Opinion
NO. 2017-C-0327
10-25-2017
JOSETTE M. RIPOLL v. PATRICK DOBARD, ET AL
WILLIE M. ZANDERS, SR. 25912 Stonehenge Drive Denham Springs, Louisiana 70726-6079 Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent JAMES M. GARNER DEBRA FISCHMAN JEFFREY D. KESSLER SHER GARNER CAHILL PICHTER KLEIN & HILBERT, L.L.C. 909 Poydras Street, Suite 2800 New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 Counsel for Defendants/Applicants
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2013-06143, DIVISION "M"
HONORABLE PAULETTE R. IRONS, JUDGE JAMES F. MCKAY III CHIEF JUDGE (Court composed of Chief Judge James F. McKay III, Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Edwin A. Lombard) WILLIE M. ZANDERS, SR.
25912 Stonehenge Drive
Denham Springs, Louisiana 70726-6079
Counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent JAMES M. GARNER
DEBRA FISCHMAN
JEFFREY D. KESSLER
SHER GARNER CAHILL PICHTER KLEIN & HILBERT, L.L.C.
909 Poydras Street, Suite 2800
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
Counsel for Defendants/Applicants
WRIT DENIED
Patrick Dobard in his capacity as Superintendent of the Louisiana Recovery District, the Louisiana Department of Education through the Recovery School District (collectively,"RSD") seek the review of the trial court's May 9, 2017 oral judgment denying their motion for summary judgment. Finding no error in the trial court's ruling, we deny this writ.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The matter arises from a petition for damages filed against the RSD, which Josette Ripoll ("Ms. Ripoll") filed on July 3, 2013, in the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, wherein she asserted breach of contract and age discrimination claims.
Based on subject matter jurisdiction, the RSD had the matter removed to United States District Court for the Eastern District. On April 9, 2014, the U.S. District Court granted the RSD's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the federal discrimination claims and remanding the matter to State court to address Ms. Ripoll's contractual claims. On appeal, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the United States District Court's judgment. Ripoll v. Dobard, 618 Fed. Appx. 188 (5 Cir. 2015).
On remand, the RSD filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Ms. Ripoll's breach of contract claim. According to the RSD's October 27, 2016 motion for new trial under La. C.C.P. art. 1973, and Show Cause Order, the trial court initially granted the RSD's motion for summary judgment on October 20, 2016, due to Ms. Ripoll's failure to file an opposition. In the April 10, 2017 judgment, the trial court denied the RSD's motion for summary judgment which precipitated this timely notice of intent to seek the instant writ.
FACTS
Ms. Ripoll asserts that in the years 2006-2007 she was employed as the Principal of Schaumburg Elementary School. She claims that she had a written 2-year contract with the RSD that was effective from July 21, 2009 until June 12, 2011. The RSD did not renew her contract or reissue Ms. Ripoll's contract for another two-year term. She admits that she was not given a formal written contract for the 2011-2012 School Year but asserts that she had a statutory contract pursuant to La. R.S. 17:444. On July 8, 2012, she was terminated as the Principal of Schaumburg Elementary School for an alleged failure to "competently and effectively run the school." While she maintained employment with the RSD, she was reassigned to a position as a classroom teacher which she allegedly declined. She tendered her resignation in August of 2012.
It is unclear from the record whether Ms. Ripoll was terminated or resigned from employment with the RSD. --------
In Ms. Ripoll's Petition for Damages, she claims that her termination was a breach of contract pursuant to La. R.S. 17: 444(B)(3). This statute was repealed on June 30, 2012.
DISCUSSION
The RSD argues that: (1) Ms. Ripoll has no breach of contract claim because she was an at-will employee at the time of discharge; (2) even if (emphasis added) a contract existed, it allowed removal for cause, and Ms. Ripoll failed to meet the performance objectives therein; (3) Ms. Ripoll is not entitled to a "statutory contract" under La. R.S. 17:444(B) because - (a) La. R.S. 17:444(B)(3) was repealed effective July 1, 2012, prior to her July 9, 2012 discharge, (b) the RSD is not governed by La. R.S. 17:444(B), citing La. R.S. 17:441(1), and (c) even if (emphasis added) applicable, La. R.S. 17:444(B)(3) contemplated performance objectives, which Ms. Ripoll failed to satisfy; (4) the 120-day rule in La. R.S. 17:444(B)(4)(c)(i) is not applicable because (a) the contract had elapsed by the time of Ms. Ripoll's discharge, and (b) La. R.S. 17:444(B)(iii) and (iv) allow discharge for failure to meet performance objectives of the contract; and (5) Patrick Dobard cannot be liable for the breach of the contract at issue because he was not a party to the contract.
After exhaustive administrative hearings and reviews, Ms. Ripoll was dismissed as Principal of Schaumburg for cause.
The RSD asserted that the cause for her dismissal from her position as school principal was based upon the following: (1) Her failure to properly manage and evaluate her faculty; (2) Schaumburg's low teacher retention rate; (3) her failure to give critical analysis feedback to teachers; (4) RSD's decision to fire thirteen Schaumburg teachers after she had recommended that the "vast majority" of her teachers be retained; and (5) her unwillingness to accept and incorporate new methods.
RSD argues in its motion for summary judgment that Ms. Ripoll was employed at-will following the expiration of the contract in July of 2011. The RSD had no obligation to extend the contract with her indefinitely. Even if (emphasis added) the expired contract was deemed to be in place, it contained performance objectives, which she failed to satisfy. The RSD also argues that the statutory provision upon which she relies was repealed before she was removed as principal. In sum, the RSD asserts that no cognizable legal basis exists to support Ms. Ripoll's claims for breach of employment contract.
Conversely, Ms. Ripoll argues that : (1) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether a statutory contract existed under La. R.S.17:444(B)(4)(a)(i) (requiring minimum two-year contracts) and (c)(i)(requiring 120 day notice prior to termination); (2) assuming the existence of a contract, a question of genuine material fact exists as to whether she was properly discharged for her poor performance; and (3) RSD is covered by La. R.S. 17:444 because La. R.S. 17:990 gave RSD the same power, authority and restrictions as school boards.
Though favored, summary judgment may only be granted when "the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). Trial court decisions on motions for summary judgment are reviewed de novo. Citron v. Gentilly Carnival Club, Inc., 2014-1096, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/15/15), 165 So.3d 304, 313.
In light of the law, facts, and exhibits submitted to the trial court and now in the record before this Court, the RSD has failed to carry sufficient proof that they were entitled to a summary judgment. The sheer numbers of unanswered or undeterminable issues are insurmountable to establish the threshold necessary to grant summary judgment.
There remain genuine issues of material facts regarding Ms. Ripoll's legal claims for breach of contract. Accordingly, this writ is denied and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceeding consistent with this opinion.
WRIT DENIED