Opinion
4:22-cv-00969-P
03-08-2023
OPINION & ORDER
MARK T. PITTMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) which alleges that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and improperly joined both Defendants as employers. ECF No. 10.
Here, Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) prior to filing suit. See ECF No. 8. As required, she received her Notice of Right to Sue and timely filed her complaint within 90 days thereafter. ECF No. 10 at 8. Defendants' counter that the substance of Plaintiff's complaint is different than the allegations in her EEOC charge. See ECF No. 23 at 4. While the Court's inquiry in a Title VII action is limited to the scope of the facts which can reasonably grow from an EEOC investigation, the complaint need not be limited to the exact charge brought to the EEOC. Young v. City of Houston, Tex., 906 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, Plaintiff's EEOC charge is sufficient in satisfying the administrative-remedy requirement of a Title VII claim.
Defendants' remaining arguments are more appropriately raised at summary judgment. The Court hereby DENIES the Motion to Dismiss.
SO ORDERED