Opinion
Civil Action 22-376
06-01-2022
KEITH RICHARDSON, Petitioner, v. ORLANDO HARPER, Warden, ADAM SMITH, Deputy Warden, and RICH FITZGERALD, County Executive, Respondents.
Marilyn J. Horan, District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Lisa Pupo Lenihan, United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 11) filed by Petitioner Keith Richardson (“Petitioner”) be summarily dismissed because the claims for relief that Petitioner asserts in it are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.
The Court has a pre-service duty to screen and dismiss a habeas petition when it plainly appears that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (which also applies to habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 cases).
II. REPORT
A. Background
Petitioner is an inmate housed in the Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”). He initiated this habeas case by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In his Petition, Petitioner claims that Respondents have “engaged in a custom, practice, and policy of disregarding the mandates” of Referendum 205, which was voted into local law by the residents of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania in the May 2021 election. (ECF No. 11, ¶¶ 13-14.) According to Petitioner, Referendum 205 bans the use of solitary confinement, as well as the use of restraint chairs, chemical agents and leg shackles. Id., ¶ 12. Petitioner states that Allegheny County, the County Executive and the County Commissioners were “afforded six (6) months [until December 6, 2021] to implement Referendum 205 at the ACJ” but they continue to lock inmates in their cells “for time periods of 22 to 24 hours per day.” Id., ¶¶ 13-14. As an example, Petitioner states that inmates housed on Unit 3-D do not receive more than one-and-a-half hours of out of cell time per day. Id., ¶ 15. Petitioner seeks an order directing the Respondents to “immediately cease and desist from all correctional practices which do not comply with local, state, or federal laws, specifically Referendum 205.” Id., ¶ 18.
Petitioner is one of several ACJ inmates who recently filed the same or similar petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Smith v. Harper, et al., No. 2:22-cv-235 (W.D. Pa.); Moss v. Harper, et al., No. 2:22-cv-290 (W.D. Pa.); Benton v. Harper, et al., No. 2:22-cv-352 (W.D. Pa.); Ellis v .Harper, et al., No. 2:22-cv-369 (W.D. Pa.); Averytt v. Harper, et al., No. 2:22-cv-443 (W.D. Pa.).
Pursuant to the Referendum, this means confinement in a cell or other living space for more than 20 hours a day.
B. Discussion
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the legal authority under which a prisoner is held in custody. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (noting that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”) Petitioner does not state whether he is being held at the ACJ as a pretrial detainee or under a state court judgment of sentence. The federal habeas statute 28 U.S.C. § 2254 applies to persons who are “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662 (1996); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2001). This statute permits a federal court to entertain an application for habeas corpus relief from a state prisoner “only on the ground that he or she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). In contrast, when an individual is in state or local custody for reasons other than a judgment of a state court, such as in pretrial detention, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 441-43 (3d Cir. 1975); Duran v. Thomas, 393 Fed.Appx. 3 (3d Cir. 2010). Section 2241 provides in relevant part: “The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added).
There are important differences between § 2241 and § 2254 cases, but those differences are not relevant to this case. It has long been the rule in the Third Circuit that a state or local prisoner cannot challenge the conditions of his or her confinement in a habeas action and thus Petitioner's claims for habeas relief are not cognizable under either § 2241 or § 2254. See, e.g., Williams v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 459 Fed.Appx. 87, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002)); Lopez v. Wetzel, No. 12-cv-96, 2012 WL 345215, at *4-5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2012). See also Brian R. Means, Federal Habeas Manual § 1.35 Westlaw (database updated May 2021).
For example, a prisoner in a habeas action under § 2241 is not subject to the amendments the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) made applicable to habeas actions filed under § 2254, including the one-year limitations at § 2244(d)(1), the deferential review standards at § 2254(d)(1) and (2), and the limitation on second or successive petitions at § 2244(b)(2).
In support of his argument that he can litigate his claims in a habeas petition, Petitioner relies on the Third Circuit's June 2020 decision in Hope v. Warden York County Prison, 972 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2020). The Court of Appeals decided Hope in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, when courts were first confronted with the question of whether an individual's detention could be found to be unconstitutional solely due to the threat posed by the virus in the prison setting. In Hope, the Court of Appeals held that federal immigration detainees could challenge their conditions of confinement as they relate to COVID-19 in a habeas petition under § 2241. Id. at 323-25.
Petitioner's reliance on Hope is misplaced. The immigration detainees who were the petitioners in that case were unequivocal that they sought outright release, and not merely a modification of their conditions of confinement, which is what Petitioner seeks in this case. See Id. at 323. Moreover, Petitioner has not directed this Court to any controlling authority that has extended the holding in Hope (1) to state or local prisoners, who are able to challenge the conditions of their confinement in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or (2) to circumstances other than those implicated by the extraordinary circumstances brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. See also Hope, 972 F.3d at 324 (“Although the context of the vast majority of habeas cases involve challenges to criminal judgments, the language of the habeas statute justifies resort to the writ by non-prisoner detainees.”) (emphasis added); Id. at 324-25 (“Given the extraordinary circumstances that existed in March 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic, we are satisfied that [the petitioners'] § 2241 claim seeking only release on the basis that unconstitutional confinement conditions require it is not improper.”) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Arrington v. Commonwealth, No. 2:21-cv-1282, 2022 WL 317147, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan 13, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 314675 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2022) (“If Petitioner wants to pursue claims regarding the alleged mold at the Beaver County Jail, the mental health care he receives there, or whether the jail follows applicable local, state or federal guidelines or its grievance procedures, he may only do so in a separate civil rights case filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Rodriguez v. Clark, No. 1:21-cv-34, 2021 WL 2187921, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2187075 (W.D. Pa. May 28, 2021) (the petitioner “is seeking damages and injunctive relief in connection with two discrete challenges to the conditions of his confinement. Such claims are not cognizable in a habeas corpus action and must be dismissed.”).
Finally, while Petitioner points out that the Referendum provides that a person held in solitary confinement in violation of the law may bring a habeas petition to end the confinement, Petitioner is advised that it is likely that the Referendum is referring to a state habeas corpus action. The Pennsylvania habeas corpus statute provides: “Any judge of a court of record may issue the writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of detention of any person or for any other lawful purpose.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 6502(a). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “habeas corpus is available to secure relief from conditions constituting cruel and unusual punishment, even though the detention itself is legal.” Com. ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 280 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1971). See also Com. ex rel. Fortune v. Dragovich, 792 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Pa. 2002) (“[T]he writ may be used only to extricate a petitioner from illegal confinement or to secure relief from conditions of confinement that constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”) Accordingly, Petitioner may be better served bringing his claim in a habeas corpus petition filed in the Pennsylvania state court.
Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court summarily dismiss the Petition. The dismissal should be without prejudice to Petitioner's ability to assert his claims in a properly supported § 1983 action if he so chooses, or in a state habeas action.
C. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). See also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, Petitioner failed to allege the denial of a constitutional right that would entitle him to habeas relief, let alone demonstrate a substantial showing of the denial of such a right. Accordingly, the Court should not grant him a certificate of appealability on his claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 11) filed by Petitioner Keith Richardson (“Petitioner”) be summarily dismissed because the claims for relief that Petitioner asserts in it are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Petitioner shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Petitioner's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.