Opinion
5-20-0234
10-20-2021
In re ESTATE OF DANNY RILEY v. Connie Lou Riley, as Administrator of the Estate of Danny Riley, Respondent-Appellee Billy Ray Riley and Vickie Louvern Childress, Petitioners-Appellants,
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Saline County. No. 19-P-28 Honorable Todd D. Lambert, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and Wharton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BOIE PRESIDING JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the circuit court's order granting the respondent's petition for reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses paid on behalf of the decedent where the circuit court's judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 The petitioners, Billy Ray Riley and Vickie Louvern Childress, appeal pro se the circuit court's order of July 20, 2020, granting respondent Connie Lou Riley's petition for reimbursement of decedent Danny Riley's funeral and burial expenses. For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court's order of July 20, 2020.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The decedent, Danny Riley, died intestate on April 20, 2018. The respondent is the widow of the decedent, and the petitioners are two of the decedent's three children. On June 8, 2020, the respondent filed a petition for reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses paid on behalf of the decedent. Exhibit A to the respondent's petition was a statement of funeral goods and services selected for the decedent's funeral from the Watson Funeral Home dated April 24, 2018. The statement indicated the services that had been selected, the cost of each service, and a total amount due of $5389. Exhibit A to the respondent's petition also included a receipt from the Watson Funeral Home demonstrating a total of $5389 paid by the respondent for the funeral expenses of the decedent dated August 31, 2018.
¶ 5 On July 20, 2020, the circuit court conducted a hearing and heard arguments on the respondent's petition for reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses. At the hearing, counsel for the petitioners stated to the circuit court as follows:
At the July 20, 2020, hearing, the circuit court also heard arguments on the respondent's petition for surviving spousal award and the respondent's petition for attorney fees. Those arguments are irrelevant to the issue on appeal and will not be reiterated or considered within this decision.
"I have an insurance assignment I was handed by one-by my client's wife just before hearing. I would like to share that with [respondent's counsel], as well. I actually think he's already seen this. My client has asked me to advance this to state that [respondent] is not entitled to the burial expenses because she waived her interest in them, that is my client has asked me to present this as proof of same."
¶ 6 The following dialog between the petitioners' counsel and the circuit court then occurred:
"THE COURT: I'm not following your argument.
[PETITIONERS' COUNSEL]: My client's position is that [respondent] waived her interest in the funeral costs by signing this insurance assignment, Your Honor.
THE COURT: She signed an insurance assignment to whom?
[PETITIONERS' COUNSEL]: To the funeral home, Your Honor.
* * *
THE COURT: Okay. She took that life insurance proceed or benefit and assigned it directly to the funeral home?
[PETITIONERS' COUNSEL]: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. And that paid for the funeral bill?
[PETITIONERS' COUNSEL]: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So what is your argument that she waive reimbursement?
[PETITIONERS' COUNSEL]: I do not have any statutory or case authority to support this position. But the argument by my client is that in light of the other acts of [respondent] that he believes merit her removal as administrator, that he believes indicate that there was some sort of crime or fraud going on in the management of the estate, that this is some sort of evidence of her attempting to acquire interest that she ought not have, and that in reality she waived a good deal of interest by this type of activity.
* * *
THE COURT: Yeah. I'm not following you, [petitioners' counsel], on this issue. The fact that [respondent] was entitled to that money and gave it up to pay for the funeral bill, she's entitled to reimbursement and I'm going to grant that."
¶ 7 The circuit court's docket entry of July 20, 2020, states as follows:
"Case called. Administrator is present with Atty. Bittle. Atty. Barton appears with Billy Riley. Vickie Childress appears pro se. Case proceeds to hearing on Petition For Surviving Spousal Award. Administrator, Connie Riley, is S&T. She rests. No evidence from any other party. Arguments heard. Billy Riley asks to call April Riley. Granted. April Riley is S&T. Billy Riley rests. Arguments made. Court allows Billy Riley 60 days to file evidence that surviving spouse caused or contributed to death of decedent. Clerk to set for review 9/21/2020. Court takes up Petition re: repayment for funeral and burial expenses. Arguments heard. Petition is granted. Order to enter. Petition For Attorney's Fees is argued. Matter taken under advisement."
The record of proceeding for the July 20, 2020, hearing indicates that counsel appeared as "Attorney for Heirs" but the circuit court's docket entry indicates that Vickie Childress appeared pro se at the hearing. For the purpose of this appeal, we will refer to "petitioners' counsel" because Vickie Childress presented no separate arguments at the hearing regarding respondent's petition for reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses. Further, whether counsel was arguing on behalf of one or both heirs does not affect our analysis.
¶ 8 Petitioners now appeal the circuit court's July 20, 2020, order granting the respondent's petition for reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses arguing that the circuit court failed to consider and/or understand all the evidence presented at the hearing and that the respondent's claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitation.
¶ 9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 At the onset, we note that a final judgment on all issues has not been entered and that this matter remains pending in the circuit court. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), our jurisdiction is confined to the review of final judgments unless the order to be reviewed comes within the exceptions for interlocutory orders. Ill. S.Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Rosewell, 262 Ill.App.3d 938, 950 (1992). The petitioners state that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to the exception for interlocutory orders under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). The respondent makes no argument or statement regarding this court's jurisdiction within her appellee brief.
¶ 11 This court has an independent duty to consider its own jurisdiction regardless of whether the issue has been raised by the parties. A.M. Realty Western L.L.C. v. MSMC Realty, L.L.C., 2016 IL App (1st) 151087, ¶ 67. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304 governs an appeal of a final judgment that does not dispose of an entire proceeding, and subsection (a) of Rule 304 states as follows:
"If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both. Such a finding may be made at the time of the entry of the judgment or thereafter on the court's own motion or on motion of any party. *** In the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties." (Emphasis added.) Ill. S.Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
¶ 12 In this matter, the petitioners did not orally request, nor did they file a motion seeking, an express written finding from the circuit court that there was no just reason for delaying either the enforcement or an appeal of the July 20, 2020, order. Further, the circuit court did not sua sponte make an express written finding regarding its July 20, 2020, order. Rule 304(a) requires an expressed written finding by the circuit court and specifically states that in the absence of such a finding, the order is not appealable. Ill. S.Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Therefore, we find that this court lacks jurisdiction under Rule 304(a) to consider this appeal because the circuit court made no expressed written finding that there was no just reason for delaying the enforcement or appeal of its July 20, 2020, order.
¶ 13 The filing of a notice of appeal, however, is generally the only jurisdictional step required to perfect an appeal. In re Miller, 396 Ill.App.3d 910, 913 (2009). Thus, where an appellant cites an incorrect supreme court rule as a basis for jurisdiction in its notice of appeal, that deficiency does not divest this court of jurisdiction if jurisdiction can be established by this court's consideration of its own jurisdiction under another exception for interlocutory orders. Id.
¶ 14 Rule 304(b)(1) allows an appeal of a judgment or order entered in the administration of an estate without the specifical finding required by Rule 304(a) if the judgment or order finally determines a right or status of a party. Ill. S.Ct. R. 304(b)(1) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). The purpose of Rule 304(b)(1) is to promote efficiency and to provide certainty during the lengthy procedure of estate administration by allowing an appeal as to some issues as those issues are resolved by the lower court. In re Estate of Devey, 239 Ill.App.3d 630, 633 (1993). The committee comments related to Rule 304(b)(1) note that examples of orders that are final in character although entered in comprehensive proceedings are "an order admitting or refusing to admit a will to probate, appointing or removing an executor, or allowing or disallowing a claim." Ill. S.Ct. R. 304(b)(1) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
¶ 15 As such, it is not necessary that the order resolve all matters or claims within the estate, but it must finally determine a right or status of a party on the particular issue. In re Estate of Vogt, 249 Ill.App.3d 282, 285 (1993). "Without the Rule 304(b)(1) exception, an appeal would have to be brought after an estate was closed, the result of which may require reopening the estate and marshalling assets that have already been distributed. That result would be both impractical and inefficient." In re Estate of Thorp, 282 Ill.App.3d 612, 616-17 (1996). Therefore, we must determine whether the circuit court's order of July 20, 2020, finally resolved the issue of the decedent's funeral and burial expenses in order to determine whether this court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant to Rule 304(b)(1).
¶ 16 Only those orders which "finally" determined the right or status of a party are subject to Rule 304(b)(1). Ill. S.Ct. R. 304(b)(1) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). As such, there can be no pending matters before the circuit court that could affect the right or status of a party regarding the issue. See generally Stephen v. Huckaba, 361 Ill.App.3d 1047, 1052 (2005) (court order that contained "a number of 'ifs'" and did not address major question of whether party was entitled to a credit for the insurance proceeds in an estate proceeding was not final order appealable under Rule 304(b)(1)). In this matter, neither party argues nor can this court locate anything within the common law record or record of proceeding that could affect the finality of the circuit court's determination regarding the reimbursement of the decedent's funeral and burial expenses. As such, we find that the circuit court's July 20, 2020, order "finally" determined the rights of the parties regarding the decedent's funeral and burial expenses, and therefore, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 304(b)(1) to consider this appeal.
¶ 17 Before proceeding to the merits of the petitioners' appeal, we also note that the respondent argues that this court should dismiss this appeal regarding the petitioner Vickie Childress, for her failure to sign the appellate brief or file a separate appellate brief. The respondent cites to First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill.2d 128 (1976), in support of her argument. The Talandis court noted that courts of review had the inherent power to dismiss where an appellant's brief was inexcusably not filed within the time prescribed, but the Talandis court made no findings regarding whether a co-appellant was required to sign the appellant brief or file a separate brief. The respondent also fails to cite any statutory requirement that a co-appellant must either sign the appellant brief or file a separate brief.
¶ 18 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(4) (eff. July 1, 2017) requires that the notice of appeal shall contain the signatures and addresses of each appellant. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which governs appellate briefs, however, does not contain the same requirement. The respondent acknowledges that petitioner Vickie Childress signed the notice of appeal. As such, the respondent's argument that this court should dismiss this appeal with regard to petitioner Vickie Childress, for her failure to sign the appellant's brief or file a separate brief, is without merit.
¶ 19 We now move to the merits of the petitioners' appeal and do so under a manifest weight of the evidence standard of review. In re Estate of Weiland, 338 Ill.App.3d 585, 604 (2003). Under a manifest weight of the evidence standard of review, a finding by the circuit court will not be disturbed unless the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Id. The petitioners raise two issues on appeal: (1) that the circuit court failed to consider or misunderstood the evidence presented at the hearing regarding the respondent's petition for reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses and (2) that the respondent's claim to the reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses was submitted after the applicable statute of limitation had expired.
¶ 20 Concerning the first issue, the petitioners argue that the respondent paid for the decedent's funeral and burial expenses from the proceeds from a life insurance policy that had been assigned to Watson Funeral Home. As such, the petitioners argue that, upon assignment, the respondent forfeited all of her legal rights as the beneficiary of the insurance policy and the proceeds from the insurance policy belonged to the funeral home and not to the respondent. The petitioners state that after the assignment, the respondent contacted the insurance company and "redirected" the insurance proceeds to the respondent's personal account instead of the funeral home and only later paid the funeral home after the petitioners contacted their attorney. Therefore, the petitioners argue that the respondent and her attorney committed fraud upon the court by producing a receipt in the respondent's name which led the circuit court to believe that the respondent had paid for the decedent's funeral expenses from her own funds. It is the petitioners' argument that the circuit court failed to look at the assignment and did not understand the importance of that evidence.
¶ 21 The respondent argues that the petitioners' exhibits attached to their appellate brief regarding the assignment were not introduced at the hearing and, as such, are not part of the record on appeal and should be ignored by this court. The respondent is correct that, generally, attachments to appellate briefs that are not otherwise of record are not properly before a reviewing court and cannot be used to supplement the record. Taylor v. Frey, 406 Ill.App.3d 1112, 1115 (2011). As such, this court will not take into consideration the petitioners' exhibits A 2-7, 5-7, 6-7 or exhibit B. However, the elimination of these exhibits does not prohibit this court's review of the petitioners' issue since the record of proceedings provides sufficient information for this court to conduct its analysis.
¶ 22 An assignment is the transfer of rights or property. Black's Law Dictionary (2d ed. 2001). In order to transfer rights or property, an individual must first legally possess the rights or property. See generally Danaj v. Anest, 77 Ill.App.3d 533, 535 (1979). Respondent was the named beneficiary of the decedent's life insurance policy, and the petitioners did not present any evidence, nor did they argue, that respondent was not the beneficiary. The petitioners also presented no evidence at the hearing that the funeral and burial expenses were not paid in full or that the decedent's funeral expenses were paid by anyone other than the respondent. As the named beneficiary of the decedent's life insurance, the respondent was entitled to receive the full amount of the policy. The respondent then assigned a portion of that right to the funeral home for the payment of the decedent's funeral and burial expenses. Whether the respondent "redirected" the insurance proceeds from the funeral home and paid for the decedent's funeral and burial expenses by another means is irrelevant to the issue of whether the respondent paid for the decedent's funeral expenses. The petitioners' argument that the monies paid for the decedent's funeral and burial expenses did not belong to the respondent, but to the funeral home based upon the assignment, would result in the absurd finding that the funeral home paid for the decedent's funeral and burial expenses from its own funds and not the funds of the respondent.
¶ 23 The receipt from the funeral home submitted as evidence at the hearing evidenced that the respondent paid the decedent's funeral costs. It is irrelevant whether the respondent paid by assignment, check, or cash. Although we cannot speak on behalf of the circuit court, we believe that when the circuit court stated that it did not understand the petitioners' argument concerning the assignment, it was not that the circuit court did not understand an assignment or its legal implications, but rather, that the manner of payment was irrelevant and had no bearing on the issue of whether the respondent paid for the decedent's funeral and burial expenses and was entitled to reimbursement of those expenses.
¶ 24 As such, the circuit court properly found that respondent paid for the decedent's funeral expenses regardless of whether the payment was accomplished by assignment, personal check, or cash and was entitled to reimbursement of those funds from the decedent's estate. Therefore, the circuit court's order of July 20, 2020, awarding the respondent reimbursement of the decedent's funeral and burial expenses was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 25 The petitioners' second issue on appeal is that the respondent's claim for reimbursement of the decedent's funeral and burial expenses was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The respondent argues that the petitioners have forfeited this issue on appeal for their failure to raise the issue at the hearing or at any time in the lower court. Upon review of the record on appeal, we agree with the respondent that the petitioners have forfeited this issue on appeal.
¶ 26 The failure to raise an issue in the circuit court results in the forfeiture of that issue on appeal. Huang v. Brenson, 2014 IL App (1st) 123231, ¶ 22. A primary purpose of the forfeiture rule is to ensure that the circuit court has the opportunity to correct any errors because the circuit court cannot correct an error and prevent prejudice when the error has not been brought to its attention. Moller v. Lipov, 368 Ill.App.3d 333, 305 (2006).
¶ 27 In their reply brief, the petitioners cite to the record of proceeding arguing that the statute of limitation issue was raised in the circuit court. The portion of the record of proceeding cited by the petitioners demonstrates that the respondent's counsel, in his argument regarding the respondent's entitlement to a spousal award, stated that it was his belief that any claim of alleged misconduct by the respondent would be barred by the applicable statute of limitation. The petitioners fail to cite to any portion of the record on appeal to demonstrate that they raised the issue of the applicable statute of limitation regarding the respondent's claim to reimbursement of the decedent's funeral and burial expenses at the hearing or at any time prior to this appeal. As such, the petitioners have forfeited this issue on appeal.
¶ 28 Finally, we note that the petitioners state in their initial brief that the circuit court ruled on this issue without recognizing petitioner, Vickie Childress, as pro se or giving her any opportunity to respond at the hearing or to present evidence in this case. The petitioners again, however, fail to cite to any portion of the record of proceeding to demonstrate that the petitioner, Vickie Childress, had requested to submit any evidence or to be heard by the circuit court on this issue. In their reply brief, the petitioners cite to the following portion of record of proceeding:
"THE COURT: Ms. Childress, do you have any witnesses on this particular issue?
MS. CHILDRESS: No."
¶ 29 The petitioners' reply brief then argues that the circuit court acknowledged petitioner Vickie Childress and that petitioner Vickie Childress did reply to the court so "therefore she did indeed participate." The petitioners' arguments in their reply brief contradict their argument in their initial brief. If the petitioner, Vickie Childress, had evidence to present or wanted to speak at the hearing, she could have requested to do so. There is no indication within the record of proceedings that the circuit court prohibited the petitioner, Vickie Childress, participation at the hearing in any manner. As such, this argument is without merit.
¶ 30 Based on the foregoing, we find that the circuit court's order of July 20, 2020, awarding the respondent reimbursement of the decedent's funeral and burial expenses was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We further find that the petitioners have forfeited their issue on appeal regarding the applicable statute of limitation for their failure to raise the issue in the circuit court.
¶ 31 CONCLUSION
¶ 32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's July 20, 2020, order granting respondent's petition for reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses.
¶ 33 Affirmed.