Opinion
06-20-00002-CV
07-30-2020
CARL FREDERICK RICKERT, III, Appellant v. KAYLA S. MEADE AND CITY OF BONHAM, Appellees
On Appeal from the 336th District Court Fannin County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV-17-43432 Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Carl Frederick Rickert, III, appeals the trial court's award of $5,000.00 in attorney fees to defendant the City of Bonham (the City) in this Section 1983 lawsuit. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's attorney fee award to the prevailing defendant, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Events Leading to the Lawsuit
Rickert was employed as a firefighter and paramedic by the Bonham Fire Department (BFD). While in the course and scope of his employment, Rickert met Meade, an emergency room clerical employee with the Texhoma Medical Center Bonham Hospital (TMC), and began a texting relationship with her. The nature of the texting relationship became sexual, and Meade and Rickert both sent nude photographs to each other. A few months later, Meade requested that Rickert delete her messages and spoke with Scott Ridling, the then-current chief of the BFD, and Brad Nichols, the former chief, about filing a sexual harassment complaint. As a result of the complaint, Rickert's employment was terminated by Ridling on behalf of BFD and the City on November 20, 2016, and his appeal of the termination was unsuccessful.
In his petition against Meade and the City, Rickert alleged that Meade requested that he delete all her text messages so that she could file a false and defamatory complaint of sexual harassment with the BFD. The petition quoted an April 14, 2017, finding by the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) determining that Rickert did not engage in harassment or work-related misconduct. The TWC found that Rickert "provided credible documentary evidence and persuasive, first-hand testimony indicating that he engaged in a consensual relationship with a female, hospital employee . . . [who] welcomed the claimant's sexual innuendos, and . . . voluntarily responded with the same kind of inappropriate and sexually-suggestive language and pictures." The City did not appeal the TWC's finding.
B. Rickert's Section 1983 Claim
"Section 1983 provides a civil remedy in federal court for violations, under color of state law, of a person's constitutionally recognized rights, privileges, or immunities." Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake, Miss., 449 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Findeisen v. North East Indep. Sch. Dist., 749 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1984)). "If the government discharges an employee amidst allegations of misconduct, the employee may have a procedural due process right to notice and an opportunity to clear his name." Id. (citing Hughes v. City of Garland, 204 F.3d 223, 225-26 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition of a procedural due process right to notice and an opportunity to clear one's name when the government discharges an employee in a manner that puts the employee's "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity . . . at stake") (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972))). "[T]he process due such an individual is merely a hearing providing a public forum or opportunity to clear one's name, not actual review of the decision to discharge the employee." Caleb v. Grier, 598 F. App'x 227, 238 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Hughes, 204 F.3d at 226). "A name-clearing hearing with no public component would not address [the] harm because . . . members of the public who had seen only the stories accusing [the employee] would not know that th[e] stigma was undeserved." Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 470 (6th Cir. 2009).
"Neither damage to reputation alone nor the stigma resulting from the discharge itself trigger the protections of due process." Bledsoe, 449 F.3d at 653 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); Wells v. Hico Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 243, 256 (5th Cir. 1984)). "Rather, a liberty interest is infringed, and the right to notice and an opportunity to clear one's name arises, only when the employee is 'discharged in a manner that creates a false and defamatory impression about him and thus stigmatizes him and forecloses him from other employment opportunities.'" Id. (quoting White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 684 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Courts employ a "seven-element 'stigma-plus-infringement' test to determine whether § 1983 affords a government employee a remedy for deprivation of liberty without notice or an opportunity to clear his name." Id. (quoting Hughes, 204 F.3d at 226). Under that test,
[t]he plaintiff must show: (1) he was discharged; (2) stigmatizing charges were made against him in connection with the discharge; (3) the charges were false; (4) he was not provided notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to the discharge; (5) the charges were made public; (6) he requested a hearing to clear his name; and (7) the employer denied the request.Id. (quoting Hughes, 204 F.3d at 226).
Rickert's claim against the City alleged that the City violated Section 1983 and his due process rights by terminating him "without a name clearing hearing, thus stigmatizing [his] reputation in the community of fire department and emergency response professionals." The petition further alleged that the City refused pre-termination and post-terminations requests for a name-clearing hearing, published the false and stigmatizing allegations to the Sherman Police Department and the TWC, and disparaged his reputation in the community.
C. The Trial Court Granted the City's No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment
The City filed a motion for no-evidence and traditional summary judgment and argued (1) that Rickert had notice and an opportunity to be heard at a disciplinary hearing held on November 20, 2016, (2) the charges were never made public, (3) Rickert did not request a name-clearing hearing, and (4) the City never denied a request for a name-clearing hearing. In support of the first ground in its motion, the City attached evidence showing that Rickert had notice of the allegations before the termination, knew that the November 20 meeting could result in his termination, and presented a written letter and a doctor's note indicating that he was having psychological issues at the November 20 meeting. In his response to interrogatories, Rickert admitted that, at the November 20 meeting, he confirmed that he communicated with Meade, but denied any wrongdoing. In support of the third and fourth grounds, the City introduced deposition testimony from Nichols that showed that he was never asked to provide a public name-clearing hearing.
Rickert introduced evidence that the allegations had been communicated to members of the Sherman Police Department.
Rickert's summary judgment response was supported, in part, by his affidavit and the affidavit of an expert witness. The trial court struck these exhibits because they were defective, a finding that Rickert does not dispute. Even so, Rickert's summary judgment evidence, including the struck affidavits, did not provide any evidence showing that he had requested a public name-clearing hearing or that the City refused his request. In fact, Rickert's excerpts from Nichols's deposition and the deposition of Sean C. Pate, the City's representative, demonstrated that they were never asked for a name-clearing hearing.
Rickert's struck affidavit stated,
I specifically requested at the November 20, 2016[,] meeting that I should have the chance to tell my side of the story. Since the meeting of November 20, 2016[,] was only with Scott Ridling, Dusty Baker and myself, it was clear that the meeting was not a public forum where I had any chance of clearing my name.While this shows Rickert asked that Ridling and Baker hear his side of the story, this did not show that Rickert asked for a public name-clearing hearing.
As a result, the trial court granted the City's summary judgment motion in its entirety, rendered a take-nothing judgment against Rickert on November 4, 2019, and dismissed his Section 1983 claim against the City with prejudice. On November 11, the City filed a motion for attorney fees, which was granted after the trial court concluded that Rickert's claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, and brought in bad faith." Rickert does not appeal the trial court's summary judgment.
II. The Attorney Fee Award Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
"Under federal law, a court has discretion to 'allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee' in a civil rights lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." James v. City of Boise, Idaho, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686 (2016) (per curiam) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Attorney fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are "review[ed] for an abuse of discretion." Myers v. City of W. Monroe, 211 F.3d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 2000).
"[T]he award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff is an award against a violator of the law and in favor of the individual chosen by Congress to vindicate an important policy; an award of fees to a prevailing defendant does not prevent those considerations." Id. at 292 n.1 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (per curiam)). For that reason, attorney fees may be awarded to a prevailing defendant only when a court finds that "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (per curiam) (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421); see Myers, 211 F.3d at 292; Walker v. City of Bogalusa, 168 F.3d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 1999). "This limitation attempts to prevent any chilling effect on the enforcement of civil rights" and "ensure[s] that plaintiffs with uncertain but arguably meritorious claims are not altogether deterred from initiating litigation by the threat of incurring onerous legal fees should their claims fail." Myers, 211 F.3d at 292 n.1 (quoting Aller v. New York Bd. of Elections, 586 F.Supp. 603, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
"We review frivolity by asking whether the case was so lacking in merit that it was groundless, rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful." United States v. Mississippi, 921 F.2d 604, 609 (5th Cir. 1991). "The factors important to frivolity determinations are (1) whether plaintiff established a prima facie case, (2) whether the defendant offered to settle, and (3) whether the district court dismissed the case or held a full-blown trial." Id. As stated in Christiansburg,
In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. . . . [N]o matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. . . . Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978).
As a result, the dismissal of claims, disposition of procedural or evidentiary rulings, or other interlocutory rulings affecting only the extent of discovery, without more, are insufficient to support a finding of frivolity. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 759 (1980) (per curiam); Myers, 211 F.3d at 293 (citing Hidden Oaks, Ltd. v. City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1053 (5th Cir. 1998)). "Frivolity determinations are done on a case-by-case basis." Blanchard-Daigle v. Geers, 802 F. App'x 113, 121 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 440 F. App'x 421, 425 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)). "[T]he fact that a claim may be 'legally insufficient to require a trial [does] not, for that reason alone, [make the claim] "groundless" or "without foundation."'" Id. (quoting Doe, 440 F. App'x at 425).
Citing to this law compiled in the above-referenced cases, Rickert argues that the trial court's summary judgment was a procedural disposition that would not support the trial court's finding of frivolity. Yet, an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party will generally be affirmed "when the plaintiff's claims lack 'a basis in fact or rel[y] on an undisputably meritless legal theory.'" Id. (quoting Doe, 440 F. App'x at 425). Thus, where there is no evidence offered by the plaintiff to show that the defendant violated any of the plaintiff's rights, an award of attorney fees to the defendant is not an abuse of discretion. See Myers, 211 F.3d at 293.
Here, the trial court found that Rickert could not make a prima facie case. The trial court's no-evidence summary judgment ruling, which is unchallenged on appeal, found that Rickert introduced (1) no evidence that he requested a public name-clearing hearing, (2) no evidence that the City denied a request for a name-clearing hearing, and (3) no evidence that he was not provided with notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to his discharge. As a result of the trial court's first two findings, nothing showed that Rickert's Section 1983 claim against the City, which was based on a denial of a public name-clearing hearing, had any merit.
Because Rickert did not establish a prima face case, nothing shows that the City offered to settle, and the grant of the no-evidence motion for summary judgment resulted in dismissal of the Section 1983 claim against the City, we cannot say that the trial court's finding of frivolity and its award of attorney fees to the City amounted to an abuse of discretion. As a result, we overrule Rickert's sole point of error.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Ralph K. Burgess
Justice Date Submitted: July 29, 2020
Date Decided: July 30, 2020