Opinion
2020-00110JD
10-14-2021
HOLLY RIVARD Plaintiff v. THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY Defendant
Sent to S.C. Reporter 12/8/21
Holly True Shaver, Magistrate Judge
DECISION
PATRICK E. SHEERAN, JUDGE
{¶1} On August 6, 2021, defendant, The Ohio State University (OSU), filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C). With leave of court, plaintiff filed a response on September 27, 2021. On October 1, 2021, OSU filed a reply. The motion for summary judgment is now before the court for a non-oral hearing pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D).
Standard of Review
{¶2} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56(C), which states, in part:
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary
judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party's favor.
{¶3} "[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's claim." Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). To meet this initial burden, the moving party must be able to point to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292-293.
{¶4} If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E), which states, in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.
Factual Background
{¶5} Plaintiff was employed by OSU as a Patient Access Coordinator in OSU's OB/GYN department from October 16, 2017 to November 9, 2018. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 6-10.) Plaintiff's responsibilities included answering telephone calls from patients, scheduling appointments, triaging medical care to nurses, scheduling surgeries, and processing referrals. (Id., at p. 8.) Plaintiff initially reported to Nicole Foulk, and after Foulk transferred to the neurology department, plaintiff then reported to Jessica Lai. (Id., at p. 9-11.) In 2015, plaintiff was diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder. (Id., at p. 33-34.) Plaintiff was treated with medication for anxiety. (Id., at p. 36.) Foulk was aware of plaintiff's anxiety. Id. Plaintiff testified that she also discussed her anxiety with both Lai and Khalid Jalil, OSU's disability accommodation manager. (Id., at p. 63.) In June 2018, plaintiffs anxiety became difficult for her to manage. (Id., at p. 64.) Plaintiff testified that during this time, she struggled to arrive at work on time which resulted in her discipline for tardiness on multiple occasions. (Id., at p. 65.) Plaintiff also testified that negative interactions with a co-worker named Teresa Price also contributed to her heightened anxiety. (Id., at p. 67.) Due to plaintiffs anxiety being difficult to manage, OSU granted plaintiff an accommodation to take a leave of absence in June 2018. (Id., at p. 62-64.) After plaintiff returned from her leave of absence in August 2018, Jalil implemented an accommodation plan for plaintiff which allowed her to change her start time. (Id., at p. 87.) According to plaintiff, the accommodation plan (plan) worked well for her. Following the plan's implementation, plaintiff had no issues with tardiness and stated that things were going well for her at OSU. Id. Plaintiff did not request any other accommodations during her employment. (Id., at p. 71-74.)
{¶6} According to plaintiff, she complained twice of racist remarks being made by Price about Somali patients and their husbands. (Id., at p. 17-21.) Specifically, on August 21, 2018, plaintiff spoke to Lai about allegedly racist comments Price made about patients who needed translation services. (Complaint, ¶ 19.) Plaintiff testified that she did not know whether disciplinary action was taken against Price. (Plaintiffs deposition, p. 17-21). Plaintiff stated that Price was the same employee that she had the incident with that was the purported basis for her termination. (Id., at p. 20, 26.) According to plaintiff, she had a strained working relationship with Price. (Id., at p. 27-31.)
{¶7} On September 28, 2018, plaintiff was in the office restroom when she overheard Price and another employee, Kim Durkin, talking about plaintiff. (Id., at p. 26.) According to plaintiff, Price stated that plaintiff was "playing dumb" regarding her lack of knowledge of a policy change. (Id.) Plaintiff took the elevator to the lobby to see what Price was talking about. (Id., at p. 27.) Plaintiff related that she became emotional over Price's comments. Id. Plaintiff testified that she told Price that she heard her comments and stated, "I told her that I heard her, I heard her calling me dumb -- or I said stupid." Id. Price responded by stating, "I didn't call you stupid." Id. A verbal altercation ensued, and Price accused plaintiff of calling her a racist. (Id., at p. 28.) Plaintiff stated that she kept a distance of 10 to 20 feet from Price during the verbal exchange. (Id., at p. 29.) Plaintiff testified that she immediately reported the incident to Lai. Id.
{¶8} Plaintiff went on approved medical leave after the incident for a previously scheduled carpal tunnel surgery. (Id., at p. 95.) After plaintiff returned from leave on October 15, 2018, she was called into a meeting with Lai and Brooke Bellamy, OSU's department supervisor, to discuss the September 28, 2018 incident. Id. According to plaintiff, during the meeting, Bellamy made a comment that plaintiff appeared intimidating based upon her physical appearance. Specifically, plaintiff described herself as "tall" and "bulky," and that her normal facial expressions make her appear angry. (Id., at p. 96.) Plaintiff referred to herself in her deposition as having "resting bitch face" when she is focused and looking "mean and scary." (Id., p. 68, 98.) After the meeting, plaintiff was sent home. (Complaint, ¶ 43.) Later that same day, Lai called plaintiff to notify her that OSU was moving forward with her termination. (Id., at ¶ 44). On November 8, 2018, a hearing was held by OSU's HR representative Marc Stoffel to determine whether plaintiff's employment would be terminated for her conduct during the incident with Price. (Id., at ¶ 45). Plaintiff's employment was terminated on November 9, 2018. (Id., at ¶ 53.) Plaintiff brings claims for employment discrimination and retaliation under R.C. 4112. Specifically, plaintiff states that she was terminated by OSU based upon the fact that she suffers from anxiety. Plaintiff also states that OSU retaliated against her by firing her after she reported Price's racist comments about Somalians. Plaintiff also brings a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
{¶9} In support of its motion, OSU submitted the depositions of plaintiff, Lai, and Bellamy, the affidavits of Stoffel and Lai, and other exhibits attached thereto. According to Lai, on September 28, 2018, plaintiff informed her of the incident between herself and Price. (Lai Aff., at ¶ 4.) Lai spoke with plaintiff, Price, and Durkin about the incident. Id. Plaintiff, Price, and Durkin submitted written statements detailing their respective accounts of what occurred during the incident. Id. After speaking to plaintiff, Price, and Durkin, Lai submitted a Hearing Request Form/Request to Human Resources for corrective action to be taken against plaintiff. (Id., at ¶ 5.) Lai believed that plaintiffs actions during the incident constituted "conduct unbecoming of an OSU employee". (Id., at ¶ 7.) Lai avers that she did not submit the Hearing Request form for corrective action to discriminate against plaintiff because of her disability or to retaliate against plaintiff for complaining of racist comments made by Price. (Id., at ¶ 8.) Lai states: "I made this request because [plaintiff] confronted and intimidated her co-workers in the lobby of our office building, and I consider such conduct deserving of corrective action." Id.
{¶10} Marc Stoffel, Employee and Labor Relations Consultant at OSU, avers that on October 18, 2018, Lai submitted a Hearing Request Form to Human Resources, alleging "conduct unbecoming" by plaintiff which specifically addressed the September 28, 2018 incident between plaintiff and Price. (Stoffel Aff., at ¶ 1-4.) After receiving the request, OSU's office of Human Resources notified plaintiff that her department requested corrective action and a hearing would be held on November 8, 2018. (Id., at ¶ 5.) Stoffel states that OSU decided to terminate plaintiff based upon the information presented at the hearing. (Id., at ¶ 6.) According to Stoffel:
[t]he reason for [plaintiffs] removal was her failure of good behavior. Specifically, OSU found that upon overhearing coworker Teresa Price make comments that upset [plaintiff], [plaintiff] chose to confront Ms. Price in the lobby of the building. Ms. Price and Kim Durkin, a witness to the
confrontation, reported being intimidated by [plaintiff's] behavior. [Plaintiffs] decision to confront Ms. Price was found to be inappropriateand escalated a conflict situation. (Id., at ¶ 7; Defendant's Exhibit A-3.) Stoffel states that plaintiff was terminated because of her actions during the September 28, 2018 incident described at the hearing. (Id., at ¶ 8.) Stoffel avers that OSU did not terminate plaintiff to discriminate against her based upon her disability. Id. Stoffel further avers that OSU did not terminate plaintiff to retaliate against her for complaining of racist comments made by Price. Id.
{¶11} Brooke Bellamy, Director of Access and Lai's supervisor at the time, testified that she met with plaintiff and Lai to discuss the incident, that OSU has a no tolerance policy for threatening behavior, and that OSU's Human Resources department recommended that plaintiff's employment be terminated. (Bellamy depo., p. 21-24.)
Disability Discrimination
{¶12} R.C. 4112.02 provides, in pertinent part, that: "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (A) For any employer, because of the * * * disability * * * of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment." In Ohio, "federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000(e) et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code, is generally applicable to cases involving alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112." Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 196 (1981). "To prevail in an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent' and may establish such intent through either direct or indirect methods of proof." Dautartas v. Abbott Labs., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-706, 2012-Ohio-1709, ¶ 25, quoting Ricker v. John Deere Ins. Co., 133 Ohio App.3d 759, 766 (10th Dist. 1998).
{¶13} Plaintiff has not submitted any direct evidence of discrimination. In this case, plaintiff seeks to establish discriminatory intent through the indirect method, which is subject to the burden shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Nist v. Nexeo Solutions, LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-854, 2015-Ohio-3363, ¶ 31. "Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first present evidence from which a reasonable [trier of fact] could conclude that there exists a prima facie case of discrimination." Turner v. Shahed Ents., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-892, 2011-Ohio-4654, ¶12. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802. Once the employer does, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason was not the true reason, but was a pretext for discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
{¶14} To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) [she] is disabled, (2) [she] was otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation, (3) [she] suffered an adverse action, (4) the employer knew or had reason to know of [her] disability, and (5) [she] was replaced or the job remained open." Hartman v. Ohio DOT, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-222, 2016-Ohio-5208, ¶ 18, citing Rosebrough v. Buckeye Valley High School, 690 F.3d 427, 431 (6th Cir.2012). As stated in Hartman, supra, the elements of a prima facie case can vary based on the circumstances of the case. See Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, LLC, 747 F.3d 419, 433 (6th Cir.2014) (stating the elements as "(1) [she] is disabled, (2) [she] is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of a position, with or without accommodation, and (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.")
{¶15} Defendant concedes for purposes of argument only, that plaintiff has stated a prima facie case of disability discrimination. (Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 8.) Plaintiff suffered a mental disability (anxiety), she was otherwise qualified for her position with or without an accommodation, her employment was terminated, and defendant knew or had reason to know of her disability. As the burden of production shifts to OSU, it has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiffs termination: plaintiffs behavior during a verbal altercation with another employee in the OSU lobby. (See deposition of plaintiff; affidavit of Lai; affidavit of Stoffel; and defendant's Exhibit A-3.)
{¶16} The burden then shifts to plaintiff to produce evidence to show that the employer's stated reason for terminating her employment has no basis in fact, was not the actual reason for her termination, or the reason was insufficient to explain the employer's action. Smith v. Ohio Dept. of Public Safety, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-1073, 2013-Ohio-4210, ¶ 77, citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir.1994). Regardless of which option is chosen, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably reject the employer's explanation and infer that the employer intentionally discriminated against her. Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir.2003). A reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
{¶17} Plaintiff argues in her response that issues of material fact exist because her employment was terminated merely two months after her accommodation request was granted. Plaintiff asserts that the temporal proximity between the granting of her request and her termination shows evidence of pretext.
{¶18} However, regarding whether the reason for plaintiff's termination has no basis in fact, the undisputed testimony of Lai, Bellamy, and Stoffel shows that OSU decided to terminate plaintiffs employment because of her conduct during the September 18, 2018 incident where she confronted another coworker in the lobby at OSU. Plaintiff does not dispute that an incident occurred between herself and Price and that the incident was the reason cited by OSU for her termination. Although plaintiff asserts that she was unfairly terminated, plaintiff has not produced any evidence to show that the stated reason for her termination has no basis in fact.
{¶19} With regard to whether the proffered reason for plaintiffs termination did not actually motivate OSU to terminate her employment, plaintiff points to no facts that dispute the evidence offered by OSU. Lai, Bellamy, and Stoffel testified that the reason OSU terminated plaintiff was because of her actions during the September 18, 2018 incident with Price. In her deposition, plaintiff testified that she felt the decision by OSU was unfair and OSU mischaracterized the facts; however, none of plaintiffs statements contradict the evidence proffered by OSU. Additionally, in a discrimination case, the court must examine the employer's motivation, not a plaintiffs perceptions. Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 502 (6th Cir.1987). Even construing the evidence most strongly in plaintiffs favor, she has not produced evidence from which to infer that defendant was not actually motivated to terminate her employment as a result of her behavior during the September 18, 2018 incident. And if plaintiff contends that the altercation was caused by her anxiety, "[s]o long as the employee's misconduct is related to the performance of her job, an employer may discipline or terminate the employee even if her misconduct was caused by her disability." Ray v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-526, 2018-Ohio-2163, ¶ 36, citing Sper v. Judson Care Ctr., Inc., 29 F.Supp.3d 1102, 1110 (S.D.Ohio 2014).
{¶20} Moreover, plaintiff was an unclassified employee, in that she served at the pleasure of the appointing authority. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 75.) Therefore, she cannot argue that the reasons stated by OSU were insufficient to explain her termination: her employment was subject to termination at any time, even without cause. See Hanly v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 78 Ohio App.3d 73, 77 (10th Dist.1991).
{¶21} Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of plaintiff, the only reasonable conclusion is that she has not brought forth sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably reject OSU's explanation for her termination, and infer that OSU intentionally discriminated against her because of her disability of anxiety. Accordingly, the court finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist, and that defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's claims of disability discrimination.
Retaliation
{¶22} R.C. 4112.02(I) states that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: "For any person to discriminate in any manner against any other person because that person has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice defined in this section or because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under sections 4112.01 to 4112.07 of the Revised Code." An investigation contemplated under 4112.01 to 4112.07 of the Revised Code pertains to proceedings or hearings with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC).
{¶23} In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff is required to prove that: "'(1) plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer knew of plaintiffs participation in the protected activity; (3) the employer engaged in retaliatory conduct; and (4) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.'" Motley v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-923, 2008-Ohio-2306, ¶ 11, quoting Zacchaeus v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-683, 2002-Ohio-444. Protected activity involves either the "opposition clause," when an employee has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice, or the "participation clause," when an employee has made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under sections 4112.01 to 4112.07 of the Revised Code. See Motley, supra, citing Coch v. GEM Indus., Inc., Lucas App. No. L-04-1357, 2005-Ohio-3045, ¶ 29.
{¶24} To engage in a protected opposition activity, a plaintiff must "make an overt stand against suspected illegal discriminatory action." Motley, supra, quoting Comiskey v. Auto. Indus. Action Grp., 40 F.Supp.2d 877, 898 (E.D. Mich. 1999). "Opposition" requires that that the employee communicate to her employer "a belief that the employer has engaged in * * * a form of employment discrimination." Crawford v. Metro. Govt. of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009). For purposes of a retaliation claim, opposition to "demeaning and harassing conduct," without complaining of illegal discrimination or taking an overt stand against such suspected illegal discriminatory action, does not constitute a protected activity. Murray v. Sears, Case No. 1:09 CV 702, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34256, 24 (N.D.Ohio April 7, 2010); see also Fox v. Eagle Distrib. Co., 510 F.3d 587, 591-592 (6th Cir.2007). Moreover, an employee's allegation that a manager is racist is not a protected activity because the allegation is not that the employer is engaging in an unlawful employment practice, but that one of its employees has a racial intolerance. Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir.1989).
{¶25} In plaintiffs complaint and deposition, she claims that she engaged in a protected activity when she reported Price's allegedly racist comments to both of her supervisors. According to plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff reported the comments to Lai on August 21, 2018. Plaintiff testified that she did not know whether Price was disciplined for her comments. Plaintiff's last day of employment with OSU was November 9, 2018. Therefore, plaintiff remained employed by OSU for over two months after she reported Price's comments to Lai. Even if the court were to construe plaintiff's reporting of racist comments to her supervisor as a protected activity, plaintiff's termination following the incident with Price was not close enough in time to be regarded as being causally related to her reporting of Price's comments. Dautartas v. Abbot Labs., 10th Dist. Franklin. No. 11AP-706, 2012-Ohio-1709, ¶ 56, (holding that a two-month interval between the complaint and adverse action is insufficient to justify a finding of causal connection). Furthermore, the uncontroverted evidence shows that plaintiff was terminated because of her conduct during a confrontation between herself and Price. Plaintiff has provided no evidence demonstrating a causal link exists between the alleged protected activity (reporting racist comments to her supervisor) and the adverse action (OSU's termination of plaintiffs employment). Therefore, plaintiff cannot state a prima facie case of retaliation, and OSU is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on this claim.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
{¶26} In order to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) that the defendant intended to cause the plaintiff serious emotional distress, (2) that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, and (3) that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of plaintiff's serious emotional distress." Phung v. Waste Mgt, 71 Ohio St.3d 408, 410, 1994-Ohio-389. An employer's termination of employment, "without more, does not constitute the outrageous conduct required to establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even when the employer knew that the decision was likely to upset the employee." Meminger v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-489, 2017-Ohio-9290, ¶ 16, quoting Craddock v. Flood Co., 9th Dist. No. 23882, 2008-Ohio-112, ¶ 20. "A lawfully conducted investigation where wrongdoing is suspected, even if vigorously or oppressively undertaken, will not be characterized as extreme or outrageous." Branan v. Mac Tools, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-1096, 2004-Ohio-5574 ¶ 31.
{¶27} In Branan, the employee alleged that his employer interrogated him for several hours, that his employer "twice refused" his requests to leave, that the employer's "Asset Protection Team members exhibited some degree of physical intimidation, and repeatedly called him a liar and a corporate spy," that the employer "threatened [him] by telling him that he would never get another job in the industry and would be unable to feed his child," and that the employer or the Asset Protection Team "went through [his] personal belongings in his office and briefcase, and observed [his] home and took pictures of the home and vehicles parked in front of the home." Id. at ¶ 30. The court in Branan concluded the employee's allegations were not so "outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency* * *" Id. at ¶ 31.
{¶28} Plaintiff contends that OSU's conduct in terminating her was extreme and outrageous and caused her to suffer severe emotional distress. (Complaint, ¶ 62.) The facts described by plaintiff in her complaint and deposition are based solely upon her termination from her employment. Indeed, even construing the evidence most strongly in plaintiff's favor, reasonable minds can conclude only that OSU's conduct of investigating the September 18, 2018 incident, interviewing witnesses, conducting a hearing, and terminating plaintiff's employment does not meet the threshold of extreme and outrageous conduct required to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As such, the conduct is not "'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Meminger, supra, ¶ 15, quoting Mendlovic v. Life Line Screening of Am., Ltd., 173 Ohio App.3d 46, 2007-Ohio-4674, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.). Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that OSU is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Conclusion
{¶29} Upon review of the evidence permitted by Civ.R. 56, the only reasonable conclusion is that plaintiff's termination was not based upon her disability, and that OSU did not retaliate against plaintiff by terminating her employment. Although certain facts may be in dispute between the parties, the court finds that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, and that OSU is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on all of plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, OSU's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and judgment shall be rendered in favor of OSU.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶30} A non-oral hearing was conducted in this case upon defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently herewith, defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and judgment is rendered in favor of defendant. All previously scheduled events are VACATED. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.