Opinion
Case No. 5D18-1737
08-09-2019
Victoria Elizabeth RIOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Edward J. Weiss, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Edward J. Weiss, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
WALLIS, J.
Appellant, Victoria Elizabeth Rios, appeals her convictions for first-degree murder and armed burglary of a dwelling. Appellant asserts that law enforcement's delayed administration of the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), rendered her subsequent waiver and incriminating statements made to law enforcement involuntary. We agree, reverse Appellant's convictions, and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
Appellant, David Damus, Konrad Schafer, and Juan Muriel were charged with the murder of Eric Roopnarine (the victim) and armed burglary with a firearm of the victim's home. Appellant, a seventeen-year-old runaway, was living with Damus and Muriel after she left her father's home. In need of rent money, Appellant approached the victim through a cellphone messaging application and offered sex for money. Appellant, Damus, Schafer, and Muriel drove to the victim's home. After the victim let Appellant into his home, she opened the door for Damus and Schafer. Damus shot the victim, Schafer stabbed him, and the trio searched the victim's home for anything of value while Muriel waited in the vehicle. They stole, among other things, a television, a PlayStation3, and an Xbox.
While investigating another homicide, law enforcement found Appellant hiding in a closet at Schafer's home. Following the search of Schafer's home, law enforcement asked the occupants of the home, including Damus, Muriel, and Appellant, to come to the police station in Kissimmee for questioning. Appellant was transported without handcuffs in an unmarked police car. At the station, law enforcement isolated Appellant in an interview room on the secured second floor. Appellant remained in that location for over eleven hours, during which time law enforcement officers interviewed her intermittently three times.
First Interview
The first interview began around 3:00 p.m. and lasted approximately twenty minutes. During that time, Detective Georgie Torres questioned Appellant about a weapon that law enforcement recovered at the Schafer residence. Afterward Detective Torres left Appellant confined and isolated in the room for approximately two hours. During the wait, Appellant expressed her desire to leave. In response, an officer told her to relax and that she could not always get what she wanted.
Mr. Rios, Appellant's father, arrived at the station at 5:00 p.m. Law enforcement instructed him that his wait "was going to be a while," that he should leave the station and get something to eat, and that they would contact him again when they finished questioning Appellant. Believing that law enforcement would not allow him to see his daughter, Mr. Rios left the police station.
Second Interview
The second interview began at 5:23 p.m. with Detectives Kristi McElroy and Alex Bejerano. During the first forty minutes of this interview, Detective McElroy developed a rapport with Appellant by delving into her status as a runaway and asking her whether she was a victim of human trafficking. The focus subsequently turned to Appellant's relationship with the victim and his death. Then, the detectives left Appellant alone for another forty minutes.
At 6:40 p.m. Detective McElroy returned and continued to inquire about Appellant's life, which included discussions on her romantic relationship with Muriel, the activities of Muriel, Damus, and Schafer, and their use of guns. Upon Detective Bejerano's return to the interview room at 7:38 p.m., the second interview turned noticeably adversarial. In particular, Detectives Bejerano and McElroy engaged Appellant in specific questioning concerning her knowledge of the victim's murder and the validity of her previous statements. After Appellant expressed her fears about being in trouble, Detective McElroy asked, "What are you scared of getting in trouble for? Did you hold the gun?" Appellant responded, "No." Detective McElroy followed up with, "Okay did you fire the trigger? Or pull the trigger?" Appellant responded, "[Damus] did." Appellant thereafter revealed the plan to rob the victim; however, she maintained that she and Muriel did not accompany Damus and Schafer to the victim's residence, claiming she did not know of the victim's death until the pair returned.
During this interview, Appellant asked about her father. Detective Bejerano told her law enforcement had called him and that he knew that she was there. The detectives left the room at 8:38 p.m. and did not return until 9:25 p.m. At that time, Appellant continued to inquire about her father, to which Detective McElroy replied that other officers would be reaching out to him. Finally, at 9:54 p.m., the detectives left Appellant alone for another two hours. Around 11:30 p.m., law enforcement contacted Mr. Rios again, instructing him to come to the station right away without providing any explanation.
Third Interview
At 12:25 a.m., the detectives brought Mr. Rios into the room and immediately told Appellant, "There's a couple of formalities that we need to go through because some of the things that we have found out has changed the course of this investigation. So, I'm going to go through these, and then we will explain to your dad what we had discussed already." Detective McElroy then provided Miranda warnings. Appellant indicated that she understood, and she waived her rights. Thereafter, Detective McElroy summarized what Appellant had already told law enforcement and confronted her with evidence of her guilt. It was only at this point that Appellant confessed to her presence at the crime scene and participation in the murder and burglary.
Appellant moved to suppress her statements to law enforcement, arguing that they failed to provide Miranda warnings while she was under custodial interrogation during the second interview and that her subsequent waiver in the third interview was involuntary because she did not understand the significance of her rights. The State contended that law enforcement did not subject Appellant to custodial interrogation in the second interview and that Appellant voluntarily waived her rights in the third interview. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the State. Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty of both counts, and the trial court sentenced her to thirty years in prison followed by lifetime probation. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
ANALYSIS
"Both the United States and Florida Constitutions provide that persons shall not be ‘compelled’ to be witnesses against themselves in any criminal matter." Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 572 (Fla. 1999) (citing Amend. V, U.S. Const.; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.). Moreover, "the right against self-incrimination provided in the Florida Constitution offers more protection than the right provided in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Myers v. State, 211 So. 3d 962, 971 (Fla. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court enunciated a bright-line rule to guard against compulsion and the coercive nature and atmosphere of custodial interrogation" by requiring law enforcement to provide warnings to those subject to custodial interrogation. Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 573. "Evidence obtained from custodial interrogations may not be used against a defendant at trial if these warnings were not provided to the defendant before the interrogation." State v. Maloney, 191 So. 3d 969, 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).
Custodial Interrogation
In evaluating Appellant's claim, the first question is whether Appellant was subjected to custodial interrogation, requiring Miranda warnings in the second interview. "[T]he initial step [in a custodial interrogation analysis] is to ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "The proper inquiry is not the unarticulated plan of the police, but rather how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have perceived the situation." Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 573 (quoting Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 1188 (Fla. 1997) ).
The Florida Supreme Court has provided the following nonexclusive factors when determining whether a defendant is in custody: "(1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; [and] (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave the place of questioning." Id. at 574. "This is a conjunctive test, so no factor is solely determinative of whether [Appellant] was in custody for Miranda purposes." Myers, 211 So. 3d at 974. "Courts are to consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a reasonable person would believe that his or her freedom of action has been curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest." State v. McAdams, 193 So. 3d 824, 833 (Fla. 2016) (citing Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188, 197 (Fla. 2010) ).
After considering the entire context of the encounter, we find that the second interview was custodial in nature because a reasonable person would not have felt that she was free to terminate the interview and leave. Here, Appellant only consented to going to the police station after the search of the Schafer residence. See Myers, 211 So. 3d at 975. Additionally, Appellant knew that she was a runaway, the residence being searched contained some stolen paraphernalia and a gun that had been used to commit crimes, and the police were questioning her co-defendants. Furthermore, law enforcement placed Appellant on the secured second floor of the police station, subjected her to video surveillance, required her to use an escort while in the building, and appeared to respond without any urgency to her requests to leave the room, specifically to use the restroom. See id. at 979 ; McAdams, 193 So. 3d at 834. Given the totality of this knowledge, we conclude a reasonable person would have believed that her acquiescence to further questioning at the police station was merely perfunctory. See Myers, 211 So. 3d at 979 ; Bell v. State, 201 So. 3d 1267, 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).
We reject the State's contention that Appellant's inability to leave was merely due to her status as a runaway. Law enforcement explicitly told Appellant that she was not free to leave until her father arrived. However, law enforcement sent Mr. Rios away when he arrived, thereby actively preventing Appellant from leaving. We note that "[a] situation can commence as a voluntary interaction with police, but slowly intensify and become more pressured, pointed, and accusatory until it evolves into custodial status," McAdams, 193 So. 3d at 839, which is what occurred here. Despite the State's contention that the detectives did not view Appellant as a suspect, the record indicates that the interview quickly became accusatory when detectives questioned Appellant's honesty, why Appellant feared getting into trouble, and finally when they pointedly asked, "Okay did you fire the trigger? Or pull the trigger?" Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances, Appellant was in custody during the second interview because a reasonable person, much less a seventeen-year-old, would not have felt that she was free to terminate the interview and leave. See id. at 842.
The next step in a custodial interrogation analysis is to ascertain whether the defendant was subjected to interrogation. The Florida Supreme Court has explained that "[i]nterrogation occurs when a state agent asks questions or engages in actions that a reasonable person would conclude are intended to lead to an incriminating response." Id. at 833. Arguably some of the detectives' questions at the beginning of the interview may not qualify as interrogation. However, by the time Detective McElroy, for whatever purpose, asked Appellant, "Okay did you fire the trigger? Or pull the trigger?" the encounter became a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. A reasonable person would conclude that Detective McElroy's yes or no question was intended to lead to an incriminating response about the specific crime. See id. Accordingly, Appellant was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of being informed of her rights. As such, the trial court erred when it denied Appellant's motion to suppress the statements from the second interview. See Maloney, 191 So. 3d at 973.
Delayed Administration of Miranda
Having found that the second interview was a custodial interrogation that required Miranda warnings, we must determine whether the delayed administration of Miranda rendered Appellant's waiver in the third interview involuntary. The Florida Supreme Court has promulgated the following factors to aid in determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the delayed administration of Miranda warnings undermined their prophylactic effect:
(1) whether the police used improper and deliberate tactics in delaying the administration of the Miranda warnings in order to obtain the initial statement; (2) whether the police minimized and downplayed the significance of the Miranda rights once they were given; and (3) the circumstances surrounding both the warned and unwarned statements including the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and second [interrogations], the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the second round as continuous with the first. In addition, there are other circumstances to consider on a case-by-case basis, such as the suspect's age, experience, intelligence, and language proficiency.
Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 424 (Fla. 2010) (internal footnotes and quotations omitted).
We are concerned about law enforcement's intentions in their delayed administration of Miranda warnings. Specifically, nine and a half hours had elapsed between the time Appellant entered the secured room, at approximately 3:00 p.m., and the time law enforcement advised her of her Miranda rights. During that protracted period, law enforcement subjected Appellant to extensive questioning regarding her status as a runaway, tumultuous family relationships, and ultimate knowledge of and participation in the murder and robbery. It was also during this prolonged solitary confinement that multiple law enforcement officers cycled through the room under the guise of having spoken with co-defendants and needing Appellant's help. They then confronted her with alleged inconsistencies in their stories. The impact of Appellant's confinement reached a pinnacle at 9:40 p.m. when she told law enforcement that she needed "to go to sleep." Detective McElroy offered to get Appellant another chair or suggested she use the floor of the interrogation room to rest. The videotaped surveillance showed Appellant slept on the floor until the third interview began around midnight, when she finally received her Miranda warnings. Contrary to the State's argument on appeal, these facts strongly suggest that law enforcement designed its tactics for no other purpose than to exhaust Appellant into admitting her involvement in the crime. Accordingly, we conclude that law enforcement used improper and deliberate tactics in delaying administration of Miranda warnings to Appellant in this case. See id.
We also conclude that Detective McElroy downplayed the significance of Miranda when she referred to it as "a couple of formalities." See id. at 428. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the interviews indicate that they were one continuous episode. For example, Appellant was confined to the same room, without access to her father, and was interrogated by the same personnel who referred to the information from the second interview that Appellant previously divulged. See id. at 432 ; Wright v. State, 161 So. 3d 442, 450 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). Finally, other factors, such as Appellant's age, intelligence, denied access to her father prior to questioning, and limited experience with the criminal justice system, all weigh against her understanding the significance of her Miranda rights. See Ross, 45 So. 3d at 424 ; Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 574 ; Neely v. State, 126 So. 3d 342, 346–47 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting Doerr v. State, 383 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 1980) ); Frances v. State, 857 So. 2d 1002, 1003–04 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Accordingly, based on the totality of the circumstances, "the warnings when given were delivered in the middle of a single protracted round of custodial interrogation of an inexperienced minor," Wright, 161 So. 3d at 451, which undermined their prophylactic effect. As such, the State has failed to establish that Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights. Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied Appellant's motion to suppress.
Evidence at the suppression hearing revealed that Appellant has an I.Q. of 75.
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HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS
"The erroneous admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda is subject to a harmless error analysis." Id. (citing Ross, 45 So. 3d at 434 ). Under the harmless error test, the State as the beneficiary of the error has the burden to prove "that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict." Ross, 45 So. 3d at 434 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986) ). "The erroneous admission of a confession is harmful when ... the confession presents the whole picture of the crime and is highly inculpatory and prejudicial...." Wright, 161 So. 3d at 452 (citing Deviney v. State, 112 So. 3d 57, 79 (Fla. 2013) ).
Based on a review of the record, we cannot find that the erroneous admission of Appellant's confession was harmless. The confession directly tied Appellant to the crime and presented a complete picture of events. See id. at 452. Moreover, the only other evidence directly connecting Appellant to the crime was Muriel's testimony that he made in exchange for a plea agreement. As such, without the confession, the State's case would have rested on the testimony of an unreliable witness. See Wilson v. State, 242 So. 3d 484, 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ; Bell, 201 So. 3d at 1281. Under these circumstances, the State cannot show that the error was harmless. Consequently, we reverse Appellant's convictions for first-degree murder and armed burglary of a dwelling and remand for a new trial without the introduction of Appellant's statements to law enforcement in the second and third interviews. REVERSED and REMANDED for a New Trial.
ORFINGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.