Opinion
CASE NO. 590-CRD-1-87
FEBRUARY 23, 1989
The claimant was represented by Leo B. Flaherty, Esq., Flaherty, Merster Courtney.
The respondents were represented by Ralph Russo, Esq., Montstream May.
This Petition for Review from the April 16, 1987 Finding and Award of the Commissioner At Large acting for the First District was heard August 19, 1988 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Andrew Denuzze A. Thomas White, Jr.
OPINION
Respondents seek to reverse the April 16, 1987 Finding and Award by the Commissioner at Large acting for the First District. They attack the ruling (#8) which orders them to execute a Voluntary Agreement signed by the Claimant April 29, 1986 and to pay the benefits listed in that unexecuted agreement. Claimant asks that the appeal be dismissed on grounds that the Respondents' brief was filed late.
The respondents' Reasons of Appeal additionally assigned the trial Commissioner's ruling denying its Motion to Correct as error. However, as the respondents have failed to address this issue in its brief filed July 14, 1988, we deem the issue as abandoned, Muha v. United Oil Co., 180 Conn. 720 (1980).
First, we consider claimant's argument. It is a matter of discretion whether to dismiss for such late filing, Maykut v. Plasko, 170 Conn. 310 (1976), Loomis v. Zoning Commission, 144 Conn. 743 (1957). Respondents' brief was filed July 14, 1988, 17 days late. However, oral argument was not until August 19. We do not ordinarily countenance failures to comply with briefing deadlines set by the C.R.D. However, claimant had sufficient time between the brief filing and oral 'argument, thirty-six days, to prepare oral argument and any responsive pleading. Therefore, we choose not to grant appellees' motion in this instance.
With respect to the employer's appeal, Sec. 31-296, C.G.S. clearly contemplates that a Voluntary Agreement is a consensual undertaking requiring the approval of both parties before it becomes the type of document described in the statute. Such agreements under Connecticut law are in the nature of contracts. Without the consent of both participants, no contract can exist. The trial Commissioner nonetheless treated the unsigned form as a de facto contract. Chapter 568 contains no provision empowering a Commissioner to force a party to consent to a contract. As the statute grants no such authority to the Commissioner, we must sustain the appeal.
Sec. 31-296 provides in part: "If an employer and an injured employee, or in case of fatal injury his legal representative or dependent, at a date not earlier than the expiration of the waiting period, reach an agreement in regard to compensation, such agreement shall be submitted in writing to the commissioner by the employer with a statement of the time, place and nature of the injury upon which it is based; and, if such commissioner finds such agreement to conform to the provisions of this chapter in every regard, he shall so approve it. A copy of the agreement, with a statement of the commissioner's approval thereof, shall be delivered to each of the parties and thereafter it shall be as binding upon both parties as an award by the commissioner."
However, that is not to prohibit the Commissioner who heard evidence in the matter from entering another Finding and Award. Such Finding and Award, if the evidence already presented is sufficient, may very well order the Respondents to pay the same benefits as previously ordered. We simply hold that the Commissioner may not obligate a party to carry out a contract to which it has not consented, but he may obligate such a party to pay benefits according to an award issued pursuant to his statutory authority.
The appeal is sustained and the matter is remanded to the First District for further proceedings, including further evidential hearings if necessary.
Commissioners Andrew Denuzze and A. Thomas White, Jr. concur.