Opinion
CIV-21-667-G
07-20-2021
DENNIS RAY RIGSBY, JR., Plaintiff, v. CUSTER COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUZANNE MITCHELL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dennis Ray Rigsby, Jr. (Plaintiff), a pretrial detainee appearing pro seand seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, moves under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the “United States Constitution/Bill of Rights” for the dismissal of the state criminal charge against him and monetary damages for the violation of his right to a speedy jury trial. See Doc. 1, at 2, 9-10. United States District Judge Charles B. Goodwin has referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). See Doc. 4.
The Court construes Plaintiff's pro se filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation and pagination. Apart from alterations to capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless indicated.
I. Screening.
Federal law requires the Court to screen complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss Plaintiff's complaint if it, or any part of it, is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Id. § 1915A(b). Consistent with those requirements, the undersigned has carefully considered Plaintiff's pleadings, the relevant state court records, and the applicable law, and recommends dismissal of this action.
II. State court proceedings.
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the electronic records of the District Court in and for Custer County, Oklahoma. Those records show that the State of Oklahoma charged Plaintiff with First Degree Murder on June 8, 2020 in Custer County Case No. CF-2020-123. See State v. Rigsby, No. CF- 2020-123 (Custer Cty. Ct. June 8, 2020) (Rigsby). Plaintiff's court-appointed counsel filed a motion for determination of competency on June 22, 2020, and the state court paused the proceedings on June 23, 2020, while officials with the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health examined Plaintiff's competency to stand trial. See Rigsby, No. CF-2020-123 (docket entries dated June 22-23, 2020). The state court resumed the proceedings on August 21, 2020. See Id. (docket entry dated August 21, 2020). A motion hearing, specifically to address Plaintiff's speedy trial claim, is scheduled for August 24, 2021, and Plaintiff's trial is scheduled for November 15, 2021. Id. (docket entries dated Feb. 26, May 28, and June 29, 2021).
See Fed. R. Evid. 201; see also United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1214 n.6 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting the court's “discretion to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in our court and certain other courts concerning matters bearing directly upon the disposition of the case at hand” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=custerν mber=cf-2020-123 (last visited July 12, 2021).
III. Plaintiff's complaint.
Plaintiff sues the “Custer County District Court, ” the “Great State of Oklahoma, ” “Custer County District Attorney Angelia Marsee, ” “The Honorable Weedon, ” and “The Honorable Jones.” Doc. 1, at 1, 7, 9, 11. Plaintiff claims the Defendants have violated his right to a speedy trial “via violations of Amendment VI to my right to assistance of counsel for [his] defence.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff seeks the dismissal of his criminal charge and monetary damages of $1, 000.00 a day because of the “freedoms and libertys” Defendants have taken from him. Id. at 10.
IV. Analysis.
A. Abstention is required under the Younger doctrine.
This Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under the Younger doctrine. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971), the Supreme Court determined that federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction when three conditions are met: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings; (2) the state proceedings provide an adequate forum to hear a petitioner's federal claims; and (3) the state proceedings implicate important state interests. See Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006). The doctrine “dictates that federal courts not interfere with state court proceedings . . . when such relief could adequately be sought before the state court.” Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999).
“Younger abstention is jurisdictional.” D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). And the Court “may raise the issue of abstention sua sponte.” D.A. Osguthorpe Family P'ship v. ASC Bank, N.A., 705 F.3d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff's claims relate to an ongoing state criminal proceeding, so the first condition is met. As to the second inquiry, Plaintiff “has not shown that the state court is not an adequate forum to hear his constitutional challenges” bearing on his right to a speedy and fair jury trial. Chapman, 472 F.3d at 749; see also Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the federal statutory and constitutional claims, a plaintiff typically has an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in state court” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, the State of Oklahoma necessarily has an important interest in prosecuting crimes that have allegedly occurred within its jurisdiction. See In re Troff, 488 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “state control over criminal justice” is “a lynchpin in the unique balance of interests” of federalism).
Aside from possible relief by the state district court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals “may entertain . . . certain extraordinary writs which arise out of criminal matters.” Rule 10.1(A), Rules of the Okla. Ct. Crim. App., Okla. Stat. tit. 22, Ch. 18, App. (2018). And if Plaintiff is convicted, he may raise any federal constitutional claims on direct appeal and by application for post-conviction relief. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1051, 1080.
There are narrow exceptions to Younger abstention. But “federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions [is] appropriate only in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown . . . .” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971); see also D.L., 392 F.3d at 1228 (noting “the Younger doctrine extends to federal claims for monetary relief when a judgment for the plaintiff would have preclusive effects on a pending state-court proceeding”). And “it is the plaintiff's heavy burden to overcome the Younger abstention bar by setting forth more than mere allegations of bad faith or harassment.” Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Neither Plaintiff's complaint nor the record of his criminal proceedings implicates an exception to Younger abstention. Plaintiff expresses his disagreement with his attorneys and the state court (see Doc. 1, at 9-11), but the record reflects the state court has not ignored his pro se motions and has scheduled another motion hearing and set Plaintiff's trial to commence in the next few months. See Rigsby, No. CF-2020-123 (docket entries dated Feb. 26, May 28, and June 29, 2021). “Younger requires only the availability of an adequate state-court forum, not a favorable result in the state forum.” Winn, 945 F.3d at 1258.
Plaintiff's allegations fail to demonstrate bad faith or harassment. And, based on the record, the Court cannot conclude Plaintiff would face irreparable injury if the Court abstained. See Id. at 1261-62 (“[T]he only injury that arises from delaying dismissal of the charges (until state remedies are exhausted) is that the defendant must go through a trial and appeal, which is not the sort of injury that satisfies the Younger exception; in particular, the process of proceeding through a trial and appeal does no damage to the right to a speedy trial.”); see also Barrus v. Hopf, 229 Fed.Appx. 791, 792 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the excessive length of his pretrial detention was an irreparable injury because he had “not shown that his detention [was] excessive or otherwise impermissible, ” or was “any special threat to his liberties beyond those normally associated with a criminal prosecution”). Under these circumstances, Younger abstention is “non-discretionary” and “[this] court is required to abstain.” Chapman, 472 F.3d at 749.
Plaintiff's request to dismiss his criminal charge could be construed as a request for habeas corpus relief. Cf. Yellowbear v. Wyo. Atty. Gen., 525 F.3d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Section [] 2241 is a vehicle for challenging pretrial detention . . . .”). Even so, the Younger doctrine would still require dismissal for the stated reasons. See, e.g., Tucker v. Reeve, 601 Fed.Appx. 760, 761 (10th Cir. 2015) (applying Younger abstention to pretrial detainee's 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition seeking dismissal of his criminal charges based on “excessive bond, deni[al] [of] a speedy trial, ” and “illegal searches and prosecution”). And the requirement that a petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief must first exhaust state court remedies would further require dismissal. See, e.g., Arter v. Gentry, 201 Fed.Appx. 653, 654 (10th Cir. 2006) (agreeing that, in addition to Younger abstention “to avoid interference in ongoing state proceedings, ” petitioner's failure to exhaust state court remedies required dismissal of pretrial detainee's claims brought under § 2241).
B. Section 1983 relief is not available against the named Defendants.
Alternatively, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
1. Sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's claims against the State of Oklahoma.
Neither States nor state officials sued in their official capacities are considered “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). And the Eleventh Amendment bars actions in federal court against States and state officers sued in their official capacities for money damages. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar that precludes unconsented suits in federal court against a state and arms of the state.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (holding that a suit against an individual acting in an official capacity is properly treated as a suit against the State itself and “the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court”); White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 366 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity barred § 1983 claims “for money damages” against prison officials in their official capacities).
Exceptions to immunity exist where a state consents to suit in federal court or where Congress has abrogated a state's sovereign immunity. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012). But Oklahoma has not consented to be sued in federal court, nor did Congress abrogate state sovereign immunity by creating a private right of action under § 1983. Berry v. Oklahoma, 495 Fed.Appx. 920, 921-22 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 152.1; Will, 491 U.S. at 66). Thus, “the State of Oklahoma's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits seeking money damages in federal court remains intact.” Christian v. Thompson, No. CIV-18-699-G, 2019 WL 4920885, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 3, 2019). Plaintiff's claims against the State of Oklahoma should be dismissed.
2. The Custer County District Court is not a suable entity under § 1983.
Plaintiff cannot prevail against the Custer County District Court because it is not a suable entity under § 1983. See Hancox v. Lucas, No. CIV-18-1049-F, 2018 WL 7137972, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 19, 2018), adopted, 2019 WL 348236 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 28, 2019). The Court should therefore dismiss Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant with prejudice. Id.
3. Defendant Marsee is entitled to absolute immunity from suit.
“‘State prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity against suits brought pursuant to § 1983 for activities intimately associated with the judicial process, such as initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions.'” Quintana v. Adair, 673 Fed.Appx. 815, 819 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1475 (10th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Marsee argued against his speedy trial motion in a hearing before the state district court. Doc. 1, at 11. Defendant Marsee's alleged acts were intimately associated with the judicial process and were undertaken by her in her role as an advocate. She is thus entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiff's claims, and the Court should dismiss them with prejudice. See Medina v. Weber, 531 Fed.Appx. 902, 903 (10th Cir. 2013) (“‘Acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.'” (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993))); Glaser v. City & Cty. of Denver, Colo., 557 Fed.Appx. 689, 705-06 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court's dismissal, “with prejudice, ” of plaintiff's § 1983 claims against state prosecutor for which the prosecutor had absolute immunity).
4. Defendants Weedon and Jones are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit.
“The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that judges are generally immune from suits for money damages.” Stein v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of N.M., 520 F.3d 1183, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Two exceptions may apply: “(1) when the act is ‘not taken in the judge's judicial capacity,' and (2) when the act, ‘though judicial in nature, is taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.'” Id. (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991) (internal brackets omitted)). “An act taken in excess of a court's jurisdiction is not to be confused with an act taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Quintana v. Waters, 769 Fed.Appx. 648, 649 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations and brackets omitted).
To determine whether a judge performed a “judicial” act or acted “in the clear absence of jurisdiction, ” the courts look to “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). Plaintiff complains about these Defendants' actions taken with respect to his speedy trial motion-acts clearly related to Plaintiff's criminal proceedings. Doc. 1, at 11. As such, both Judge Weedon and Judge Jones are absolutely immune from suit on any claims based on the conduct of their office. See Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462, 1473 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[J]udges are absolutely immune from suit on any claim based on the conduct of their office, including allegations that a decision is erroneous, malicious, or in excess of their judicial authority.”). The undersigned therefore recommends the court dismiss with prejudice the claims against these Defendants. See Phan v. Babcock, 764 Fed.Appx. 837, 838 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that the district court had properly dismissed with prejudice the claims against two judges who were entitled to absolutely immunity from a civil rights suit).
V. Recommendation and notice of right to object.
The undersigned recommends the Court abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this matter and dismiss it without prejudice under the Younger abstention doctrine. Alternatively, Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and seeks monetary relief from Defendants who are immune from suit. The undersigned also recommends that Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 2, and his request for counsel, Doc. 5, be denied as moot if this Report and Recommendation is adopted.
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before August 10, 2021, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to file a timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues and terminates the referral to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.
ENTERED.