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Ringo v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Apr 5, 2004
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2968 SECTION "R" (5) (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2004)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2968 SECTION "R" (5)

April 5, 2004


ORDER AND REASONS


Defendant Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. moves the Court to dismiss plaintiff Lois M. Ringo's claim under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Act, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:301, et seq., for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has filed no opposition to defendant's motion. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendant's motion.

I. Background

Defendant Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. employed plaintiff Lois M. Ringo as a deli server between June 1997 and February 1999. Plaintiff alleges that defendant is a qualified employer and that she is a qualified employee with a disability under the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111, et seq., and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Ace, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:301, et. seq.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant, after having learned of her disability, engaged in a course of work place harassment. Plaintiff contends that defendant made prohibited medical inquiries about her disability and failed to keep her medical condition confidential. Plaintiff alleges that management and other employees harassed her on a daily basis and ostracized her. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant required her to submit to an unlawful and unnecessary medical inquiry. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant assigned her to a different store as a pretext for "luring her out of the store to confront her about her perceived condition." (Pl.'s Compl., at ¶ 9).

In October 2003, plaintiff sued defendant in this Court under the ADA and the LEDA. Defendant now moves the Court to dismiss plaintiff's state law claim as time-barred.

II. Legal Standard

In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court must resolve doubts as to the sufficiency of the claim in plaintiff's favor. Valcan Materials Company v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. Id.; Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).

III. Analysis

Louisiana Revised Statute 23:303 sets forth the prescriptive period for an employment discrimination claim. Section 23:303 provides that

[a]ny cause of action provided in this Chapter shall be subject to a prescriptive period of one year. However, this one-year period shall be suspended during the pendency of any administrative review or investigation of the claim conducted by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights. No suspension authorized pursuant to this Subsection of this one-year prescriptive period shall last longer than six months.

LA. REV. STAT. § 23:303(D); Nelson v. Shoney's, Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-2199, 1997 WL 5679557, at *3 (E.D. La. 1997); Eastin v. Entergy Corp., 865 So.2d 49, 53 (La. 2004). This one-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of notice of termination. Eastin, 865 So.2d at 54. As noted, Section 23:303(D) also provides that prescription may be suspended for a period of no more than six months during the pendency of an investigation of the claim by the EEOC or the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:303(D).

Here, plaintiff's employment with Winn-Dixie ended in February 1999. Under Section 23:303(D), plaintiff had one year from that date within which to file her claim, i.e., to February 2000. Plaintiff also filed a complaint with the EEOC, which suspended prescription on plaintiff's claim for a period of not more than six months. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:303(D). This action entitled plaintiff to file her claim in August 2000. Plaintiff did not sue Winn-Dixie until October 2003, well beyond the one-year prescriptive period and the six-month suspension period. Plaintiff's claim under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Act is time-barred. See, e.g., Langley v. Pinker ton's Inc., 220 F. Supp.2d 575, 581-82 (M.D. La. 2002) (finding that notwithstanding eighteen-month EEOC investigation, plaintiff's Louisiana employment discrimination claim had prescribed because Section 23:303(D) suspended prescriptive period for only six of the eighteen months).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss.


Summaries of

Ringo v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Apr 5, 2004
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2968 SECTION "R" (5) (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2004)
Case details for

Ringo v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana Inc.

Case Details

Full title:LOIS M. RINGO VERSUS WINN-DIXIE LOUISIANA, INC

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Apr 5, 2004

Citations

CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2968 SECTION "R" (5) (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2004)

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