to predict the possible developments in the state court proceedings." Odeco, 74 F.3d at 675. This court cannot second-guess the logic of Fifth Circuit precedent and must, therefore, deny the Motion to Lift Stay.
3. Motion for Remand
Defendants, Energy Partners and Coast Crafts, removed the action to this court, asserting federal question jurisdiction under the OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1333. In support of his Motion for Remand, Rivas contends that its action against Coast Crafts was improvidently removed because his state court petition did not specifically invoke OCSLA. Therefore, according to Rivas, his claims are strictly general maritime claims.
Moreover, even if OCSLA were implicated on the face of plaintiff's complaint, Rivas argues that the his general maritime claim against Coast Crafts trumps the OCSLA claim, and the case may not be removed unless there is diversity of citizenship and no local defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
On the other hand, Coast Crafts and Energy Partners contend that OCSLA is implicated on the face of plaintiff's complaint. Defendants argue that OCSLA vests the court with removal jurisdiction under § 1441(b), despite plaintiff's general maritime claim and the savings to suitors clause. Alternatively, defendants argue that even if the court does not have removal jurisdiction under § 1441(b), that the maritime claim is removable under § 1441(c) because it is joined with and is separate and independent from an otherwise removable claim (the OCSLA claim).
The court has carefully considered the briefs of the parties and has conducted its own research. While the jurisprudence concerning the interplay of OCSLA and maritime claims is plentiful, unanswered questions and confusion abound.
b. Removal Under § 1441
The question before the court is whether Rivas' claims against Coast Crafts and Energy Partners are removable under § 1441. Section 1441(a) and (b) provide:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. For purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
OCSLA was enacted by Congress to provide a federal body of law to govern operations on the outer Continental Shelf. Recognizing that the statutory federal Law may in some areas be inadequate, Congress incorporated into OCSLA the laws of adjacent states, where they are not inconsistent with OCSLA. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A). Nonetheless, OCSLA is exclusively federal law. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969). Therefore, federal courts have original jurisdiction over OCSLA claims. Such claims are removable under § 1441 without regard to the citizenship of the parties. See Hufnagel v. Omega Service Industries, Inc., 182 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1999).
On the other hand, general maritime claims do not "arise under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States" for purposes of federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. An admiralty action filed in state court under the savings to suitors clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1), is not removable solely because it might have been filed in federal court. Rather, removal of an admiralty action filed in state court is possible only if jurisdiction is based on other grounds, such as diversity or a statutory provision. Tennessee Gas v. Houston casualty Co., Ins., 87 F.3d at 153 (5th Cir. 1996).
With these principles in mind, the court must first determine whether Rivas' claims against Coast Crafts and Energy Partners implicate OCSLA and/or the general maritime law. Rivas' petition does not specifically invoke OCSLA. The petition does indicate, however, that the defendants' acts of negligence occurred on or near Energy Partners' fixed platform "at South Timbalier, Block 26-A, OCSG 1361." See Rivas' Petition for Damages. Nor does Rivas specifically plead recovery against the defendants under the general maritime law or jurisdiction under the Savings to Suitors clause.
c. Applicability of OCSLA and General Maritime Law to Claim Against Platform Owner
Title 43 United States Code, § 1349(b)(1) provides that the district courts "shall have jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising out of, or in connection with (A) any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration development, or production of the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf."
It is not necessary that a plaintiff plead OCSLA specifically as long as the allegations in his complaint set forth legal claims based on OCSLA. See Hufnagel, 182 F.2d 349-350; Tennessee Gas, 87 F.3d at 154-155. In this case, Rivas made allegations of negligence against Energy Partners, owner of a fixed offshore oil platform on the Outer Continental Shelf for actions allegedly occurring on that platform. Only under OCSLA may a plaintiff maintain an action for negligence under such circumstances. Therefore, OCSLA provides Rivas' only remedy against Energy Partners under these factual circumstances.
The Fifth Circuit applies a "but-for" test to determine whether a cause of action arises under OCSLA. A plaintiff's claims arise under OCSLA if 1) plaintiff's employment furthered mineral development on the continental shelf, and 2) plaintiff's injury would not have occurred, but-for his employment. See Recar v. CNG Producing Co., 853 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1988).
In this case, but-for Rivas' employment on the platform, he would not have been injured. The alleged injuries occurred while Rivas was being transferred from a stationary platform that was involved in the "exploration, development, or production" of minerals on the shelf. The but-for test is satisfied, and OCSLA governs Rivas' claim against Energy Partners.
The court finds that plaintiff's claim against Energy Partners is governed solely by OCSLA. Therefore the court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over such claim.
d. Applicability of General Maritime Law
The applicability of OCSLA to the claims against Energy Partners does not end the inquiry into the propriety of removal in this instance. Rivas' claim against Energy Partners is joined with his claim against Coast Crafts. The court now turns to the question of jurisdiction over the claim against Coast Crafts.
Rivas' claim against Coast Crafts is governed by the general maritime law. To give rise to a tort claim in admiralty, the wrong must have both a maritime situs and a connection to traditional maritime activity. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). In this case, both the locality and nexus prongs of the Executive Jet test are satisfied. First, the alleged wrong occurred on navigable waters — the Gulf of Mexico. Second, the wrong occurred during vessel's receipt of passengers from a fixed platform, a traditional maritime activity.
This Court has further held that a district court determining whether some alleged negligence bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity must address four considerations: 1) the functions and roles of the parties involved; 2) the types of instrumentalities involved; 3) the nature and cause of the accident; 4) traditional concepts of admiralty law. West v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 615 F. Supp. 377 (E.D.La. 1985) ( citing Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973).
Under three of the West factors, plaintiff's allegations against Coast Crafts indicate a relationship to maritime law. The plaintiff was a sandblaster/painter aboard the platform, but his claim is that he was wronged during his transfer to the vessel. Additionally, if plaintiff's claim against the vessel is accepted as alleged, the accident was caused by the operational negligence of the ship. Finally, the Fifth Circuit has held that "[t]he transportation of passengers over the seas is a maritime-type function." Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102, 1111 (1982); see also Aguillard v. Chevron, U.S.A., 1993 WL 515764 (E.D.La.).
In this case, there is an overlap between OCSLA and general maritime law. OCSLA is applicable to Rivas' claim against Energy Partners, and his claim against Coast Crafts is governed by admiralty law. There is no diversity of citizenship among the parties to this case. The Fifth Circuit has referred to the conundrum of the non-removability of an OCSLA claim joined with a general maritime claim. For example, in Tennessee Gas, the court noted that § 1441(b) places citizenship restrictions on the removal of claims, even though citizenship is arguably irrelevant to the district court's original jurisdiction under OCSLA. 87 F.3d at 156.
In Tennessee Gas, an ocean-going vessel collided with an offshore oil platform. The platform owner brought an action in state court against the insurer of the tug, asserting a federal maritime claim that was "saved to suitors and that the Louisiana Direct Action statute gave it the right to proceed directly against the insurer. The insurer then removed, contending that the platform owner had stated a claim under OCSLA. The court found that it had jurisdiction under OCSLA and that the plaintiff had asserted general maritime claims. The court noted the conundrum that § 1441(b) places citizenship restrictions on removal even though the court has original jurisdiction under OCSLA. Nonetheless, because the parties were diverse, removal was proper under the second sentence of § 1441(b).
However, in neither Hufnagel nor Tennessee Gas was the court forced to resolve the conundrum. In Tennessee Gas, diversity of citizenship existed, and the case was removable under § 1441(b). In Hufnagel, removal was allowed because the plaintiff had not stated a maritime claim, and the action fell squarely within federal question jurisdiction under OCSLA. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit has never held that where OCSLA and general maritime law overlap, the case is removable without regard to citizenship.
In Hufnagel, the plaintiff was the employee of an oil platform repair company and was injured by working on the platform. He brought an action against his employer, the platform owner, and the owner of the adjacent jack-up rig, asserting claims under general maritime law, the Jones Act, and under the Louisiana Civil Code. Defendants removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under QCSLA. The court held that plaintiff had implicated OCSLA because he specifically invoked state law, which can only apply through OCSLA. Although the Fifth Circuit discussed at length the overlap of OCSLA and maritime claims, it held that removal was proper because plaintiff's claims did not relate to maritime law under the Executive Jet test.
Although the Fifth Circuit has suggested in dicta that, when OCSLA and maritime law overlap, the congressional intent of OCSLA might support removal under the first sentence of § 1441(b), this court will not make that leap. See Tennessee Gas, 87 F.3d at 156. Without diversity of citizenship, § 1441(b) does not permit removal of Rivas' general maritime claim.
e. Applicability of § 1441(c)
If plaintiff's claim against the vessel owner is maritime, and no other doctrinal basis exists for removal of that claim, then the propriety of removal of the entire case must be analyzed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) which governs the removal of claims which are joined with other non-removable claims. See, e.g., Nunez v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 1994 WL 24248 (E.D.La). Subsection 1441(c) reads:
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates.
Energy Partners argues that the OCSLA and maritime claims are separate and independent, citing a footnote in Hufnagel. In footnote 8, the Hufnagel court stated that even if there had been a maritime claim, the case would still be removable under § 1441(c). 182 F.3d 351. The Fifth Circuit provided no analysis in support of this statement, and the footnote was not necessary to the holding. Furthermore, Energy Partners did not cite any cases to support its contention.
Rivas' claim against Coast Crafts and Energy Partners are not separate and independent because "where there is a single wrong to the plaintiff, for which relief is sought, arising from an interlocked series of transactions there is no separate or independent cause of action under § 1441(c)." American Fire Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951). This case is a classic example of an incident resulting from an interlocked series of transactions. The alleged negligence of each of the defendants hinges on Rivas' transfer from the platform to the vessel. The facts relevant to each claim are identical, and none of the claims could be resolved without the participation of the other parties. Consequently, the defendants cannot base removal of the OCSLA claim joined with the maritime claim on § 1441(c). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that civil actions 99-3352 and 99-2742 shall be deconsolidated.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rivas' Motion for Remand of civil action 99-2742 is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rivas' Motion to Lift Stay is hereby DENIED.