Opinion
22A-PC-742
10-31-2022
Ronnie Ricketts, Jr., Appellant-Petitioner, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT John Andrew Goodridge Evansville, Indiana. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General Jodi Kathryn Stein Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 82D03-1901-PC-37
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT John Andrew Goodridge Evansville, Indiana.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General Jodi Kathryn Stein Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Ronnie Ricketts, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). He argues that the trial court's finding that he was not competent to proceed pro se at trial renders his trial counsel's failure to attempt to suppress his post-Miranda custodial confession ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree and affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] The underlying facts as recited by this Court on direct appeal are as follows:
On March 2, 2017, Maurice Huffman, Huffman's mother, James Smith, and [Sarah] Metcalf were eating dinner together in the dining hall at the Evansville Rescue Mission. There were "a lot" of children volunteering in the Rescue Mission that day. Metcalf had had sexual intercourse with Smith on a single occasion, and Ricketts, the father of Metcalf's infant daughter and with whom she had been romantically involved for approximately four years, had previously told Metcalf not to associate with Smith anymore. As the quartet was eating, Ricketts came into the hall, called Metcalf a "lying whore[,]" and told Huffman and Smith that if they did not leave her alone "[they] would be dead." According to Smith, Ricketts entered the hall; said "this is how it's f-ing going to be" to Metcalf; and told Smith and Huffman, "you are both going to die now[.]"
Metcalf followed Ricketts outside as he retrieved two handguns from his vehicle. Despite Metcalf begging him to stop, Ricketts tried to reenter the Rescue Mission, and, when he discovered that he could not reenter through the door, shot out a window and stepped through. Smith ran to the kitchen and Hoffman ran out the back door and hid behind a dumpster. Ricketts searched for Smith and Hoffman without success, returned to his vehicle, and
drove off. After a vehicular pursuit, police apprehended Ricketts in front of his home.
Ricketts told police after his arrest that he and Metcalf had been together for four years and that he had gone to the mission to see if she was lying to him. Ricketts told an interviewer that
[t]he first time when I went in, and I seen her with 'em, and I got pissed. I went back out to the truck got [the handguns]. They shut me out with the door-the wooden doors, so I shot the window out. I didn't shoot at nobody. I didn't hurt nobody. I shot the window out. Kick- pushed it through, and went through it and went after 'em.
The interviewing detective asked Ricketts if he told both Smith and Huffman that he was going to kill them, to which Ricketts responded, "You're damn right I did." When the detective asked, "if you would have found them would you have shot them?", Ricketts replied, "Oh, yeah." The detective then asked or stated, "You-you wanted to kill them[,]" to which Ricketts replied, "Yeah." On March 6, 2017, the State charged Ricketts with Level 2 felony burglary.
At a hearing on November 28, 2017, Ricketts told the trial court that he wished to proceed pro se because trial counsel had agreed to delays in the case and had been unsuccessful in having his bail reduced. The trial court denied Ricketts's request to proceed pro se. At a hearing on December 4, 2017, Ricketts again indicated that he wanted to proceed pro se. Ricketts's trial counsel indicated that Ricketts wanted to be added to the trial court's calendar because he wanted "to make a record that he wishes to proceed pro-se[,]" the hearing the previous week had been before a substitute judge, and "there's a stronger record that needs to be laid." The following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Okay you do not want [trial counsel] to represent you?
[Ricketts]: No, sir.
THE COURT: Okay do you want to tell me why?
[Ricketts]: Not really a reason. [J]ust that she hasn't been doing nothing. I've been in here for nine months. I've had [a] heart attack, and my health issues are pretty bad, and my other stuff's going on and-
THE COURT: Okay.
[Ricketts]: I don't think she's been doing what she should do to try and get me out.
THE COURT: Well it's not up to her whether you get out. That's up to the court. Uh, have you ever represented yourself before?
[Ricketts]: No, sir. This is the first time I've ever been in jail.
THE COURT: Okay. Well the-do you have any familiarity with the rules of evidence or the trial procedures, court procedures anything like that?
[Ricketts]: Not really. We got the law books in here though.
THE COURT: Do you understand that it's almost always unwise to represent yourself?
[Ricketts]: Yes, like I said, it's my first time, sir. I'm not-.
THE COURT: Okay. That throughout the trial the State of Indiana will be represented by an experienced legal counsel. I'm not sure in your case who that is, but someone who has legal training, and that they will, um, be they are representative. And that will be held-uh, I-the Court will be required, as a matter of law, to hold you to the same standards. I can't let you violate the rules of evidence, or trial procedure, or anything in that way- nature. You're going to have to present your case according to the law. You understand that?
[Ricketts]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Um, that I can't give you any other special indulgence. I can't give you-change your sentence because you represented yourself. You can't get a more serious sentence, but you also can't get a lesser sentence. Do you understand that?
[Ricketts]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Lawyers can-have been trained on how to question witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, gather evidence, objective [sic] evidence, identify evidence that might be harmful, or illegally obtained by the government, and move[ ] to suppress or exclude that evidence in ways that I'm pretty confident you're not capable of right now. Do you understand that?
[Ricketts]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Um, have you ever-have you ever been found mentally incompetent for any reason?
[Ricketts]: I got out of the military on mental health issues.
THE COURT: Okay what-what generally speaking what were they?
[Ricketts]: Uh, depression, personality disorder, and PTSD.
THE COURT: Do you currently take medication for that?
[Ricketts]: Yes, sir. I've been seeing a therapist-a psychiatrist for-well off and on for twenty years. But I've also been seeing them at the VA for the last six years.
THE COURT: Okay. [Ricketts]: On a regular basis.
THE COURT: All right. Does any of that medication interfere with your thinking?
[Ricketts]: It don't-it hasn't been helping, the stuff I've been taking. I told my therapist before this happened that my medicine wasn't working and I was needing to get something stronger, and then this happened.
THE COURT: Okay.
[Ricketts]: Also on pain medication and about six other different medications. Anxiety medication, and stuff like that too.
THE COURT: Is that going to interfere with your ability to, uh, represent yourself? Concentrate on the case? Do the research that's necessary? Look up, you know, the relevant law and facts, and-?
[Ricketts]: It could sir. I'm not for sure. Like, I said I've never had to do anything like this before.
THE COURT: Well if there's a possibility that that's going to interfere, how are you going to do that if you're representing yourself?
[Ricketts]: I have no idea sir.
THE COURT: Okay.
[Ricketts]: I will just have to do the best I can.
THE COURT: What makes you think you-um, how far did you go in school?
[Ricketts]: I graduate[d] high school and took a couple years of automotive school at Ivy Tech College.
THE COURT: Okay can you-okay. And how long were you in the arm-were you in the army?
[Ricketts]: Yes sir. I was Army Military Police for three years before I got out on the medical, and then I got back
and went into the Indiana National Guard for six years and got out in 2004.
THE COURT: Okay. Have you ever seen a final argument or an opening statement given in a criminal case?
[Ricketts]: We did it in high school once, sir.
THE COURT: All right. Have you-
[Ricketts]: It's been a while back.
THE COURT: Have you ever been in a courtroom for any reason?
[Ricketts]: No sir.
THE COURT: All right I'm going to deny your request Mr. Ricketts. I'm not confident you can represent yourself adequately. You're entitled to a fair trial, uh, it's been my experience that most people who represent themselves just screw up their case big time. That generally speaking, would not be enough. If that was all there was to it I'd probably let you go ahead and represent yourself, but the mental problems, the emotional issues, those kind of things will intensify the pressure as a trial gets closer. Um, trials are [an] immensely [ ] nerve-racking experience for everyone involved, and that will not help whatever mental condition or emotional problems that you are suffering from. I'm afraid that you would-might for lack of a better term, come un-come undone during the trial and then end up either saying or doing something that would devastate your case.Ricketts v. State, 108 N.E.3d 416, 418-20 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018) (citations omitted), trans. denied.
[¶3] The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Ricketts guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced him to a seventeen-and-one-half-year executed term. Ricketts directly appealed his conviction and sentence alleging that the trial court erred in denying his request to proceed pro se at trial and further that his sentence was inappropriate. Another panel of this Court affirmed his conviction and sentence by published opinion. Id. Ricketts filed a PCR petition in January 2019 and amended petitions in August and September 2019, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court held a hearing on July 30, 2021. On March 4, 2022, the post-conviction court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law denying relief. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶4] "Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a defendant may present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence." Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019) (citing Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b)), cert. denied (2020). "The scope of potential relief is limited to issues unknown at trial or unavailable on direct appeal." Id. A defendant who files a petition for post-conviction relief "bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5); Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 681 (Ind. 2017). Because the defendant is appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, he is appealing from a negative judgment:
Thus, the defendant must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision. In other words, the defendant must convince this Court that there is no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did. We review the post-conviction court's factual findings for clear error, but do not defer to its conclusions of law.Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses and will consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences flowing therefrom that support the post-conviction court's decision. Hinesley v. State, 999 N.E.2d 975, 981 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied (2014).
[¶5] Ricketts maintains that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was denied the right to effective assistance of trial counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("[T]he right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.") (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must satisfy the two-part test articulated in Strickland. Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 682. "To satisfy the first prong, 'the defendant must show deficient performance: representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.'" Id. (quoting McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002)). When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we strongly presume "that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Hinesley, 999 N.E.2d at 982 (citation omitted). We presume that counsel performed effectively, and a defendant must offer strong and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption. Id. Isolated poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics does not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance. Id.
[¶6] To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must show prejudice. Humphrey, 73 N.E.3d at 682. To demonstrate prejudice from counsel's deficient performance, a petitioner need only show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Middleton v. State, 72 N.E.3d 891, 891 (Ind. 2017) (emphasis and citation omitted). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 891-92. "Although the performance prong and the prejudice prong are separate inquiries, failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail." Baer v. State, 942 N.E.2d 80, 91 (Ind. 2011).
[¶7] Ricketts contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress his custodial confession. Specifically, he contends that because the trial court determined that his mental health impeded his ability to proceed pro se at trial, his mental health also would have made any waiver of his Miranda rights and following confession involuntary, and trial counsel should have moved to suppress it on that basis. The decision of whether to file a particular motion is generally a matter of trial strategy, and, absent an express showing to the contrary, the failure to file a motion does not indicate ineffective assistance of counsel. Glotzbach v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). Moreover, to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object or failure to file a motion, a petitioner must prove that an objection would have been sustained or the motion would have been granted if made, and that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to make an objection. Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138, 1150 (Ind. 2010); Talley v. State, 51 N.E.3d 300, 303 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), trans. denied.
Ricketts concedes that he was advised of his Miranda rights prior to his custodial confession and that he waived them.
[¶8] Ricketts' trial counsel testified that she did not observe a meritorious suppression issue regarding his custodial confession because she did not believe that his mental health, specifically his history of depression and anxiety, impeded him at the time he made the confession. Trial counsel also stated that, because Ricketts had made several additional confessions that the State elected not to introduce, and there was "so much" evidence caught on video of what had occurred, the only "creditable" trial strategy was to argue that the State had not proven Ricketts's intent to commit a felony when he reentered the mission. Tr. Vol. 1 at 17. We agree with the post-conviction court that this was not an unreasonable trial strategy.
[¶9] More significantly, Ricketts has not demonstrated that a motion to suppress his custodial confession would have been successful. Indeed, Ricketts does not cite a single case or any portion of the record to support his assertion that his confession was involuntarily given. Accordingly, he has waived our review of this issue. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (appellant's brief "must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning ... [and] citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on"); Daniels v. State, 515 N.E.2d 530, 530 (Ind. 1987) ("Failure to present cogent argument operates as a waiver ... on appeal").
[¶10] Waiver notwithstanding, while it is true that Ricketts suffers from some form of mental illness, that is only one of the numerous factors to be considered by a trial court in determining voluntariness of a confession. See State v. Banks, 2 N.E.3d 71, 81 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (noting that mental illness is only a factor to be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether a statement was voluntary). Ricketts makes no other claims regarding the circumstances surrounding his custodial confession and, without more, we agree with the post-conviction court that "there is simply no basis" to conclude that Ricketts' custodial confession was involuntary. Appealed Order at 8.
We note that Ricketts's entire argument on appeal involves him conflating the mental competence necessary to understand one's right to an attorney and to voluntarily waive that right in a custodial setting, with the mental where-with-all necessary to represent oneself at trial. However, we agree with the postconviction court that understanding "your right to an attorney before questioning is not the same as representing yourself in a jury trial and being held to the same standard as an experienced attorney." Appealed Order at 7.
[¶11] In sum, because Ricketts has not shown that a motion to suppress his confession would have been granted if made, he has not demonstrated that his trial counsel performed deficiently for failing to file the motion nor can he show that he was prejudiced by such failure. Therefore, Ricketts has not established that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel and we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for relief.
[¶12] Affirmed.
May, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.