Opinion
Case No. 5D02-718.
Opinion filed April 2, 2004.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County, W. David Dugan, Judge.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Rebecca M. Becker, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Judy Taylor Rush, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Scipio G. Ridley appeals a civil restitution lien entered eighty-two days after the date of his sentencing, contending that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order restitution. We agree.
After pleading nolo contendere to burglary of a structure, grand theft and dealing in stolen property, Ridley was sentenced to prison on December 7, 2001. At sentencing, the State announced that no restitution was due. Within sixty days thereafter, the State petitioned the trial court to enter a civil restitution lien pursuant to section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2000), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. At a hearing conducted February 5, 2002, the court denied the State's restitution motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Rather than seeking appellate review of that decision, the State filed a motion for rehearing. On February 27, 2002, the court heard the State's motion for rehearing, and over Ridley's objection, entered a civil restitution lien in the amount of $800. Ridley now argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the civil restitution lien eighty-two days after sentencing.
Restitution is a mandated part of sentencing. The failure to impose restitution as part of a sentence results in an incomplete sentence that is subject to timely modification. See Grice v. State, 528 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Restitution may be imposed at the time of sentencing or within sixty days thereafter. State v. Sanderson, 625 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1993);see also § 960.292(2), Fla. Stat. (2000) ("The court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders."). Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction to consider the imposition of restitution at the hearing conducted February 5, 2002, less than sixty days after Ridley's sentencing.
Nonetheless, when the trial court erroneously concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the State's restitution petition, the State should have asked this court to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to review the trial court's jurisdictional ruling.See Ward v. State, 854 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Instead, the State filed an unauthorized motion for rehearing directed to the order denying the State's rule 3.800 motion. An unauthorized motion for rehearing does not have the effect of extending the trial court's jurisdiction. See King v. State, 754 So.2d 85, 85 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (recognizing that motions for rehearing are not authorized by Rule 3.800). As a result, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the restitution order eighty-two days following sentencing. Accordingly, the restitution order is reversed.
Had the court ordered restitution at sentencing or within sixty days thereafter, the court could have reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty-day period. See State v. Hiscox, 677 So.2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). However, that did not occur here.
REVERSED.
PETERSON and PALMER, JJ., concur.