Richardson v. Dayton Public Schools

Full title: EARL RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants

Court: United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division at Dayton

Date published: Jun 8, 2010

Case No. 3:10-cv-028 (S.D. Ohio Jun. 8, 2010)

Opinion

Case No. 3:10-cv-028.

June 8, 2010

INDICATIVE RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

MICHAEL MERZ, Magistrate Judge

This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment (Doc. No. 33). Plaintiff requests relief from judgment due to his emergency hospitalization for incipient kidney failure from May 21-23, 2010, and his absence from Dayton to attend his mother in intensive care in Royal Oak, Michigan, from May 29 to June 2, 2010. In ruling on this Motion, the Court accepts without qualification Plaintiff's averments about his unavailability, the reasons therefor, and the importance of the medical emergencies involved.

Because Plaintiff has taken an appeal from the final judgment in this case, ¹ this Court is limited to deferring the motion pending appeal, denying it, or stating that it would grant the motion if the Court of Appeals remanded for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 62.1.

1 Actually Plaintiff has taken two appeals, Sixth Circuit Case Nos. 10-3680 and 10-3682. Because the second appeal is duplicative, the Sixth Circuit has dismissed it (Doc. No. 32).

Plaintiff accompanied his Motion with Objections (Doc. No. 34) to the Report and Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge recommending that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted (Doc. No. 15). The chronology of filings is important: pro se, ²

2 Between the time of the Report and Recommendations and the judgment, the parties had unanimously consented to plenary magistrate judge jurisdiction in their Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(f) Report and the case had been referred on that basis (Doc. Nos. 17, 18).

March 26, 2010 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 7) is filed. On the same day, the Court gave Plaintiff, who is proceeding notice of the date by which he was required to file a response, to wit, not later than April 19, 2010. April 16, 2010 Plaintiff files his response to the Motion (Doc. No. 11). April 23, 2010 The Magistrate Judge files the Report and Recommendations (Doc. No. 15), accompanied by a notice to Plaintiff that objections are due seventeen days later, to wit, by May 10, 2010. May 3, 2010 Plaintiff files what he styles as Objections (Doc. No. 20). May 4, 2010 The Court overrules Plaintiff's Objections (Doc. No. 21). May 11, 2010 Having received no other objections by the due date of May 10, 2010, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendations and dismisses the case (Doc. Nos. 23 24). May 21, 2010 Plaintiff is hospitalized. Thus Plaintiff became ill and unable to file papers ten days after the last date on which he could have filed objections. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide only one opportunity to file objections to a report and recommendations as a matter of right, and Plaintiff never sought leave to file additional objections after his first set was denied on May 4, 2010.

Plaintiff accuses the Magistrate Judge of rushing to judgment "with the intent to obstruct due process procedures and halt the alternative dispute resolution process." The due process to which a litigant in federal court is entitled is the process prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Plaintiff fails to point out any place where those Rules have not been scrupulously followed in this case. As for any "alternative dispute resolution process," the Court was entirely and completely unadvised that any such process was ongoing until the Plaintiff filed the instant Motion on June 7, 2010. In their Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(f) Report, the parties advised the Court they would "evaluate ADR after discovery has taken place." (Doc. No. 17, ¶ 9, PageID 87); the discovery cut-off as recommended by the parties and adopted by the Court was April 30, 2011.

Plaintiff accuses the Magistrate Judge of failing to consider numerous provisions of law. He principally claims he does not have to exhaust administrative remedies under the Americans with Disabilities Act because he is proceeding under Title II rather than Title I. In the Report and Recommendations, the Magistrate Judge relies on Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997), controlling Sixth Circuit precedent which holds that "the statutory framework of the ADA expressly limits discrimination in employment practices to Title I of the ADA. . . ." (R R, Doc. No. 15, PageID 73). Nothing in the late Objections suggests the Report and Recommendations is wrong on the merits of any of the claims on which it recommended dismissal.

In his Second Issue branch of the renewed Objections, Plaintiff complains that he was not allowed to amend his Complaint. Most of what he writes in this portion is directed to the Ohio Workers Compensation law, but there is no workers compensation claim in this case against Dayton Public Schools.

In his Fourth Issue³, Plaintiff claims that somehow Defendants fall within the FELA. That is simply not so and does not speak to the Court's ruling that Plaintiff's actual breach of contract claim against Dayton Public Schools is a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 185 and barred by the statute of limitations.

3 The renewed Objections contain no "Third Issue" labeled as such.

In his Fifth Issue, Plaintiff complains that his own motion for summary judgment for failure to defend was not granted (Renewed Objections, Doc. No. 34, PageID 167). Actually, Plaintiff never filed a document entitled motion for summary judgment, but himself objected that Defendants had untimely answered the Complaint. This objection is thoroughly dealt with in the Decision and Order of May 4, 2010 (Doc. No. 21, PageID 101-102).

Plaintiff has not shown any error in the Court's final judgment or in the interlocutory matters of which he complains. The Motion for Relief from Judgment is DENIED.