Riemers v. Clark

2 Citing cases

  1. Sikora v. Keillor

    17 A.D.2d 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962)   Cited 28 times
    In Sikora v Keillor, 17 AD2d 6, 230 NYS2d 571 (2d Dept 1962), aff'd 13 NY2d 610, 191 NE2d 88, 240 NYS2d 601 (1963), the vicarious liability of the owner of a private vehicle operated by a volunteer firefighter in the performance of his duties was held to be measured by the same standard of care as the volunteer firefighter under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104.

    Though the operator of a motor vehicle may be a volunteer fireman who enjoys immunity for his negligent acts, the party injured as an outcome of the fireman's negligence still may maintain a cause of action against the owner who loaned the vehicle to the fireman. This result is consistent with the general principle that the immunity of one tort-feasor does not inure to the benefit of a second tort-feasor ( Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253; Riemers v. Clark, 252 App. Div. 892; Schomber v. Tait, 207 Misc. 328; Contino v. Baltimore Annapolis R.R. Co., 178 F.2d 521, 525 [C.C.A. 4th]; see, also, 4 Restatement, Torts, § 880; 2 Harper and James, Torts, § 26.16, p. 1425). Nor do I regard the result to inflict an unreasonable hardship on the defendant owner.

  2. Schwartz v. Forty-Second St., M. St. N. Ave. R. Co.

    175 Misc. 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940)   Cited 8 times

    The case of Van Wormer v. Arnold ( 255 A.D. 233) is plainly distinguishable in that subdivision 6 did not bar the plaintiffs who were there suing. Hall v. Hill ( 158 Misc. 341) was decided before Abbondondolo v. Mealing and Behan v. Maleady ( supra) and was brought to the attention of the Appellate Division in those cases and is in effect overruled by them, and I should take those cases as authorities binding on me even if I did not agree with them, which I do. Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co. ( 249 N.Y. 253) and Riemers v. Clark ( 252 A.D. 892) rest upon a totally different principle. True, the liability of the defendant in those cases derived from the negligence of the husband of the plaintiff, but the reason no action could be maintained against the husband was the wife's lack of capacity to sue resulting from the marital status, whereas here plaintiffs' inability to maintain an action against their coemployees is due to the fact that the Legislature has deprived them of a cause of action and substituted therefor a right to compensation from the employer.