Opinion
NO. 2015-CA-001392-MR
06-29-2018
BARBAROSIA WILLIAMS RICHARDSON; WILLIAM A. RICHARDSON; MARGARETTA WILLIAMS; JACQUELINE DENNY WILLIAMS; SHIRLEY WILLIAMS CARR; STEPHANIE Y. MALONE; AND GARY COMBS APPELLANTS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET AND KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Barbarosia Williams Richardson, pro se William Richardson, pro se Los Angeles, California Margaretta Williams, pro se Allen, Texas Gary Combs, pro se Garden Grove, California Stephanie Y. Malone, pro se Jacqueline Denny Williams, pro se Frisco, Texas Shirley Williams Carr, pro se Dallas, Texas BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Pam Clay-Young Lexington, Kentucky Susan Pugh Chaplin Louisville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CI-03817 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND JONES, JUDGES. JONES, JUDGE: Acting without the assistance of counsel, the Appellants—Barbarosia Williams Richardson, William A. Richardson, Margaretta Williams, Jacqueline Denny Williams, Shirley Williams Carr, Stephanie Y. Malone, and Gary Combs (collectively, "Williams' Heirs")—appeal the August 17, 2015 Opinion and Order of the Fayette Circuit Court. The underlying action was initiated by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, and Kentucky Department of Highways ("Commonwealth") to quiet title to a small piece of property known as Parcel 1215. Ultimately, the circuit court determined that the Commonwealth obtained title to Parcel 1215 by way of a quit claim deed from the prior owner. The Williams' Heirs were joined in the action before the circuit court because they claimed an interest in the property. However, the trial court ultimately concluded that the Williams' Heirs did not have standing to argue legal ownership because they did not possess a deed to the property, were not in possession of the property, and had not used Parcel 1215 for many years. Having reviewed the record in conjunction with the applicable legal authority, we affirm the circuit court's decision insomuch as it concluded that the Williams' Heirs were not the legal owners of Parcel 1215.
I. BACKGROUND
Approximately a decade ago, the Commonwealth began the process of extending Newtown Pike in Lexington, Kentucky. To mitigate the impact of the extension project on a low-income neighborhood, the Commonwealth was required to develop additional affordable housing in the area. The Commonwealth acquired three lots on De Roode Street for this purpose: 750 De Roode Street (Parcel 12), 770 De Roode Street (Parcel 15) and 810 De Roode Street (Parcel 16). The properties sit side by side. By October 2013, the Commonwealth began the process of assembling the three parcels into a single parcel so that it could begin the development phase. During this process, the Commonwealth discovered an unaccounted for area within the perimeter fencing of Parcel 12. The parties refer to this unaccounted area as "Parcel 1215". It is undisputed that Parcel 1215 is not included in the legal descriptions of the source deeds for either Parcel 12 or Parcel 15 or in any other known deed.
The Commonwealth acquired Parcel 12 from Rachel and E. Lawson King ("the Kings"). The Kings acquired Parcel 12 from the Williams' Heirs, for use by their trucking company, in January 1985. According to the Kings, even though they did not believe themselves to be the owners of Parcel 1215, they did begin using Parcel 1215 as their own by March of 1985. After purchasing Parcel 12, the Kings cleared the area, which included Parcel 1215, and put asphalt down. They also fenced in their property, including Parcel 1215, and erected concrete walls at each corner located at the front of the property. They also mowed their property, including Parcel 1215, and paid taxes on a larger area than what was described in their deed. According to the Kings, they believed they were paying taxes on the entire fenced area of their property, including Parcel 1215.
After discovering that Parcel 1215 was not included in any deeds, the Commonwealth approached both the Kings and the Williams' Heirs to obtain a quit claim deed for Parcel 1215. Although not entirely clear, the Commonwealth presumably believed that either the Williams' Heirs or the Kings were the lawful owners of the property by virtue of adverse possession. The Kings conveyed Parcel 1215, by way of quit claim deed to the Commonwealth in February 2014. The Williams' Heirs refused to execute a quit claim deed. Moreover, they asserted that they, not the Kings, were the rightful owners of Parcel 1215. The Williams' Heirs maintained that they inherited Parcel 1215 from R.B. Williams, who obtained the property through adverse possession.
In October of 2014, the Commonwealth filed an action in Fayette Circuit Court to quiet title to Parcel 1215. The Commonwealth named the Williams' Heirs as defendants. Ultimately, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of deciding who owned Parcel 1215. Following the testimony of several witnesses, the circuit court concluded that the Williams' Heirs "have no standing to argue they have legal ownership through adverse possession." The circuit court based this conclusion on the following findings of fact: 1) there was no recorded title to Parcel 1215; 2) the Williams' Heirs were not using the property adversely when the Kings acquired it in 1985; 3) and the Kings treated Parcel 1215 as their own from 1985 until 2011 when they transferred Parcel 12 to the Commonwealth. Ultimately, the circuit court ordered that the Commonwealth "acquired title to Parcel 1215 through adverse possession via quit claim deed [from the Kings] and title is now perfected . . . ."
This appeal by the Williams' Heirs followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure ("CR") 52.01 governs our review of findings of fact following a bench trial. It provides that the circuit court's findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." CR 52.01. A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence, which "means evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men." Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998). "The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are subject to independent de novo appellate determination." Gosney v. Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Ky. App. 2015).
III. ANALYSIS
The limited issue before us on appeal is whether the circuit court correctly determined that the Williams' Heirs did not have any ownership interest in Parcel 1215. It is undisputed that the Williams' Heirs never had a deed to Parcel 1215. The Williams' Heirs claimed they inherited Parcel 1215 from R.B. Williams, who obtained the property through adverse possession. According to the Williams' Heirs, R.B. Williams purchased Parcel 12 in 1938 and continuously used and treated Parcel 1215 as his own from 1938 to 1965. While this may be true, the evidence indicated that in 1985, Parcel 12 was sold to the Kings. The circuit court concluded that the Kings acquired Parcel 1215 by adverse possession. Thus, the question we must decide is whether the circuit court correctly determined that any interest the Williams' Heirs had in Parcel 1215 was extinguished by the Kings' adverse possession.
In order to establish title through adverse possession, a claimant must show possession of disputed property that is hostile, actual, open and notorious, exclusive, and continuous for a period of fifteen years. See Tartar v. Tucker, 280 S.W.2d 150, 152 (1955). The Williams' Heirs argue that the Kings cannot demonstrate all the required elements because they only used Parcel 1215 from 1985 until 1992 to 1993, less than the required 15 years.
However, the circuit court determined that the Kings' use was continuous because the Kings maintained a fence across the entire backside of the property on De Roode Street, which included Parcel 1215, until they sold the property in 2011, used Parcel 1215 to park trucks on from time to time, and mowed Parcel 1215. Having studied the record closely, we cannot find any error with the circuit court's conclusion. Several factors are relevant in determining the nature and length of use. While continuous use does not mean use every single day in the literal sense, it must be of such a nature that it "would rule out sporadic activity which would not bring home to the true owner reasonable notice of a continuing hostile claim of right." Kentucky Women's Christian Temperance Union v. Thomas, 412 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Ky. 1967). While the Kings may not have put Parcel 1215 to use every day in the literal sense, the fence they erected across the backside of the property was a continual presence on the property and a powerful reminder that they treated Parcel 1215 as their exclusive property. Id. ("Notoriety, exclusiveness and continuity of possession are often evidenced by the erection of physical improvements on the property, such as fences, houses or other structures."); see also Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., Inc., 824 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Ky. 1992).
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the circuit court's conclusion that the Kings acquired ownership of Parcel 1215 by adverse possession. The Kings' acquisition of Parcel 1215 by adverse possession extinguished any right the Williams' Heirs had in Parcel 1215.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the stated above reasons, the Fayette Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Barbarosia Williams Richardson, pro se
William Richardson, pro se
Los Angeles, California Margaretta Williams, pro se
Allen, Texas Gary Combs, pro se
Garden Grove, California Stephanie Y. Malone, pro se
Jacqueline Denny Williams, pro se
Frisco, Texas Shirley Williams Carr, pro se
Dallas, Texas BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Pam Clay-Young
Lexington, Kentucky Susan Pugh Chaplin
Louisville, Kentucky