Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-5072
08-25-2021
Terry RICHARDSON, Plaintiff v. Ilya DIDOK, et al., Defendants
J. Michael Considine, Jr., J. Michael Considine Jr., PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff. Andrew Pomager, City of Philadelphia Law Department, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants Ilya Didok, Nicholas Frye, Adam Stennett, Travis Terrell, Richard K. Price.
J. Michael Considine, Jr., J. Michael Considine Jr., PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Andrew Pomager, City of Philadelphia Law Department, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants Ilya Didok, Nicholas Frye, Adam Stennett, Travis Terrell, Richard K. Price.
ORDER
NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, United States District Judge
AND NOW , this 25th day of August 2021, upon consideration of Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment , [ECF 71], Plaintiff's response in opposition thereto, [ECF 72], Defendants’ reply, [ECF 76], and Plaintiff's letter response, [ECF 77], it is hereby ORDERED that:
• Defendants’ motion is GRANTED , in part , as to Count I of Plaintiff's second amended complaint (Fourth Amendment Claim), but only to the extent the claim is based on an alleged false arrest;i
• Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to Count II of Plaintiff's second amended complaint (Retaliation Claim for Complaining of Police Misconduct) as against Defendant Nicholas Frye only ii and DENIED
as to Defendants Ilya Didok, Richard K. Price, Adam Stennett, and Travis Terrell;iii and
• Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to Count III of
Plaintiff's second amended complaint (Fourteenth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claim).iv-------- Notes: i In his second amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts various civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, premised on his alleged unlawful seizure and arrest and subsequent detention in an unsanitary detention cell. [ECF 63]. Defendants move for summary judgment on various grounds. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the case, and a dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non[-]moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Under Rule 56, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant (here, Plaintiff). Galena v. Leone , 638 F.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir. 2011). Here, Defendants move for partial summary judgment on specific claims. As to Count I, Defendants move for summary judgment "inasmuch as it raises a false arrest claim." [Def's. Br., ECF 71 at p. 1]. In response, Plaintiff concedes that "[t]here never was a false arrest claim based on what happened after police knew of the warrants. There was a claim for a stop without reasonable suspicion, a distinct claim." [Pl's. Resp., ECF 72 at p. 2]. It is undisputed that after Plaintiff was stopped, Defendants Frye and Didok learned of the existence of four outstanding warrants for Plaintiff's arrest. At that point, Defendants Frye and Didok had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Based on these facts and Plaintiff's concession, Defendants’ motion is granted as to any purported false arrest claim asserted in Count I. ii Defendants next argue that summary judgment on Plaintiff's First Amendment Retaliation Claim (Count II) is appropriate because the record is devoid of evidence of causation, and "[t]o the extent Plaintiff points to his arrest as a retaliatory act," such a claim is barred under Nieves v. Bartlett , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 204 L.Ed.2d 1 (2019), since probable cause existed for his arrest. Plaintiff disagrees and counters that evidence of causation is present, as well as disputed material facts, that render summary judgment inappropriate. To prove a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must establish: (1) that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) that he suffered a retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights; and (3) a causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action. Conard v. Pa. State Police , 902 F.3d 178, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2018). The constitutionally protected conduct must be a substantial or motivating factor in the retaliatory action. Watson v. Rozum , 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016). To assess whether the record evidence could support such a claim here, it is helpful to first identify what Plaintiff alleges as constitutionally protected conduct and retaliatory actions. At the outset, it must be noted that Plaintiff clarifies in his response that he is alleging protected conduct in the form of his complaints about the officers’ conduct and his conditions of confinement. Specifically, Plaintiff describes his protected activity as complaints (1) to Defendants Didok and Frye that they were arresting him without investigating and without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and (2) to Defendants Stennett, Terrell, and Price about their failure to either move him to another cell or clean his cell. [Pl's. Resp., ECF 72 at p. 5]. It is also useful to identify the alleged retaliatory actions corresponding to those complaints. As Plaintiff clarified in his response, he alleges that, as a result of his complaints to Defendants Didok and Frye, Defendant Didok falsely stated on a form titled "Detainee's Medical Checklist" that (1) Plaintiff had been drinking and (2) Plaintiff had refused to sign the form. Id. Plaintiff also clarified that he alleges that, as a result of his complaints to Defendants Stennett, Terrell, and Price, those three officers (1) "refused to clean up the raw feces," (2) "refused to take action to minimize the risk of an asthma attack and continued to hold [Plaintiff] under conditions that created an unreasonable risk of asthma attack and physical harm to [Plaintiff.]" Id. Thus, contrary to Defendants’ suggestions, it is evident that Plaintiff's claim does not rely on his arrest as a retaliatory act and is not barred on that basis. It is also evident from Plaintiff's own descriptions of these retaliatory actions, however, that none of them involves conduct by Defendant Frye. Because there is no evidence that Defendant Frye engaged in any retaliatory action, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted, in part, as to Count II (Retaliation) against Defendant Frye only. iii Turning to Plaintiff's retaliation claim against the other officers, Defendants’ remaining argument is that Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite causal link for his retaliation claim against each Defendant. Specifically, Defendants argue that there is no evidence that Plaintiff's complaints to Defendants Stennett, Terrell, and Price "motivated the decision to" engage in the alleged acts and omissions regarding the conditions of his cell. [Def's. Br., ECF 72 at p. 7–8]. In response, Plaintiff contends that the timing of the retaliatory acts and/or omissions is "unusually suggestive" of retaliatory motive, as they "occurred within minutes or hours of [Plaintiff's] complaints[.]" [Pl's. Resp., ECF 71 at p. 5]. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that "[t]emporal proximity alone suffices only when it is ‘unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive.’ " Simoni v. Diamond , 835 F. App'x 660, 663 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co. , 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) ). Here, the parties dispute whether the timing of a few minutes or hours is "unusually suggestive." Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury could find the timing to be "unusually suggestive." Thus, timing alone could be sufficient to support a finding of causation. Defendants also argue that "it is illogical to speculate that the failure to respond to a complaint is in fact retaliation for the making of that very complaint[.]" [Def. Br., ECF 72 at p. 8]. However, what Defendants fail to acknowledge is that failure to respond to subsequent complaints could be retaliation for the making of an initial complaint. Because Plaintiff identified facts in the record that, if believed, could establish a causal link between his complaints to Defendants Stennett, Terrell, and Price and their alleged retaliatory conduct, Defendants’ motion is denied as to Count II against those three Defendants. Plaintiff makes the same temporal proximity argument regarding his retaliation claim against Defendant Didok. For the same reasons, this Court finds that Plaintiff has identified facts in the record that could establish the required causal link between his complaints to Defendant Didok and Defendant Didok's alleged retaliatory conduct. Further, the parties dispute whether Defendant Didok's alleged retaliatory actions were "sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness" from exercising his or her constitutional rights. Accordingly, in light of these genuine disputes of material fact, Defendants’ motion is denied as to Count II against Defendant Didok. iv At Count III, Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim for the violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, premised on the unsanitary conditions of his detention. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that he was detained in a cell which had feces on the floor in the area around the toilet. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because, inter alia , (1) there is insufficient evidence to establish a constitutional deprivation, and (2) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement that "amount to punishment." Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). However, the "Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons." Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). "There is ... a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned." Robinson v. Danberg , 673 F. App'x 205, 212–13 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Bell , 441 U.S. at 539 n.21, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ). To determine whether conditions are punitive, a court must ask (1) whether there are any "legitimate purposes ... served by [the] conditions" and (2) "whether [the] conditions are rationally related to [those] purposes." Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. Di Buono , 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983). When analyzing a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, courts must determine whether the conditions caused the plaintiff to "endure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time , that the adverse conditions become excessive" in relation to prison purposes. Taylor v. Pennsylvania , 2018 WL 6574187, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2018) (quoting Hubbard v. Taylor , 399 F.3d 150, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2005) ) (emphasis added). "In determining whether the conditions of confinement amount to a constitutional violation, the ‘circumstances, nature, and duration’ of the conditions must be carefully considered’ but the ‘length of exposure ... is often of prime importance.’ " Martin v. Gearhart , 712 F. App'x 179, 186 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). The evidence in support of Plaintiff's pretrial conditions claim is meager at best. While Plaintiff testified to the presence of feces "around the immediate toilet area" and a "clogged up" toilet, he described the conditions as merely not meeting the level of "housekeeping" he expected. He presented no evidence, however, as to the extent of his exposure or contact with the feces. At most, Plaintiff was exposed to these conditions for eight hours. While the conditions described are certainly unpleasant, they do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. "There is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned," Bell , 441 U.S. at 539 n.21, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright , 430 U.S. 651, 674, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) ), and Plaintiff has failed to present evidence demonstrating that the conditions of his confinement passed this threshold. Cf., Martin , 712 F. App'x at 186–87 (affirming grant of summary judgment where plaintiff was exposed to feces and urine in cell for 27 ½ hours); Robinson , 673 F. App'x at 212 (affirming grant of summary judgment where plaintiff was left in cell with overflowing toilet for more than seven hours); Lewis v. Connections , 2020 WL 2332585, at *4 (D. Del. May 11, 2020) (dismissing Fourth Amendment claim where plaintiff alleged exposure to visible blood, urine, and feces in his cell for four days). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to this claim. Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim. "In considering the applicability of qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-pronged examination. First, a court must decide ‘whether the facts that a plaintiff has ... shown make out a violation of a constitutional right.’ " Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist. , 800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ). Second, "the court must determine ‘whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.’ " Id. (quoting Pearson , 555 U.S. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808 ). " ‘[C]learly established’ for purposes of qualified immunity means that ‘[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ " Wilson v. Layne , 526 U.S. 603, 614–15, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower courts "not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality." Kisela v. Hughes , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152, 200 L.Ed.2d 449 (2018) (quoting City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan , 575 U.S. 600, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015) ). While Supreme Court caselaw "does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Id. (quoting White v. Pauly , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) ). "When properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ " Spady , 800 F.3d at 637 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ). Here, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has not presented evidence sufficient to show a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights with respect to the conditions of his confinement. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim under the first prong of the analysis.