Opinion
23-CV-113-DC-RCG
05-22-2024
LONNIE RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. KWES TELEVISION, LLC, and TEGNA, INC., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
RONALD C. GRIFFIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants KWES Television, LLC and Tegna, Inc.'s Amended Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 8). This case is before the Court through a Standing Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. After due consideration, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants KWES Television, LLC and Tegna, Inc.'s Amended Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (Doc. 8).
All page number citations are to CM/ECF generated pagination unless otherwise noted.
I. Background
On July 18, 2023, Plaintiff Lonnie Richardson (“Plaintiff”) filed his Complaint against KWES Television, LLC (“KWES”) and Tegna, Inc. (individually, “Tegna”; together with KWES, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff asserts two causes of action: (1) religious discrimination; and (2) retaliation, each under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Doc. 1 at 4-6).
Tegna, Inc. owns and operates KWES Television, LLC. (Doc. 1 at 3).
Plaintiff's case stems from his attempt to obtain a religious accommodation from receiving a COVID-19 vaccine in 2021. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff began working for KWES in 2019. Id. at 3. At the time of his termination, he worked in KWES's Marketing and Production Department. Id. On September 13, 2021, KWES amended its policy “to require all employees to be vaccinated for COVID-19 on or before November 12, 2021, or obtain an approved exemption as an accommodation.” Id. Tegna Human Resources reached out via email on September 16, 2021, inquiring why KWES had not received Plaintiff's vaccination card. (Doc. 1 at 3). Plaintiff responded, “he was waiting for KWES to send him information about exemptions for religious reasons.” Id.
Plaintiff attaches a copy of KWES's policy to his Complaint. (See Doc. 1-2).
Plaintiff received an “Accommodation Request from Vaccination - Religious Exemption form” on October 17, 2021. Id. He submitted his completed form that same day. Id. Plaintiff asserts he “explained that because all COVID-19 vaccines use cell lines from aborted fetuses in early development or production, getting the vaccine violated his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff received notification on November 5, 2021, that his religious exemption request was denied. (Doc. 1 at 4). On November 11, 2021, Plaintiff received a termination email from Tegna Human Resources stating his termination would be effective on close of business on November 12, 2021. Id.; (Doc. 1-4). Plaintiff further alleges Defendants did not engage in “any meaningful interactive process,” nor did they attempt to determine whether they could accommodate Plaintiff's religious observance and practice. (Doc. 1 at 4). Finally, Plaintiff alleges he “did not receive any explanation or reason why his request for accommodation was denied.” Id.
Plaintiff attaches a copy of his completed Accommodation Request from Vaccination - Religious Exemption form to his Complaint. (See Doc. 1-3).
Plaintiff attaches a copy of his termination email to his Complaint. (See Doc. 1-4).
Plaintiff provides that he filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and received his Right to Sue Notification on April 21, 2023. Id. at 2; (Doc. 1-1).
Plaintiff attaches a copy of the EEOC's Determination and Notice of Rights to his Complaint. (See Doc. 1-1).
On September 19, 2023, Defendants filed the instant Amended Motion to Dismiss arguing Plaintiff fails to state a claim regarding his Title VII religious discrimination and retaliation claims (Doc. 8). Plaintiff filed his Response in Opposition on October 3, 2023, and Defendants filed their Reply on October 10, 2023. (Docs. 10, 11). Thus, the instant Motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
II. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must “accept the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Thus, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint need not include detailed facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. However, a plaintiff must do more than recite the formulaic elements of a cause of action. See id. at 556-57. Additionally, the Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation in the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, although all reasonable inferences will be resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff must plead “specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.” Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
III. Discussion
A. Plaintiff's Title VII Religious Discrimination Claim
The Court begins with Plaintiff's religious discrimination claim under Title VII for failure to accommodate. (See Doc. 1 at 4-5). Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of his religion. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1). “An employer has the statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodations for the religious observances of its employees, but is not required to incur undue hardship.” Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir.2000)).
To state a prima facie claim of religious discrimination for failure to accommodate under Title VII, Plaintiff must plead (1) “she held a bona fide religious belief”; (2) “her belief conflicted with a requirement of her employment”; (3) “her employer was informed of her belief”; and (4) “she suffered an adverse employment action for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” Davis, 765 F.3d at 485 (citing Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2013)).
Defendants argue dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiff “failed to adequately allege that he held a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with KWES's vaccination policy.” (Doc. 8 at 3). In advancing this argument Defendants assert Plaintiff “has not alleged any facts to establish that his opposition to the Station's mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy was based on a bona fide religious belief.” Id. at 4. In fact, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to “even identify the specific nature of the religious beliefs on which his objection to receiving a COVID-19 vaccination is based.” Id. Further, Defendants point out that in his Accommodation Request from Vaccination - Religious Exemption form, Plaintiff only stated, “[a]ll COVID-19 vaccines use cell lines from aborted fetuses in early development or production.” Id. (quoting Doc. 1-3).
Plaintiff counters by citing Liner v. Terminix Pest Control, where a district court in the Eastern District of Louisiana allowed a similar claim to survive. (Doc. 10 at 3-4). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts he adequately pleaded his prima facie case for religious discrimination. Id. at 4.
“Bona fide religious beliefs include ‘moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.' ” Davis, 765 F.3d at 485 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1). “A court's inquiry is limited to focusing upon the individual's motivation.” Id. “Specifically, a court's task is to decide ‘whether [the individual's beliefs] are, in his own scheme of things, religious.' ” Id. (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (emphasis added)). “In this regard, a belief is ‘religious' if it is ‘[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by . . . God.' ” Id. (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176). “Though the sincerity inquiry is important, it must be handled with a light touch, or ‘judicial shyness.' ” Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dept. of Crim. Just., 703 F.3d 781, 792 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 262 (5th Cir. 2010)).
However, the Court need not delve into the sincerity or reasonableness of Plaintiff's belief here-because it cannot-Plaintiff has pled no facts as to his religious beliefs in his Complaint. (See Doc. 1). The Court is left to conclude that Plaintiff's Complaint, as presently pled, fails to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim of religious discrimination. Plaintiff at most pleads that he desired a religious accommodation from KWES's vaccination policy, but never pleads that he held a religious belief, nor does he describe what the religious belief is. “To plead a religious belief such that the Court can remedy its violation, ‘a plaintiff must allege some facts regarding the nature of her belief system, as well as facts connecting her objection to that belief system.' ” Arzamendi v. Austin, No. 4:23-cv-0770-P, 2024 WL 1641962, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2024) (quoting Caspersen v. W. Union, LLC, 2023 WL 6602123, at *7 (D. Colo. Oct. 10, 2023)); compare Troulliet v. Gray Media Grp, Inc., NO. 22-5256, 2023 WL 2894707, at *5 (E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2023) (“The Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint, as presently plead, fails to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for religious discrimination. She has failed to allege with any particularity that she held a bona fide religious belief, much less one that conflicted with a requirement of her employment.”), and Reichert v. Infusion Partners, L.L.C., No. 22-5450, 2023 WL 4685377, at *4 (E.D. La. July 21, 2023) (“This Court cannot begin the inquiry into religious discrimination because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts regarding the essential element of her claim: her sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiff summarily states that the COVID-19 vaccine violated her religious beliefs, but her Complaint is lacking any allegations as to what those beliefs are. She does not explain what her religious beliefs are, nor why her religious beliefs conflict with Defendants' policy.”) (internal citation omitted), with McNeill v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 2:23-CV-041-Z, 2023 WL 8532408, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2023) (finding the plaintiff adequately pled a sincere religious belief where his complaint alleged “he experienced a religious conversion more than thirteen years ago in which he formed the belief that his ‘God given blood is the only immune system [he] or [his] children need,' and accordingly believes taking any vaccine is ‘against my faith, my God.' ” (quoting Doc. 27 at 16)).
The Court notes Plaintiff's citation to Liner is unpersuasive, as the defendant in that case argued the plaintiff “fails to state a claim under Title VII because he did not allege a factual connection between his sincerely held belief and his termination,” whereas here the question is whether Plaintiff sufficiently pled a bona fide religious belief. Liner, 2023 WL 3275823, at *4.
Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's religious discrimination claim for failure to accommodate be GRANTED and this cause of action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (Doc. 8).
B. Plaintiff's Title VII Retaliation Claim
Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim. (Doc. 8 at 5-6). “A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: (1) they engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) there was a causal connection between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment decision.” Smith v. McDonough, SA-22-CV-01383-JKP, 2023 WL 5918322, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2023) (quoting LeMaire v. La. Bd. of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2007)).
Defendants' argument for dismissal is premised on their assertion that “Plaintiff's retaliation claim is predicated solely on the denial of his request for religious accommodation,” and this fails as a matter of law because “the denial of a requested accommodation does not and cannot by itself form the basis for a retaliation claim.” (Doc. 8 at 5) (citing Adinolfi v. N. Carolina Dep't of Just., No. 5:18-CV-539-FL, 2022 WL 956330, at 14 n.4 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 25, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-1329, 2023 WL 1814206 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 2023) (per curiam); Sacks v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cnty., No. CV RDB-21-968, 2021 WL 5233752, at * 6 (D. Md. Nov. 9, 2021); Dockery v. Maryville Acad., 379 F.Supp.3d 704, 722 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Leigh v. Artis-Naples, Inc., No. 2:22-CV-606-JLB-NPM, 2022 WL 18027780, at * 13 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2022)).
In contrast, Plaintiff argues his retaliation claim “does not hinge on Defendant's refusal to accommodate Plaintiff. Plaintiff's retaliation claim turns on Defendant's termination of Plaintiff.” (Doc. 10 at 4).
An employee has engaged in activity protected by Title VII if he either (1) “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII, or (2) “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. EEOC v. U.S. Steel Tubular Prods, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-02747, 2016 WL 11795815, at *16 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). “The former is known as the ‘opposition clause,' and the latter as the ‘participation clause.' ” Id. (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 274 (2009)).
Despite Defendants' contentions, the Court finds the first element of Plaintiff's prima facie case is satisfied. Although the Eighth Circuit has ruled that an employee's request for accommodation alone does not constitute “oppositional conduct” for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim, the Fifth Circuit has not. See EEOC v. N. Mem'l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2019). However, two district courts within the Fifth Circuit (one of them post-N. Mem'l Health Care) have held that a request for religious accommodation constitutes protected activity for the purpose of pleading a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation. See U.S. Steel Tubular, 2016 WL 11795815, at *16 (“In this case, it is undisputed that [the plaintiff] refused to provide a hair sample from his scalp for the drug test on the basis of his religious beliefs and, sometime afterwards, requested a religious accommodation. Consequently, the Court finds that [the plaintiff] engaged in protected activity. Plaintiff has satisfied the first element of its prima facie case.”); McNeill, 2023 WL 8532408, at *5 (“[R]equesting religious accommodation is protected activity,' as is opposing an allegedly unlawful denial of a religious accommodation.” (quoting EEOC, Compliance Manual Section 12: Religious Discrimination § 12-V.B (2021)); see also Dorantes v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 2003 WL 21474255, at *4 (“Opposition conduct may also include threatening to file a charge or other formal complaint, complaining to anyone about discrimination, refusing to obey an order because of a reasonable belief that it is discriminatory, and requesting reasonable accommodation or religious accommodation.” (citation omitted)).
Therefore, as the relevant case law stands today, and for purposes of pleading, the Court finds that Plaintiff's accommodation request may constitute protected activity to satisfy the first element of his prima facie Title VII retaliation claim against Defendants. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim be DENIED. (Doc. 8).
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (Doc. 8). Specifically, the Court RECOMMENDS:
• Plaintiff's Title VII religious discrimination claim be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to allow him to amend his Complaint within 14 days of an Order adopting this Report and Recommendation (should it be adopted) to allege he held a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with KWES's vaccine policy.
• Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be DENIED as to Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim.
Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Appeal/Object
In the event that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report and Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to this report must serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which objections are being made; the District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Such party shall file the objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the objections on all other parties. A party's failure to file such objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge. Additionally, a party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Judge. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996). (Dkt. #350). Moreover, the government intends to present testimony from other witnesses and documentary evidence to corroborate the formulas it instructed Petron to apply. Id.