Opinion
Record No. 2248-92-2
August 3, 1993
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
(R. Ferrell Newman; Thompson, Smithers, Newman Wade, on brief), for appellants.
No brief for appellee.
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Richfood, Inc. appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission awarding Henry Stafford compensation benefits. Richfood contends that the commission erred in finding that Stafford sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Upon reviewing the record and opening brief, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.
Stafford was employed by Richfood as a water plant operator. On February 19, 1992, he was hanging conduit in a freezer where the temperature was twenty degrees below zero. While hanging conduit, Stafford was required to stand in a forklift basket between one to six feet away from the front of an air blower. He was exposed to a strong constant flow of air producing temperatures of forty degrees below zero.
After ten minutes of standing in this position, Stafford's head began to hurt. On his third attempt to place a screw into another device, he felt like his head was going to "split open." His co-worker testified that Stafford became pale, began to sweat, and then requested to come down. Stafford had been working in front of the blower for a total of twenty minutes. After he was assisted out of the freezer, he began to feel nauseous and had dry heaves. He felt groggy, became disoriented, and was required to leave work about one half hour later.
That evening, Stafford went to the emergency room of a hospital where he was diagnosed as suffering from vascular headaches. A month later, neurologist Thomas A. Smith stated that Stafford sustained a cold-induced vascular or migraine headache syndrome.
Richfood contends that Stafford failed to prove he sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment because there is no evidence in the record from which to determine whether Stafford's illness developed suddenly or gradually developed as a result of his work in the frozen food section, becoming painful only on the day he went to the hospital. Richfood further asserts that an injury incurred over a twenty minute period is too long to constitute an injury by accident.
"In order to carry his burden of proving an 'injury by accident,' a claimant must prove that the cause of his injury was an identifiable incident or sudden precipitating event and that it resulted in an obvious sudden mechanical or structural change in the body." Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 589, 385 S.E.2d 858, 865 (1989) (emphasis in original, citations omitted). Factual findings by the commission are conclusive and binding on appeal where credible evidence exists to support the findings. Classic Floors, Inc. v. Guy, 9 Va. App. 90, 95, 383 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1989).
The commission found that Stafford's injury occurred on April 2, 1991, and further found:
The claimant's injury in the case at bar was not one which has occurred from a series of events but is due to the particular piece of work which he was performing for the employer at the time. Certainly, the claimant was exposed to hazards to a degree beyond that of the public at large. We believe the vascular change that occurred resulting in the headaches is sufficient to establish a structural change in the claimant's body occurring rather suddenly while performing the work.
Stafford's testimony provides sufficient credible evidence to support the commission's decision that he suffered a sudden mechanical change in his body consisting of a vascular contraction which was manifested by a sudden and severe headache and that the injury occurred as the result of an identifiable incident, the screwing in of the device in front of the cold air blower. It is clear from the record that Stafford's exposure to the extreme cold caused by the blower occurred over a sufficiently short and discrete period of time sufficient to meet the requirement that the event be bounded by rigid temporal precision. Morris, 238 Va. at 589, 385 S.E.2d at 865. See also Byrd v. Stonega Coke Coal Co., 182 Va. 212, 28 S.E.2d 725 (1973).
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.