Opinion
00 Civ. 1374 (SAS), 03 Civ. 8798 (SAS).
October 26, 2006
Beverly A. Riddle, New York, NY, Plaintiff Pro se.
Jed L. Marcus, Esq., Michael DiChiara, Esq., GROTTA, GLASSMAN HOFFMAN, P.C., Roseland, NJ, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Beverly A. Riddle, proceeding pro se, brings two separate actions against Liz Claiborne, Inc. ("LCI") and individual LCI employees, alleging violations of several federal statutes. In the first of these related cases ("2000 Case"), Riddle claims racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). In the second case ("2003 Case"), Riddle asserts that defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") by discriminating against her because of her disabilities (depression and allergies). Riddle, a former employee of LCI, claims that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, disparate treatment and wrongful termination. She further alleges retaliation for reporting this discrimination to LCI management and the City of New York Commission on Human Rights ("NYCHR"). Defendants now move for summary judgment as to all claims in both cases. Because the 2000 and 2003 actions are premised on the same facts, I address both motions in one opinion.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
See id. § 12102 et seq.
Plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants in the 2000 Case must be summarily dismissed because there is no individual liability under Title VII. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that individual defendants may not be held personally liable for alleged violations of the ADA. See Corr v. MTA Long Island Bus, 199 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, plaintiff's Title VII and ADA claims against the individual defendants are hereby dismissed.
II. BACKGROUND
Riddle, an African-American female, began working for LCI in January, 1998, as a Senior Administrative Assistant to Katherine Hudson, LCI's former Vice President of Sales for its Handbags and Small Leather Goods division. Riddle's duties included managing Hudson's executive appointment calendar, answering Hudson's telephone, coordinating projects with account executives and sales assistants, and filing and distributing reports. Hudson was Riddle's immediate supervisor; Hudson, in turn, reported to Kathy Robson, LCI's former Vice President and General Manager of the division.
See Defendants' Statement in Compliance with Rule 56.1 ("Def. 56.1") ¶¶ 2-3; Plaintiff's Statement in Compliance with Rule 56.1 ("Pl. 56.1") ¶¶ 2-3.
See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 4-6; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 4-6.
See id.
On June 12, 1998, Riddle sent a memo to Shelley O'Connell, LCI's Director of Human Resources, asserting that Robson was fostering a "hostile working environment" and describing several incidents to illustrate her point. Specifically, Riddle wrote:
6/12/98 Memo from Riddle to O'Connell ("6/12/98 Memo to O'Connell"), Ex. J of Certification of Mark A. Saloman, Esq., Counsel to Defendants ("Saloman Cert.").
I feel Kathy Robson is creating a hostile working environment.
The week of January 26, 1998
My 1st week in the department, I was reprimanded by my boss, Katherine Hudson because Kathy Robson made an issue of me to her about me not recognizing her voice on the telephone. It made me feel badly as if I had done something wrong, which I had not.
April 22, 1998
I was yelled at by Kathy Robson for not disturbing a meeting for a phone call, making me feel once again that I had done something wrong when I had not been informed to interrupt the meeting for any phone calls, so I took a message as usual.
April 22, 1998
Kathy Robson yelled to me to put a meeting on my boss' calendar and left without giving me an opportunity to see if it could be done; once again I was reprimanded by my boss because Kathy Robson made an issue about something that was clearly not my fault.
April 23, 1998
While working on an urgent report that was time sensitive I was reprimanded for not doing receptionist relief and I was not scheduled to do so. I did not have time to do the receptionist relief plus complete the report as well. I was made to feel badly again. I felt that this is a priority problem that I am being burden [sic] with and it is not my fault. It is creating a stressful work environment.
June 9, 1998
Kathy Robson yelled at me for saying "Good Morning" — This made me feel very frighten [sic] and on edge as I do not know what is expected of me. I have tried to resolve these issues which stems [sic] from Ms. Robson's action by talking with my boss, Katherine Hudson, but the situation remains the same which is very stressful for me.
Riddle characterizes this incident as "criticism for [her] speech." Pl. 56.1 ¶ 22.
6/12/98 Memo to O'Connell (bold in original).
On July 16, 1998, Riddle sent O'Connell an addendum:
Katherine Hudson threatened me, saying based on my complaint about Kathy Robson, that there will be repercussions for my actions. I asked her what she meant with regards to her statement, "that there will be repercussions for me" and again she made me feel that I should be silent and not have a voice in my mistreatment.
Id.
O'Connell states that after receiving these memos she immediately contacted Riddle saying that LCI did not tolerate retaliation and there would be no "repercussions" resulting from any complaint filed with Human Resources. According to O'Connell, throughout the summer of 1998, she had a series of discussions with Hudson and Robson about Riddle's allegations and that "[e]ach strenuously denied that they were hostile to Ms. Riddle and both confirmed that they merely coached Ms. Riddle to improve her job performance in the workplace."
Affidavit of Shelly O'Connell ("O'Connell Aff.") ¶ 5.
Def. 56.1 ¶ 30. Riddle contests that she received any "ongoing coaching," because she characterizes these statements as "retaliatory" criticism. Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 23, 25-28, 30.
Riddle sent another complaint to O'Connell on or about October 2, 1998, stating:
There are times when I have been late, as have many of the other employees of Liz Claiborne. And on these occasions, it has been, because I was not feeling well and even thought I might not make it to work at all. Admittedly, I could have phoned Katherine Hudson and let her know of the circumstance. However, I did not want my health to be an issue for discrimination. In the past, I have phoned, but not for every instance when I was not feeling well. Since the time of the lateness was only for 10 minutes or less [sic].
I don't believe there are any issues between Katherine Hudson and myself as my work for her and Liz Claiborne has been exemplary for the past year and four months (June 5, 1997 thru October 5, 1998) which is the reason I am now a permanent employee as I started working at Liz Claiborne as a temporary employee.
I do not understand why, but this seems no more than a witch hunt of Kathy Robson carry [sic] out by Katherine Hudson to make good on her promise to me on her 07/06/98, that since I had spoken with Shelley O'Connell on 06/12/98, in reference to Kathy Robson creating a hostile environment for me, there will be ramifications for me.
Since that statement and in Katherine Hudson's continued contact with Kelly Robson, she has made subtle moves to retaliate against me. Before I went on my 2 week vacation, Katherine Hudson warned me that Kathy Robson would be upset that she allowed me to take those 2 weeks off. Since my return from my vacation on 8/30, an effort has been made to create problems for me, where there are none.
The memo also describes several incidents occurring in September and October in which Riddle was allegedly reprimanded for being late to work, failing to promptly answer telephones and allowing Hudson's unchecked voicemails to accumulate. Nothing in the memo suggests that the reprimands had discriminatory undertones or stemmed from racial prejudice.
10/2/98 Memo from Riddle to O'Connell ("10/2/98 Memo to O'Connell"), Ex. L to Saloman Cert.
See id.; Def. 56.1 ¶ 33. In one memo, Riddle admits that she was late on numerous occasions because she did not feel well and that she chose not to notify her boss on these occasions because she presumed her health would become "an issue for discrimination." 10/2/98 Memo to O'Connell. However, in her moving papers, Riddle asserts there is "no evidence on record that would identify that, I admitted in writing that I was, in fact late to work [sic]. . . . I admitted in writing that Hudson considered me to be late." Pl. 56.1 ¶ 33 (bold in original).
On October 29, 1998, Riddle met with O'Connell and Hudson. They discussed Riddle's written complaints, and Riddle declared, in substance, that she felt she was receiving harsher reprimands than other employees and that she wanted fair treatment. Nothing Riddle said at the meeting indicated that she believed her treatment was the product of racial or disability discrimination.
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 37; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 37.
See O'Connell Aff. ¶ 37; Def. 56.1 ¶ 36; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 36.
The next day, Riddle sent an email to O'Connell, asserting that she was "disturbed" by the previous meeting and still felt that her supervisors were conducting "a continued and deliberate attempt at what must now be considered harassment." In response to this memo, O'Connell met with Riddle on October 30 and November 3, and on one of those days O'Connell suggested to Riddle that she "think about exiting" the company. O'Connell then referred the matter to Francine Hopkins, Director of LCI's Associate Relations Division, who opened a formal investigation into Riddle's complaints.
10/29/98 Email from Riddle to O'Connell ("10/29/98 Email to O'Connell"), Ex. M to Saloman Cert.
Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 42-44. Riddle asserts that the meeting had a much more wicked tone: "Shelley O'Connell wanted me to discuss what was in [previous complaints] and I told her at this point, any questions that she has, must be in writing and which would show good intentions [sic]. . . . [O'Connell] stated that it is not how they work [sic]; and that I should think about exiting; I felt threatened by this remark and appalled. She continued to badger me; saying this is not going to work and she can not put me into that assignment and that I should really think of a way to exit the company. . . . [she] became hostile and jumped up and verbally threw me out of the . . . office saying I better think about this over the week-end and she will call me on Monday; I was frightened as she was very angry I wasn't sure whether she was going to strike me. . . . I see this meeting was an attempt to further intimidate or silence me by threatening me with possible loss of my job." 10/30/98 Email from Riddle to O'Connell ("10/30/98 Email to O'Connell"), Ex. O to Salomon Cert.
See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 43-44; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 44-46.
Riddle's next step was to send a letter to Paul Charron, LCI's President and CEO. She informed him that she was being subjected to harassment, hostility and threats by company employees, and that she was "alarmed" that they would engage in such "blatant discrimination without considering the illegal implications." Charron re-directed the letter to Hopkins, who contacted Riddle by telephone and arranged a meeting.
See 11/4/98 Letter from Riddle to Charron ("11/4/98 Letter to Charron"), Ex. O to Salomon Cert.; Def. 56.1 ¶ 45; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 45.
Def. 56.1 ¶ 45; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 45.
On November 5, Riddle filed a complaint with the NYCHR. Although she had never alleged racial discrimination in her internal complaints, Riddle told the Commission that she had been subjected to "racially inflammatory rhetoric and epithets" since January 26, 1998.
11/20/98 Verified Complaint to the NYCHR ("Verified Compl.") ¶ 7, Ex. 4 to Plaintiff's Exhibits in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Exhibits").
Riddle and Hopkins met on November 19, 1998. It was an abrupt meeting; when Hopkins asked Riddle if she had anything to add to her complaints, Riddle declared that she had already submitted everything in writing and was not prepared to "give a deposition."
Def. 56.1 ¶ 48; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 48. Riddle contends, without any citation to the record, that "Hopkins [sic] investigation was retaliatory." Pl. 56.1 ¶ 48.
Hopkins concluded her investigation in late November with a written report finding Riddle's complaints "completely without merit," and noting that Riddle had "mis-characterized [her] supervisor's discipline," which in reality had simply been "steps . . . taken by management to correct legitimate performance issues." Riddle received a copy of Hopkins' report and responded by sending another letter to Charron. As in her previous complaints to LCI management, Riddle claimed her workplace was hostile and discriminatory but made no indication that she believed she was a target of disability or racial animus.
11/6/98 Memo from Hopkins to Riddle ("Hopkins Memo"), Ex. H to Certification of Michael DiChiara (Defendants' Counsel) in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("DiChiara Cert."); Def. 56.1 ¶ 50. While I appreciate that Riddle is appearing pro se, her rebuttal of Hopkins' report — along with most of her submissions — contains incomplete sentences and is difficult to understand. For example, she writes: "Francine Hopkins of Liz Claiborne Human Resources has identified that I was `disciplined' and the Plaintiff has identified that she received unwarranted disciplines that came after the Plaintiff' objection of the harassment that she received from the Defendants." [sic] (bold in original). Pl. 56.1 ¶ 50.
See 11/20/98 Letter from Riddle to Charron ("11/20/98 Letter to Charron"), annexed as an undesignated exhibit to the Amended Complaint.
See id.
In March 1999, Hudson resigned from LCI and Riddle was reassigned to assist Regional Sales Manager Jeanne Bradshaw; her job functions remained the same. A pattern of skirmishes developed between Riddle and Bradshaw, usually over Riddle's office attendance and work-product. LCI also alleges that by this time Riddle's behavior was "increasingly bizarre." On June 30, 1999, Riddle sent an email to Liz Claiborne's CEO, this time accusing Bradshaw of being hostile to her on the telephone. She emailed him again on August 18, claiming that she was being blamed for things out of her control. Riddle's next few weeks at work did not go smoothly. She allegedly suffered from depression accompanied by acute stress reaction. She left work on multiple occasions because of health problems and was reprimanded at least once for leaving without notifying her supervisor. She was also criticized for making errors at work and inaccurately following directions. Riddle was ultimately dismissed by LCI on September 10, 1999, allegedly based on her poor work performance.
See Def. 56.1 ¶ 72.
See Declaration of Zuzel Prieto, Director of Human Resources at LCI, in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Prieto Decl.") ¶¶ 9-13. 13.
Def. 56.1 ¶ 70; Prieto Decl. ¶ 9. Riddle disputes that her behavior was "bizarre," but concedes that she was being treated for depression at the time, which "many times" led to "bouts of crying." Pl. 56.1 ¶ 72.
See 6/20/99 Email from Riddle to Charron ("6/20/99 Email to Charron"), Ex. L to DiChiara Cert.; Def. 56.1 ¶ 73. Riddle justifies emailing Charron on the theory that Bradshaw's remark "you are just a typist," was an invective worthy of reporting to the highest level of LCI management. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 73.
See 8/18/99 Email from Riddle to Charron ("6/20/99 Email to Charron"), Ex. M to DiChiara Cert.
See Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 75, 80; see also Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Reply and Request for Clarification of the Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, Statement of Disputed Facts and Affidavit, in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Reply") at 7.
See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 75-78. Riddle's discussion of this issue is a string of unrelated, incomplete sentences, but she writes that she was "given a hard time about seeing her doctor." Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 75-78.
See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 75-78; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 75-78.
See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 70-81. LCI offers several reasons for Riddle's dismissal, including her failure to obey supervisors' instructions and her "established practice of accusing her supervisors of harassment when they simply were trying to communicate with her or requesting that she perform her job duties." Def. 56.1 ¶ 70; Prieto Decl. ¶ 7.
Soon after her dismissal, Riddle filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and was granted a Notice of Right to Sue. She filed her initial complaint in the instant case on February 23, 2000. On October 31, 2002, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims. On November 1, 2002, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On August 20, 2003, Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman issued a Report and Recommendation ("R R"), denying plaintiff's motion on the merits and denying defendants' motion, without prejudice to renewal, because of a procedural defect.
On November 6, 2003, Riddle filed a separate complaint — based on the same facts — alleging that she was discriminated against under the ADA and the FMLA. Defendants moved for summary judgment in both cases on November 28, 2005.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." An issue of fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." A fact is material when it "`might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" The movant has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accord Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006).
Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
See Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).
In turn, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must raise a genuine issue of material fact that does "`not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.'" To do so, it must do more than show that there is "`metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in that party's favor.
Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 554 (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir. 2002)).
Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
See Golden Pac. Bancorp v. FDIC, 375 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2004).
B. Title VII Wrongful Termination
Under Title VII, it is "unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ."
"To withstand a motion for summary judgment, a discrimination plaintiff must withstand the three-part burden-shifting laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green." "[T]he initial burden rests with the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination." A plaintiff meets this burden by showing that "(1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [she] is competent to perform the job or is performing [her] duties satisfactorily; (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment decision or action; and (4) the decision or action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination based on [her] membership in the protected class." The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed that the evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case is "`minimal,'" noting that "`it requires no evidence of discrimination.'"
McPherson v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Accord Joseph v. Leavitt, No. 05 Civ. 3348, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2615313, at *2-3 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 2006) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to race discrimination claim).
Cross v. New York City Transit Auth., 417 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2005).
Dawson v. Bumble Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 216-17 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Mario v. P C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 767 (2d Cir. 2002)).
Joseph, 2006 WL 2615313, at *2 (quoting James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiff's prima facie case "gives rise to a presumption of unlawful discrimination that shifts the burden of production to the defendant, who must proffer a `legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for the challenged employment action." "If the defendant articulates such a reason, `the presumption of discrimination drops out,' and the plaintiff must `prove that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.'" At this final stage of analysis, courts must "examin[e] the entire record to determine whether the plaintiff could satisfy [her] `ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.'" In other words, plaintiff has the burden of proving that race was the actual reason for any adverse employment actions.
Woodman, 411 F.3d at 76 (quoting Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2001)) (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)).
See Joseph, 2006 WL 2615313, at *2 (citing James, 233 F.3d at 153-54).
C. ADA Disability Claims
1. Discrimination
The ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating:
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
Under the ADA, a plaintiff raising an employment discrimination claim bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case and must show:
(1) her employer is subject to the ADA; (2) she suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (3) she could perform the essential functions of her job with or without a reasonable accommodation; and (4) she was [discriminated against] because of her disability.
Ryan v. Grae Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 869-70 (2d Cir. 1998). Accord Usala v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 141 F. Supp. 2d 373, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
The ADA describes an individual as suffering from a "disability" if she makes a showing of any one of the following: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." Riddle does not allege, nor can it be inferred from the pleadings, that she has a record of disability or that she was regarded as disabled by defendants. Accordingly, under the statute, Riddle must plead that she has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."
Id. § 12102(2)(A).
In evaluating whether an individual qualifies as disabled under the ADA, the Second Circuit uses the three-step approach taken by the Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott. First, plaintiff must show that she suffers from a physical or mental impairment. Second, plaintiff must identify the activity claimed to be impaired and establish that it constitutes a "major life activity." Third, the plaintiff must show that her impairment "substantially limits" the major life activity previously identified. If a plaintiff fails to satisfy any of these three prongs, her discrimination claim must be dismissed.
524 U.S. 624 (1998). Accord Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 1998).
See Colwell, 158 F.3d at 641 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631).
Id.
Id.
See Felix v. New York City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Because LCI does not dispute that Riddle has an impairment under the ADA, the inquiry is whether her impairments substantially limit a major life activity. The ADA does not define "substantially limits" or "major life activities," but the EEOC regulations provide significant guidance. In general, "major life activities" include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."
See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgment ("Def.Mem.") at 6 (recognizing that depression is an ADA-qualifying impairment).
See Ryan, 135 F.3d at 870.
Whether a plaintiff's impairment substantially limits a major life activity is a "fact-specific" inquiry. To prove that an impairment substantially limits the major life activity of working, a plaintiff must show that she is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." "The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." When determining whether an individual is disabled under the ADA, the court must consider her condition as she functions with the use of corrective and mitigating measures, including prescribed medications. 2. Failure to Accommodate
Godfrey v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 02 Civ. 2101, 2006 WL 2505223, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2006) (citing Colwell, 158 F.3d at 643).
Id. Accord Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
See Godfrey, 2006 WL 2505223, at *4 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475 (holding that the court must consider plaintiff's condition in reference to eyeglasses and contact lenses)).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Riddle also brings claims under the ADA based upon defendants' denial of equal terms, conditions, and privileges of employment — in particular, that defendants deliberately made it difficult for her to leave work for doctors' appointments. Although couched in different language, these allegations constitute part of Riddle's failure to accommodate claim because both claims ultimately turn on Riddle's requests to leave work. Therefore, only the failure to accommodate claim need be addressed.
A failure to accommodate claim requires plaintiff to allege facts showing: (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) that an employer covered by the ADA had notice of her disability; (3) that, with reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of the position; and that (4) that the employer refused to make such accommodations.
See Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1515 (2d Cir. 1995).
3. Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA a plaintiff must show: "(1) she was engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Failure to satisfy any of these prongs is fatal to a retaliation claim.
Lovejoy-Wilson v. Noco Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 2001).
D. FMLA Claims
Generally, there is a two-year statute of limitations for alleging a violation of the FMLA. Where the conduct underlying the FMLA claim is "willful," the time period is extended to three years. In both instances, the limitations period begins after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation.
Id. § 2617(c)(2).
See id. § 2617(c)(1)-(2).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Title VII
1. Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation
Because Riddle's opposition to LCI's motion for summary judgement offers no new facts or arguments, and because I have reviewed Judge Pitman's thorough and thoughtful report, it is hereby adopted in full on both her hostile work environment and retaliation claims. As Judge Pitman found no evidence in the record to support these claims, they are hereby dismissed. The only Title VII claim that Judge Pitman never considered on its merits concerns Riddle's wrongful termination, addressed below.
2. Wrongful Termination
See R R at 14-16 (denying defendants' motion for summary judgement on the 2000 Case because it did not include proper notice to pro se litigant, as required by Local Civil Rule 56.2 and Vital v. Interfaith Medical Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1999)).
See id. at 15 (finding that "[s]ince the Amended Complaint expressly alleges wrongful termination at page 3, defendants' current motion, even if granted, would not dispose of all claims in the case.")
Defendants argue that since they have cured the procedural defect of their previous motion for summary judgment in the 2000 Case, law of the case "mandates" that I dismiss all of Riddle's Title VII claims. See Def. Mem. at 5. This argument overlooks the purpose of pro se summary judgment notice. Judge Pitman observed that Riddle's reply papers "failed to address many of defendants' arguments," relied on parts of the record that had no relevance, and presented facts in a manner "so muddled" it could not "support an inference that plaintiff understands the nature of a summary judgement motion." R R at 14-15. Judge Pitman gave Riddle a second chance to oppose summary judgment, perhaps with greater awareness of its nature and consequence. Therefore, this opinion fully considers Riddle's opposition.
The record demonstrates that Riddle has failed to establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination due to race-based animus because she has not provided the "de minimis" evidence needed to establish the second and fourth elements of a prima facie case. As an African-American whose employment was terminated, Riddle satisfies the first and third elements of a prima facie case. However, the record also clearly demonstrates that Riddle was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance and behavioral issues — not because of racial discrimination.
See Joseph, 2006 WL 2615313, at *3 (listing termination of employment as an example of an `adverse employment action') (citing Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003)).
From the start of her employment at LCI, Riddle had difficulty communicating with her co-workers, particularly her supervisors. The reports of her supervisors are particularly relevant here, because "in determining whether an employee's job performance is satisfactory, courts may — as they often must — rely on [supervisors] evaluations." A pattern emerged whereby after Riddle received constructive criticism or direction, she would lodge an accusation of harassment. Despite repeated attempts by Human Resources to clear up misunderstandings between parties, Riddle continued to misconstrue comments by her supervisors as harassment.
See 06/12/99 Memo to O'Connell.
Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1985).
See Prieto Decl. ¶ 7; see also 06/12/99 Memo to O'Connell; 10/2/98 Memo to O'Connell; 10/29/98 Email; 11/4/98 Letter to Charron; 6/20/99 Email to Charron.
In early 1999, Riddle was satisfactorially performing her duties as an administrative assistant, but her behavior remained unprofessional and taxing on co-workers. This is reflected in Riddle's annual performance review dated March 23, 1999, in which Hudson describes Riddle as "accurate" and "extremely organized," but goes on at length about Riddle's need to curb her aggressiveness and hostility, cultivate better working relationships and be respectful of others' opinions.
1998 Performance Review of Beverly Riddle ("Performance Review"), Ex. G to DiChiara Cert.
The record demonstrates Riddle's declining job performance throughout 1999 and her increasingly volatile behavior. O'Connell, Hudson, and Bradshaw cite numerous instances of Riddle failing to perform tasks correctly, overreacting to criticism and complaining to the company CEO. These problems came to a head in September 1999, when Riddle, an "at-will" employee, was dismissed. In light of these events and the absence of any countervailing evidence refuting the supervisors' testimony, Riddle fails to establish the second element of a prima facie case, that her job performance had been satisfactory when she was terminated.
See id; see also Prieto Decl. ¶¶ 9-16; 10/2/98 Memo to O'Connell; 10/29/98 Email to O'Connell; 11/4/98 Letter to Charron.
See 11/4/98 Letter to Charron; 11/6/98 Letter to Charron; 6/30/99 Email to Charron; 8/18/99 Email to Charron.
See LCI Associate Handbook ("Handbook"), Ex. E to Saloman Decl. at i. (defining associate employement as "`at-will,' which means that it is for no definite period, and can be terminated at any time by either you or the Company, for any or no reason, with or without cause or notice.").
Riddle also fails to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case because — even construing the facts in a light most favorable to her — she was not terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Every example of alleged discrimination she cites is an ambiguous, isolated incident that offers no basis for inferring discrimination. For example, Riddle contends that she suffered discrimination upon overhearing a female account executive comment that "Blacks, Jews and Gays, they have it all bad." Riddle finds this offensive because she is African-American, her last name is Jewish and she has gay friends. Another example is Riddle's statement that she witnessed LCI employees mocking and criticizing African-American celebrities, including Stevie Wonder and Whoopi Goldberg. As Judge Pitman observed, "even if the conduct alleged did occur," it is "not derogatory on its face and is susceptible to [racially neutral] interpretation." The same holds true for all the job-related directives that Riddle contends were race-based, such as Hudson's comments about phone etiquette that Riddle took as criticisms of her "African American dialect." The record is simply devoid of evidence that would suggest anything other than termination due to unsatisfactory job performance and volatile temperament.
Pl. 56.1 ¶ 53.
See id.
See id. at ¶¶ 52-58.
R R at 26.
Pl. 56.1 ¶ 53.
Riddle has failed to raise any triable issue of fact that would preclude summary judgment. LCI supported its motion for summary judgment with depositions and affidavits setting forth numerous examples of substandard job performance and disruptive, contentious behavior exhibited by Riddle throughout her employment. The lack of countervailing evidence on these points renders Riddle's wrongful termination claim a "mere incantation of intent or state of mind," which cannot "defeat an otherwise valid motion." After construing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Riddle and drawing all justifiable inferences in her favor, I find that she has failed to establish a prima facie case necessary to survive summary judgment. Riddle's Title VII claims must be dismissed as a matter of law.
Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998 (citations omitted).
B. ADA Disability Claims
1. Discrimination
Riddle satisfies the first and third elements of a prima facie case of disability discrimination. LCI does not dispute that it is subject to the ADA, nor that Riddle was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of her job.
See Def. Mem. at 6,10 (only discussing the second and fourth elements of the prima facie case).
See id. at 7.
The second element of a prima facie case requires that plaintiff have an ADA-qualifying disability. In order for Riddle's impairments to qualify, they must substantially limit a major life activity. Although Riddle does not expressly articulate which major life activities are affected by her disorders she alleges that as a result of her depression, acute stress and allergies she was forced to miss work on several occasions and suffered "sleepless nights" that affected her job performance. Even granting that Riddle has pled a limitation on her ability to work, however, her claim suffers from a more fatal defect.
See Colwell, 158 F.3d at 641.
See id. LCI stipulates that depression can constitute an "impairment" under the ADA. See Horwitz v. L J.G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350, 354 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
See 2003 Complaint ("2003 Compl.") ¶¶ 79, 89.
In Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491-93 (1999), the Supreme Court expressed some concern over whether "working" should be considered a "major life activity" under the ADA and noted that limitations on working should only be considered if a plaintiff is limited in no other "major life activities."
While the nature of Riddle's impairment is not insignificant, given the record in the present case, no reasonable jury could conclude that its effect on her ability to work was substantial. Aside from isolated incidents of crying and difficulty sleeping, there is no medical documentation or other evidence substantiating a degree of impairment that would interfere with her ability to work. She also testified that medication and therapy helped her keep her depression under control. Uncontroverted evidence in the record reveals that Riddle was perfectly capable of working in a wide range of jobs in various fields despite her disability. By her own admission, her annual performance review attests that she met expectations and that "there was no problem where [she] was unable to do the work." Even in the weeks leading up to her termination, she fully participated in projects and completed numerous administrative tasks. There is simply no basis for concluding that Riddle's impairments substantially limited the major life activity of working.
See 2003 Compl. ¶¶ 79, 84, 86-89.
See Deposition of Beverly A. Riddle ("Riddle Dep."), Ex. F to DiChiara Cert. at 76-77.
Id. at 91.
See Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 73, 75-78.
As I noted earlier in conjunction with plaintiff's Title VII wrongful termination claim, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that race or disability played any role in LCI's decision to terminate Riddle. The record clearly demonstrates that she was dismissed for poor work performance and behavioral issues.
2. Failure to Accommodate
Riddle does not make out a prima facie case for failure to accommodate because there is no indication that LCI employees had any notice of her alleged disability. As the Second Circuit recently held, a plaintiff must provide some evidence that her employer knew of her alleged disability to satisfy a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA. Riddle only proffers a few isolated incidents where she complained of not feeling well and had difficulty getting last-minute permission to go to the doctor. Accordingly, her failure to accommodate claim is dismissed.
See Woodman, 411 F.3d at 81-82 (citations omitted).
See Riddle Dep. at 318, 321, 324; 2003 Compl. ¶¶ 15-17; 19.
3. Retaliation
Riddle's purported protected activity was filing a complaint with the NYCHR on November 5, 1998. She alleges that in retaliation for filing this complaint she was subjected to hostility from her supervisors, unequal treatment and ultimately terminated from her job. Yet as I discussed at length above, and as Judge Pitman concluded in his Report and Recommendation, the record is devoid of any examples of disparate or hostile treatment. Moreover, plaintiff's termination in September 1999 is too far removed from her protected activity to suggest the requisite causal connection. Her retaliation claim is dismissed.
See R R at 22.
See Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (noting that where mere temporal proximity establishes the causal connection the temporal proximity must be "very close," and finding that a time period of twenty months suggested, "by itself, no causality at all") (citations omitted)).
C. FMLA Claim
Riddle's FMLA claim is time-barred because it was not filed until November 6, 2003, more than four years after LCI terminated her employment.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1)-(2).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, LCI's motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion [No. 169 on the Docket Sheet]. The Clerk is also directed to close the 2000 Case and all of its pending motions [Nos. 154, 161, 166, 167, and 180 on the Docket Sheet], as well as the 2003 Case and all of its pending motions [Nos. 27 and 31 on the Docket Sheet].
SO ORDERED: