Opinion
No. 25571-9-III.
August 23, 2007.
Nancy Mares owns a mobile home and rents her lot from Larry Ridge, doing business as Ridge Property Management (Mr. Ridge). Mr. Ridge sent Ms. Mares a notice that he was terminating the rental agreement effective December 31, 2005, based on his belief that either party could terminate the rental agreement with 30-days' notice. Mr. Ridge later filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. After a bench trial, the court concluded that the parties had a year-to-year rental agreement and that Mr. Ridge's efforts to terminate the tenancy had created a valid termination as of November 23, 2006. The court also entered an order restraining Ms. Mares's son, Nicholas Tannahill, from occupancy of the premises. Ms. Mares appeals, arguing that the court erred by terminating the rental agreement without cause and by entering the restraining order without first obtaining personal jurisdiction. Ms. Mares also contends that her procedural due process rights were violated when the court would not allow her to testify or call witnesses at trial. We reverse and grant attorney fees to Ms. Mares.
FACTS
Ms. Mares lives in a mobile home park owned by Larry Ridge, doing business as Ridge Property Management. Ms. Mares owns the mobile home and rents her lot from Mr. Ridge, pursuant to a rental agreement.
On November 22, 2005, Mr. Ridge sent Ms. Mares notice that he was terminating the rental agreement effective December 31, 2005. This notice was based on Mr. Ridge's belief that the rental agreement allowed either party to terminate the lease with 30-days' notice. In May 2006, Mr. Ridge filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Ms. Mares. Mr. Ridge alleged that the rental agreement provided for a 12-month term for the first year and then became a month-to-month lease at the end of the first year.
After a bench trial, the court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court concluded that the parties had a year-to-year rental agreement, not a month-to-month agreement. The court concluded that, while Mr. Ridge's attempts to terminate the tenancy had failed, his efforts had created a valid termination of the tenancy as of November 23, 2006. The court also entered an order restraining Ms. Mares's son from occupancy of the premises. Ms. Mares appeals.
ANALYSIS
Appealability
Mr. Ridge contends that the three assignments of error here were not raised at trial and cannot be heard on appeal pursuant to RAP 2.5(a). He maintains that these issues should have been handled by supplemental motions or a motion for a new trial/reconsideration. Mr. Ridge points out that Ms. Mares made no objection when the court terminated the rental agreement or when the court concluded that Mr. Ridge's attempts to terminate, based on a month-to-month lease, created a valid termination of the tenancy.
RAP 2.5(a) provides that an appellate court "may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court." One exception to this rule is that a party may raise a manifest constitutional error for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3). Here, Ms. Mares, who appeared pro se at trial, claims her procedural due process rights were violated when the court deprived her of the opportunity to testify or call witnesses.
Moreover, when the basic argument has been raised at the trial court level, a reviewing court may consider the issue even if the party did not cite to relevant statutes or case law. Wilson v. Horsley, 137 Wn.2d 500, 508-09, 974 P.2d 316 (1999); Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wn.2d 912, 918, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990). Here, the basic arguments on appeal were raised at trial even if Ms. Mares did not refer to the relevant case law or statutes. Finally, the application of RAP 2.5(a) is ultimately a matter of the reviewing court's discretion. Obert v. Envtl. Research § Dev. Corp., 112 Wn.2d 323, 333, 771 P.2d 340 (1989). This court will consider the issues raised on appeal.
Standard of Review
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The questions here are issues of law, which are reviewed de novo. Better Fin. Solutions, Inc. v. Caicos Corp., 117 Wn. App. 899, 908, 73 P.3d 424 (2003).
Termination of the Tenancy
The rental agreement at issue is governed by the manufactured/mobile home landlord-tenant act (MHLTA), chapter 59.20 RCW. The purpose of the MHLTA is to "regulate and determine legal rights, remedies, and obligations arising from any rental agreement between a landlord and a tenant regarding a mobile home lot." RCW 59.20.040.
The MHLTA provides that, unless otherwise agreed between the parties, rental agreements shall be for one-year terms. RCW 59.20.090(1). Moreover, "[a]ny rental agreement of whatever duration shall be automatically renewed for the term of the original rental agreement, unless a different specified term is agreed upon." RCW 59.20.090(1). This provision grants the tenant an unqualified right to a one-year term at the beginning of the tenancy, the right of an automatic renewal at the end of the one-year term, and the right to a one-year term at the end of every year term thereafter. Holiday Resort Cmty. Ass'n v. Echo Lake Assocs., 134 Wn. App. 210, 224, 135 P.3d 499 (2006).
More importantly, the MHLTA limits the landlord's ability to terminate or fail to renew a tenancy. Specifically, the MHLTA provides that the "landlord shall not terminate or fail to renew a tenancy of a tenant or the occupancy of an occupant, of whatever duration," except for one or more of the 13 reasons set forth in RCW 59.20.080(1)(a) through (m). RCW 59.20.080(1). These 13 reasons include: substantial violation of the rules, nonpayment of rent, conviction of specified crimes, failure to comply with local ordinances and state laws and regulations concerning mobile homes, change of the land use of the park, engaging in criminal activities as defined in the statute, making a material misstatement on the application to gain approval as a resident, engaging in disorderly or substantially annoying conduct, causing a nuisance, and any other substantial just cause materially affecting the health, safety, and welfare of other residents. RCW 59.20.080(1)(a)-(m).
The trial court concluded that the rental agreement was terminated on November 23, 2006. Mr. Ridge argues that there is enough evidence to justify the termination of the tenancy under RCW 59.20.080(a), (h), and (j). But the court's findings do not support Mr. Ridge's position. There are no findings showing that Ms. Mares committed a substantial violation of park rules, that she received three, 15-day notices to comply or vacate for failure to comply with the material terms of park rules, or that Ms. Mares engaged in disorderly, or substantially annoying conduct on park premises. Significantly, under RCW 59.20.080(1), a landlord may not terminate or fail to renew a tenancy without cause.
At the hearing, Mr. Ridge maintained that the 30-day termination provision in the rental agreement authorized either party to terminate the lease with 30-days' notice. This provision reads as follows:
"The term of this Agreement shall be for 12 months (one month or 12 months) staring on the 27th day of October, 2003. A one month rental agreement shall continue on a month to month basis until either party to this agreement provides thirty (30) days notice of cancellation to the other party. Notice is to be in writing and delivered in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. If Tenant selects a 12 month rental agreement and a new 12 month rental agreement is not executed at least thirty (30) days prior to the end of this 12 month agreement, this agreement shall continue on a month to month basis until either party to this agreement provides thirty days (30) notice of cancellation to the other party. Notice is to be in writing and delivered in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Tenant hereby waives the right to a one year rental agreement."
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 95. The rental agreement also provided in paragraph 6:
TERMINATION OF TENANCY SHALL BE BY WRITTEN NOTICE OF THIRTY (30) DAYS OR MORE PRECEDING THE END OF THE RENTAL AGREEMENT PERIOD GIVEN BY EITHER PARTY TO EACH OTHER.
CP at 7.
These provisions in the rental agreement violate RCW 59.20.090(1) which provides that a mobile home lease is automatically renewable, and RCW 59.20.080(1), which provides that a landlord may not terminate or fail to renew a mobile home tenancy without cause as set forth in this statute. Moreover, RCW 59.20.060(2)(d) does not allow a tenant to waive the rights granted under the MHLTA as part of a rental agreement. Holiday Resort, 134 Wn. App. at 223-24. And an agreement to a rental term, other than one year or any agreement to waive the right to renew, must be in writing separate from the rental agreement. Id. at 225.
Here the court held that the lease was terminated on November 23, 2006. But the court made no finding of fact to support a cause for termination under RCW 59.20.080(1). The court erred by terminating Ms. Mares's tenancy without cause.
Restraining Order
The court entered a restraining order against Nicholas Tannahill, who is not a party to this case. The court had no personal jurisdiction over Mr. Tannahill. When a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a party, any judgment obtained is void. Scott v. Goldman, 82 Wn. App. 1, 6, 917 P.2d 131 (1996). The restraining order against Mr. Tannahill is void.
Due Process
The essential elements of procedural due process are notice and opportunity to be heard. In re Hendrickson, 12 Wn.2d 600, 606, 123 P.2d 322 (1942). A litigant who is denied notice and opportunity to be heard is denied procedural due process of law in violation of article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution. Ware v. Phillips, 77 Wn.2d 879, 884, 468 P.2d 444 (1970) (quoting State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 36 Wn.2d 868, 872, 220 P.2d 1081 (1950)). Every litigant is entitled to be heard before his or her case is dismissed. Esmieu v. Schrag, 88 Wn.2d 490, 497, 563 P.2d 203 (1977). An application of this rule is that a plaintiff must be given the opportunity to present not just part, but all, of his or her evidence before the trial court rules on the sufficiency of the evidence. Smith v. Fourre, 71 Wn. App. 304, 307, 858 P.2d 276 (1993).
Mr. Ridge, the owner of the mobile home park, was the only witness who testified at the hearing. Then, Ms. Mares conducted her cross-examination. After about 10 minutes, the trial court told Ms. Mares that it was going to cut her off. When Ms. Mares asked why, the court replied, "[b]ecause you are winning." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 75. Before Ms. Mares was able to finish her cross-examination, call her witnesses, or testify herself, the trial court announced its ruling. Ms. Mares started to speak and the trial court interrupted, stating, "Now, you're winning. Why do you want to say anything else?" RP at 78.
By cutting short the trial before Ms. Mares had finished her cross-examination, called her witnesses, or testified herself, the trial court violated Ms. Mares's procedural due process rights.
Attorney Fees
Ms. Mares is entitled to an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party in an action under the MHLTA. RCW 59.20.110; RAP 18.1(a). Such fees are also available to the prevailing party on appeal. White River Estates v. Hiltbruner, 84 Wn. App. 352, 368, 928 P.2d 440 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 134 Wn.2d 761, 953 P.2d 796 (1998).
We reverse and award attorney fees to Ms. Mares. A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
BROWN, J., SWEENEY, C.J., concur.