Opinion
Case No.: 3:13-cv-402
03-27-2014
JOSEPH M. RIEGER, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL DYNAMICS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC., Defendant.
Judge Walter H. Rice
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman
ORDER
On March 25, 2014, the Court held a forty-five minute informal discovery conference by telephone with pro se Plaintiff and counsel for Defendant, Mr. Seidler. The conference was scheduled at Plaintiff's request and multiple discovery issues were then raised by Plaintiff. These issues are addressed in turn.
Less than twenty minutes before the call was scheduled to begin, pro se Plaintiff sent five separate emails to the undersigned's chambers email account and attached documents that he wished to discuss during the call. These emails and documents are attached hereto.
First, the discovery deadline in this case is set for November 3, 2014. Doc. 20 at PageID 61. There was no request to change this date and, accordingly, the Court CONFIRMS the November 3, 2014 discovery deadline. To be clear, the Court reminds both sides that this is the date by which all discovery must be completed in this case. If depositions are to be taken, they must be noticed far enough in advance that they occur on or before this date. Additionally, if discovery requests, such as interrogatories or requests for production of documents, are sent by one party to the other, such discovery requests must be made 30 or more days in advance of the discovery deadline so that the responding party has sufficient time to respond prior to November 3, 2014. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2), 34(b)(2)(A).
Second, Plaintiff has moved the Court to extend the lay witness disclosure deadline currently set for May 26, 2014. Doc. 35. As discussed above, this deadline is not relevant for the taking of depositions and depositions need not occur prior to May 26, 2014. Plaintiff shall use his best efforts to identify those lay witnesses he expects to call at trial on or before May 26, 2014, and shall supplement that list in good faith thereafter if he believe other lay witnesses may also testify or if he discovers additional lay witnesses during the discovery period. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to extend the lay witness deadline (doc. 35) is DENIED.
Third, there was a lengthy discussion about the scheduling of the depositions in this case. As the Court said on the telephone and in a prior Order, see doc. 29, the Court expects Plaintiff and Defendant's counsel to work cooperatively and in good faith to schedule each of these depositions at a time, date and location that is convenient for both sides. Apparently, pro se Plaintiff advised Defendant's counsel that some or all of these depositions would be no more than 3 or 4 hours in length, but now wishes to schedule depositions of 7 hours in length as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1). Although depositions of such length are authorized by Rule 30(d)(1), this undoubtedly has caused Defendant's counsel difficulty, in that the depositions were previously scheduled to occur two per day. In the future, pro se Plaintiff shall use his best efforts to determine and finalize the discovery he seeks in advance of making such a request to Defendant.
Fourth, there was a discussion about the deposition of Plaintiff's former manager James Breitbeil. Recognizing that Mr. Breitbeil was Plaintiff's former supervisor and that he may be able to testify with respect to Plaintiff's employment status at General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, the Court finds it appropriate that he be deposed sometime after Plaintiff's deposition on April 29, 2014. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). The fact that Mr. Breitbeil was employed by a different subsidiary corporation of General Dynamics does not operate as a bar to the taking of his deposition. This finding should not be interpreted by pro se Plaintiff to mean that he is entitled to, or can seek, any other discovery from this separate corporate entity.
Fifth, Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of Defendant's answers to his interrogatories. With regard to this issue, there is no motion to compel discovery before the Court; additionally, the Court believes that the parties have not exhausted their extrajudicial efforts to resolve this dispute. Accordingly, both sides are ORDERED to meet and confer -- in person or by telephone -- regarding each and every discovery response which the requesting party finds deficient. In this regard, Defendant's counsel advised the Court that pro se Plaintiff was apparently less than candid in response to one or more interrogatories concerning his prior involvement in the civil or criminal justice system. Plaintiff is ORDERED to be truthful and to answer honestly every discovery request that is put to him. The parties are directed to review Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 26(g), and 37. The Court advises pro se Plaintiff that sanctions can be imposed against him for his failure and/or refusal to be truthful in his discovery responses. See Bank One of Cleveland, N.A. v. Abbe, 916 F.2d 1067, 1073 (6th Cir. 1990). After exhausting all extrajudicial efforts, if either party believes that appropriate discovery responses have not been forthcoming, they may file an appropriate motion.
Finally, the Court notes that it has been patient and generous with its time regarding this pro se case. See doc. 30. To date, and only seven weeks after the issuance of the Calendar Order, the Court has meet with the parties by telephone four times, in addition to the preliminary pretrial conference, to address concerns regarding pro se Plaintiff's discovery practices. While the Court is always willing to meet with parties in any case in which there is a discovery dispute in an attempt to resolve that dispute, there is a corollary requirement that the parties must exhaust all extrajudicial means amongst themselves prior to seeking the Court's intervention. S.D. Ohio Civ. P. 37.1. In the future, absent an unusual or emergency circumstance, the Court will not hold additional informal telephone conferences at pro se Plaintiff's request unless Plaintiff first files an affidavit explaining with particularity the precise dispute he has with Defendant's counsel and the means he and counsel have undertaken to resolve that dispute before seeking the Court's assistance. This affidavit requirement is not imposed to limit pro se Plaintiff's access to the Court in any way; rather, it is done to ensure compliance in this case with the "extrajudicial means for the resolution of differences" requirement set forth in S.D. Ohio Civ. P. 37.1. The Court has been tolerant, but is aware of the pattern exhibited by pro se Plaintiff in seeking judicial intervention prior to exhausting extrajudicial efforts.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Michael J. Newman
United States Magistrate Judge