Opinion
Civil Action 2:02-CV-168
November 6, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings this action against two judges of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and two clerks of the Supreme Court of the United States. Plaintiff alleges that defendants have executed and/or failed to execute their clerical and judicial duties in connection with litigation initiated by plaintiff. This matter is now before the Court on the motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and on the federal defendants' motion to consolidate this case with another case currently pending before this Court.
Although plaintiff was granted the opportunity to respond to defendants' motion to dismiss within 15 days of the Order denying plaintiff's motion for default judgment, Opinion and Order, at p. 2 (May 29, 2002), he has not responded.
I. Background
Plaintiffs complaint, which contains no factual allegations, consists of a number of virtually incomprehensible legal claims. It appears to this Court, however, that plaintiff is attempting to assert two main claims. First, plaintiff contends that defendants are civilly liable under U.S.C. § 1986 for having "knowledge of law" and yet failing to prevent the commission of legal wrongs. Complaint, at ¶¶ 7-19. Plaintiff asserts that defendants' failure to prevent the commission of these legal wrongs violates his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. Second, plaintiff asserts a claim of breach of contract in connection with the dismissal of his previously filed civil cases, See Id., at ¶ 25. See also Affidavit in Support, at ¶¶ 5. Plaintiff seeks in excess of $1.2 billion in damages. Complaint, at ¶¶ 20-22.
Plaintiff' claims that defendants had knowledge of and failed to prevent at least thirteen violations of his constitutional and civil rights, including: "Conspiracy to interfere with Civil Rights," pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 18 U.S.C. § 241; "Deprivation of Rights," pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242; "Perjury of Oath of Office," pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1621; "Extortion," pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 872; "Mail Fraud," pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1341; "Obstruction of Justice," pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1505. See complaint, at ¶¶ 7-19.
Plaintiff appears to reason that his payment of the filing fees gave rise to a contractual relationship with the Court, which the Court breached when his civil cases were dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Complaint, at ¶ 25; see also Affidavit in Support, at ¶¶ 5, 9, 21, 45, 72.
Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support, attached to the complaint, does contain some factual allegations. Plaintiff claims that, by paying a filing fee to the United States Supreme Court, he entered into a contract with the Supreme Court pursuant to which the Supreme Court was required to hear his claim. Affidavit in Support, at ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges that no Justice of the Supreme Court considered his claim, but that instead defendants Suter and Lorson, clerks of the Supreme Court, rejected his petition. Id., at ¶¶ 6-20. As a result, plaintiff filed an action against Suter and Lorson in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id., at ¶ 21. That action was assigned to District Judge Kessler. Id. The fact of defendants' default was apparently entered. Id., at ¶¶ 24-30. Defendants thereafter filed a motion to dismiss. Id., at ¶ 39. The entry of default was vacated and defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. Again, plaintiff claims his payment of the filing fee in that case gave rise to a contract with the District Court for the District of Columbia and that, by dismissing his claim, that court acted in breach of that contract. Id., at ¶ 21.
Plaintiff apparently sought to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1251 because his case involved a conflict between two states: the " State of Equity v. State of Judicial Power." Affidavit in Support, at ¶¶ 82-84.
Ritchie v. Suter, Case No. 1:00CV01878 (D.D.C. August 3, 2000), attached as Exhibit A to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed three other actions, all in the District Court for the District of Columbia, naming various persons as defendants but raising identical issues. See Id., at ¶¶ 45-46, 72; see also Exhibits A, B, C, D attached to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. In addition to the breach of contract claims, plaintiff also asserted claims against the various judges arguing that, by not ruling in his favor, they failed to prevent the denial of his constitutional rights. In each of these cases, plaintiff's motion for default judgment was denied and the court dismissed the action sua sponte. Id.
See Ritchie v. Rehnquist, Case No. 1:01CV00008, attached as Exhibit B to Defendants Motion to Dismiss, Ritchie v. Kessler, Case No. 1:01CV00562, attached as Exhibit C to Defendants Motion to Dismiss; Richie v. Kessler, Case No. 1:01CV01310, attached as Exhibit D to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
II. Motion to Dismiss
A. Standard
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs claims on the ground that they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether in a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
* * * *
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . .
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In determining whether dismissal on this basis is appropriate, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Bower v. Federal Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1996); Misch v. The Community Mutual Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 734, 738 (S.D. Ohio 1994). Moreover, because plaintiff is appearing pro se, his pleadings will be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by a lawyer. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The complaint may be dismissed only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). This Court will grant defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) if the complaint is without merit because of an absence of facts or law to support the claim asserted, or if on the face of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief. See generally, Rauch v. Day Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1978).
B. Application
1. District Judges
Plaintiff has named as defendants Judge Norma Johnson and Judge Gladys Kessler, both of whom are judges for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Even viewing the allegations in plaintiffs complaint as liberally as possible, this Court cannot conclude that the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted against either defendant.
This Court initially notes that, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to assert claims against the defendants in their individual capacity, venue appears to be improper. Because plaintiff invokes federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, see complaint, at ¶ 4, venue is ordinarily governed by § 1391(b). That section authorizes venue in
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State,
(2)a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or
(3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). There is no evidence that any defendant resides within the Southern District of Ohio, or that any events relating to plaintiffs claims occurred here. It would appear that venue in this district is improper.
The statute also authorizes venue in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides (if no real property is involved in the action) when a plaintiff sues an officer or employee of the United States acting an his official capacity. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity would preclude plaintiffs claim for monetary damages under these circumstances. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985)("an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a Suit against the [government] entity"); Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988)("[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit).
Nevertheless, it is well established that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for money damages for all actions taken in a judicial capacity, unless those actions are taken in the complete absence of any jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1997). The rationale for this rule was explained by the Supreme Court:
It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Thus, judicial immunity applies even if the judge's action was in error, was done maliciously, was in excess of authority, or was "flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." Stump, 435 U.S. at 356.
To avoid this immunity, plaintiff must show either: (1) that the actions of the defendant judge were "nonjudicial," or (2) that the judge acted in complete absence of jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Barnes, 105 F.2d at 1116. Whether an act is "judicial" depends on "the 'nature' and 'function' of the act, not the 'act' itself." Barnes, 105 F.2d at 1116 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13). This analysis usually turns on whether the act is one normally performed by a judge, and whether the parties dealt with the defendant judge in his or her judicial capacity. Id. The proper inquiry is "whether at the time he took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him." Stump, 435 U.S. at 356.
Plaintiff has failed to make either showing in this case. In fact, plaintiff concedes that defendant Judge Kessler "did possess complete jurisdiction over Subject Matter and over all Parties." Affidavit in Support, at ¶ 23. Plaintiff has otherwise failed to allege that either defendant Judge Johnson or defendant Judge Kessler lacked jurisdiction in rendering their decisions. Plaintiff has also failed to allege that either defendant was engaged in nonjudicial acts. Thus, this Court concludes that defendant judges are protected by absolute judicial immunity.
2. Clerk of Courts
Plaintiff has also named as defendants William Suter and Francis Lorson, identified as clerks for the United States Supreme Court. Plaintiff essentially alleges that Suter and Lorson violated his rights by not accepting his petition for a writ of certiorari. See Affidavit in Support, at ¶¶ 6-20.
The venue analysis, applied supra to the defendant judges, also applies to these defendants. To the extent that plaintiff is suing Suter and Lorson in their individual capacities, venue is improper.
Moreover, these defendants are also cloaked with absolute immunity from monetary liability. Absolute judicial immunity has been extended to non-judicial officers who perform "quasi-judicial" duties. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 1994); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1988). This immunity extends to those who perform tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer, who, as stated supra, is immune from monetary liability. Bush, 38 F.3d at 847. Under the Supreme Court's "functional approach" to judicial immunity, the relevant inquiry is not the identity of the actor, but instead the "nature of the function performed." Bush, 38 F.3d at 847 (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993)). "Suits against clerks for damages, like those against judges, are generally not necessary to control unconstitutional conduct in light of the numerous safeguards that are 'built into the judicial process,' especially the 'correctability of error on appeal.'" Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.D.C. 1993) (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 512). In carrying out their duties as clerks for the Supreme Court, defendants Suter and Lorson were cloaked with quasi-judicial immunity and cannot be held liable in monetary damages for their actions.
3. Ohio Attorney General
Ohio Attorney General Betty D. Montgomery (hereinafter "Attorney General") has also moved this Court to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to the extent that it names her as a defendant. The complaint does not name the Attorney General as a defendant, although plaintiff served her with process. If the complaint is construed to attempt to assert a claim against the Attorney General, it cannot survive the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has failed to provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the Attorney General. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-513 (2002); Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a "complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Glassner v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 223 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 2000)( quoting Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988). As it related to the Attorney General, the complaint fails to meet this standard.
The only reference to the Attorney General in the complaint is under the heading "Caveat," wherein plaintiff states that
[i]n interest of preserving Justice and prevention of breach of Contract Chief Constitutional Officer Attorney General Betty Montgomery for State of Ohio will be served with all of Larry Irving, Ritchie Junior Plaintiff's Answer(s); Pleading(s); Defense(s) and instruments for examination purposes of possessing knowledge of Law for preventing further injury(s) or wrong(s) and by law will prosecute under an Indictment in name of State of Ohio any perpretationarion [sic] of fraud by any Federal; State or Local Actor
Complaint, at ¶ 2. It appears that plaintiff is attempting to file a complaint with the Attorney General, not against her, for any future violation of law perpetrated against plaintiff.
Defendants' motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED. To the extent that plaintiff has asserted claims against Ohio Attorney General Betty D. Montgomery, her motion to dismiss is also GRANTED. Furthermore, defendants' motion to consolidate this case with Case No. 2:02-CV-222 is DENIED as moot.
The Clerk shall enter FINAL JUDGMENT in this action.
K